Gal 9 F. a

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL'S PRINCE.

ALSO,
The life of *Castruccio Castracani* of *Lucca*.

AND

The meanes Duke *Valentine* us'd to put to death *Vitellozzo Vitelli*, *Oliverotto* of *Fermo*, *Paul*, and the Duke of *Gravina*.

Translated out of *Italian* into *English*;
By *E. D.*

With some Animadversions noting and taxing his errours.

LONDON,
Printed by *R. Bishop*, for *Wil: Hils*, and are to be sold by *Daniel Pakeman* at the signe of the Rainebow neare the Inner Temple gate. 1640.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

To the most noble and Illustrious, JAMES Duke of *Lenox*, Earle of *March*, Baron of *Setrington*, *Darnly*, *Terbanten*, and *Methuen*, Lord Great Chamberlaine & Admirall of *Scotland*, Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter, and one of his Majesties most honourable Privy Counsel in both kingdomes.

POysons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality, that, as destructives of Nature, they are utterly to be abhord; but we find many, nay most of them

have their medicinall uſes. This book carryes its poyſon and malice in it; yet mee thinks the judicious peruſer may honeſtly make uſe of it in the actions of his life, with advantage. The Lamprey, they ſay, hath a venemous ſtring runs all along the back of it; take that out, and it is ſerv'd in for a choyce diſh to dainty palates. Epictetus *the Philoſopher ſayes, Every thing hath two handles, as the firebrand, it may bee taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt: the other being laid hold on, will cleave to the very fleſh, and the ſmart of it will pierce even to the heart. Sin hath the condition of the firy end, the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the ſoule: nay it is worſe, one ſinne goes*

not

not alone, but hath many consequences. Your Grace may find the truth of this in your perusall of this Author: your judgement shal easily direct you in finding out the good uses of him: I have pointed at his chiefest errors with my best endeavours, and have devoted them to your Graces service: which if you shall accept and protect, I shall remaine

Your Graces

humble and

devoted

servant

EDWARD DACRES.

The Epistle to the Reader.

Questionlesse some men will blame mee for making this Authour speake in our vulgar tongue. For his maximes and tenents are condemnd of all, as pernicious to all Christian States, and hurtfull to all humane Societies. Herein I shall answer for my selfe with the Comœdian, *Placere studeo bonis quamplurimis, & minimè multos lædere*: I endeavour to give content to the most I can of those that are well disposed, and no scandall to any. I grant, I find him blam'd and condemnd: I doe no lesse my selfe. Reader, either doe thou read him with a prejudicate opinion, & out of thy own judgement tax his errors; or at least, if thou canst stoop so low, make use of my paines to helpe thee. I

will

will promise thee this reward for thy labour: if thou consider well the actions of the world, thou shalt find him much practisd by those that condemne him; who willingly would walk as theeves doe with close lanternes in the night, that they being undescried, and yet seeing all, might surprise the unwary in the dark. Surely this book will infect no man: out of the wicked treasure of a mans own wicked heart, he drawes his malice and mischiefe. From the same flower the Bee sucks hony, from whence the Spider hath his poyson. And he that means well, shall be here warnd, where the deceitfull man learnes to set his snares. A judge who hath often usd to examine theeves, becomes the more expert to sift out their tricks. If mischiefe come hereupon, blame not me, nor blame my Authour: lay the saddle on the right horse: but *Hony soit qui mal y pense*: let shame light on him that hatcht the mischiefe.

Nicholas Machiavelli, to the Magnificent *Laurence*, sonne to *Peter* of *Medicis*, health.

THey, that desire to ingratiate themselves with a Prince, commonly use to offer themselves to his view, with things of that nature, as such persons take most pleasure and delight in: whereupon wee see they are many times presented with Horses and Armes, cloth of gold, pretious stones, and such like ornaments, worthy of their greatnesse. Having then a mind to offer my selfe to your Magnificence, with some testimony of my service to you, I found nothing in my whole Inventory, that I thinke better of, or more esteeme, than the knowledge

ledge of great mens actions, which I have learned by a long experience of moderne affaires, and a continuall reading of those of the Ancients. Which, now that I have with great diligence long work it out, and throughly sifted, I commend to your Magnificence. And however I may well think this work unworthy of your view; yet such is your humanity, that I doubt not but it shall find acceptance, considering, that for my part I am not able to tender a greater gift, than to present you with the meanes, whereby in a very short time you may be able to understand all that, which I, in the space of many yeares, and with many sufferances and dangers, have made proofe and gaind the knowledge of. And this worke I have not set forth either with elegancy of discourse or stile, nor with any other ornament whereby to captivate the reader, as others use, because I would not have it gaine its esteeme from elsewhere, than from

the

he truth of the matter, and the gravity of the subject. Nor can this be thought presumption; if a man of humble and low condition venture to dilate and discourse upon the government of Princes; for even as they that with their pensills designe out countreys, get themselves into the plaines below to consider the nature of the mountaines, and other high palces above; and againe to consider the plaines below, they get up to the tops of the mountaines; in like manner to understand the nature of the people, it is fit to be a Prince, and to know well the dispositions of Princes, sutes best with the understanding of a subject. Your Magnificence then may be pleas'd, to receive this small present, with the same mind that I send it; which if you shall throughly peruse and consider, you shall perceive therein that I exceedingly wish, that you may attaine to that greatnesse, which your own Fortune, and your excellent endowments promise you: and if

your

your Magnifisence from the very point of your Highnesse shall sometime cast your eyes upon these inferiour places, you shall see how undeservedly I undergoe an extreame and continuall despight of Fortune.

THE PRINCE;

Written by
Nicholas Machiavelli,
Secretary and Citizen
of *Florence*.

CHAP. I.

How many sorts of Principalities there are, and how many wayes they are attained to.

ALl States, all Dominions that have had, or now have rule over men, have been, and are, either Republiques, or Principalities. Principalities are either herditary, whereof they of the bloud of the Lord thereof have long time

been Princes; or else they a
new; and those that are new, a
either all new, as was the Dutc
of Millan to *Francis Sforce*; or a
as members adjoyned to the her
ditary State of the Prince tha
gaines it; as the kingdome of *N*
ples is to the King of *Spain*. The
Dominions so gotten, are ac
customed either to live under
Prince, or to enjoy their liberty
and are made conquest of, eithe
with others forces, or ones owne
either by fortune, or by valour.

CHAP. II.

Of Hereditary Principalities.

I Will not here discourse of Re
publiques, because I have other
where treated of them at large
I will apply my selfe only to
Principality, and proceed, whi
I weave this web, by arguin
thereupon, how these Principal
ties can be governed and main
tained. I say then that in State
of inheritance, and accustome

o the bloud of their Princes, there
e far fewer difficulties to keep
hem, than in the new: for it suf-
ces only not to transgresse the
ourse his Ancestors took, and so
fterwards to temporize with
hose accidents that can happen;
hat if such a Prince be but of or-
inary industry, he shall alwayes
e able to maintain himselfe in
is State, unlesse by some extraor-
inary or excessive power he be
eprived thereof; and when he
ath lost it, upon the least sinister
hance that befals the usurper, he
ecovers it again. We have in *Ita-*
ly the Duke of *Ferrara* for example
hereof, who was of ability to re-
ist the *Venetians*, in the yeer 84,
nd to withstand Pope *Julius* in
e tenth for no other reason,
an because he had of old con-
nued in that rule; for the natu-
ll Prince hath fewer occasions,
d lesse heed to give offence,
hereupon of necessity he must
e more beloved; and unlesse it
e that some extravagant vices of

his bring him into hatred, it
agreeable to reason; that natur-
ly he should be well beloved b
his own subjects: and in the an
quity and continuation of t
Dominion, the remembran
and occasions of innovations a
quite extinguished: for evermo
one change leaves a kinde
breach or dent, to fasten the buil
ing of another.

Chap. III.

Of mixt Principalities.

But the difficulties consist i
the new Principality; an
first, if it be not all new, but a
member, so that it may be ter
altogether as mixt; and the v
riations thereof proceed in t
first place, from a naturall diff
culty, which we commonly fin
in all new Principalities; for m
do willingly change their Lo
beleeving to better their condit
on; and this beliefe causes the
to take armes against him th

rul

les over them, whereby they de-
ive themselves ; because they
nde after by experience, they
ave made it worse : which de-
ends upon another naturall and
dinary necessity, forcing him
wayes to offend those, whose
rince he newly becomes, as well
y his souldiers he is put to enter-
in upon them, as by many other
juries, which a new conquest
aws along with it; insuch man-
r, as thou findest all those thine
emies, whom thou hast endam-
aged in the seizing of that Prin-
cipality, and afterwards canst
keep them thy friends that
ave seated thee in it, for not be-
g able to satisfie them accord-
g to their expectations, nor put
practise strong remedies against
em, being obliged to them. For
wever one bee very well pro-
ded with strong armies, yet hath
alwayes need of the favour of
e inhabitants in the countrey,
enter thereinto. For these rea-
ns, *Lewis* the twelfth, King of

France, suddenly tooke *Mil*[illegible] and as soone lost it; and the fi[illegible] time *Lodwick* his owne forces se[illegible] ved well enough to wrest it out [illegible] his hands; for those people th[illegible] had opened him the gates, fin[illegible] ing themselves deceived of th[illegible] opinion, and of that future goo[illegible] which they had promised them[illegible] selves, could not endure the di[illegible] tastes the new Prince gave them. True it is, that countreyes th[illegible] have rebelled again the secon[illegible] time, being recovered, are hard[illegible] lost; for their Lord taking occ[illegible] sion from their rebellion, is le[illegible] respective of persons, but car[illegible] only to secure himselfe, by punish[illegible] ing delinquents, to clear all susp[illegible] cions, and to provide for himsel[illegible] where he thinks he is weakest: [illegible] that if to make *France* lose *Mi*[illegible] *lan* the first time, it was enoug[illegible] for Duke *Lodwick* to make so[illegible] small stir only upon the confine[illegible] yet afterwards, before they cou[illegible] make him lose it the second tim[illegible] they had neede of the wh[illegible]

world together against him, and that al his armies should be wasted and driven out of *Italy*; which proceeded from the forenamed causes: however though, both the first and second time it was taken from him. The generall causes of the first we have treated of; it remaines now that we see those of the second, and set down the remedies that he had, or any one else can have, that should chance to be in those tearmes he was, whereby he might be able to maintaine himselfe better in his conquest, than the King of *France* did. I say therefore, that these States which by conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their Conquerour, are either of the same Province, and the same language, or otherwise; and when they are, it is very easie to hold them, especially when they are not used to live free: and to enjoy them securely, it is enough to have extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them: For in

other matters, allowing them their ancient conditions, and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them, men ordinarily live quiet enough; as we have seene that *Burgundy* did, *Britany*, *Gascony*, and *Normandy*, which so long time continued with *France*: for however there be some difference of language betweene them, yet can they easily comport one with another; and whosoever makes the conquest of them, meaning to hold them, must have two regards; the first, that the race of their former Prince be quite extinguished; the other, that he change nothing, neither in their lawes nor taxes: so that in a very short time they become one entire body with their ancient Principality. But when any States are gaind in a Province disagreeing in language, manners, and orders, here are the difficulties, and here is there need of good fortune, and great industry to maintain them;

and it would be one of the best and liveliest remedies, for the Conquerour to goe in person and dwell there; this would make the possession hereof more secure and durable; as the Turke hath done in *Greece*, who among al the other courses taken by him for to hold that State, had he not gone thither himselfe in person to dwell, it had never beene possible for him to have kept it: for abiding there, he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings, and forthwith can remedy them; whereas, being not there present, they are heard of when they are growne to some height, and then is there no help for them. Moreover, the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither: the subjects are much satisfied, of having recourse to the Prince neere at hand, whereupon have they more reason to love him, if they meane to be good; and intending to doe otherwise, to feare him: and forrein Princes

will be well aware how they invade that State; insomuch, that making his abode there, he can very hardly lose it. Another remedy, which is also a better, is to send Colonies into one or two places, which may be as it were the keyes of that State; for it is necessary either to doe this, or to maintaine there many horse and foot. In these colonies the Prince makes no great expence, and either without his charge, or at a very small rate, he may both send and maintaine them; & gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses, to bestow them on those new inhabitants, who are but a very small part of that State; and those that he offends, remaining dispersed and poore, can never hurt him: and all the rest on one part, have no offence given them, and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet: on the other side, they are wary not to erre, for feare it befals not them, as it did those that

ere dispoyld. I conclude then, at those colonies that are not argeable, are the more trusty, yeeld lesse offence; and they that e offended, being but poor and attered, can do but little harme, I have said; for it is to be no- d, that men must either be dalli- and flatterd withall, or else be ite crusht; for they revenge emselves of small dammages; of great ones they are not le; so that when wrong is done any man, it ought so to be ne, that it need feare no returne revenge againe. But in lieu of olonies, by maintaining souldi- s there, the expence is great; for whole revenues of that State to be spent in the keeping of so the conquest proves but a sse to him that hath got it, and dammages him rather; for it rts that whole State, to remove e army from place to place, of hich annoyance, every one hath feeling, and so becomes enemie thee; as they are enemies, I wis, who

who are outraged by thee in their own houses, whensoever they are able to do thee mischief. Every way then is this guard unprofitable, as that of the colonies is profitable. Besides, he that is in a different Province, (as it is said) should make himself Head and defender of his lesse powerfull neighbours, and devise all wayes to weaken those that are more mighty therein, and take care, that upon no chance there enter not any forreiner as mighty as himselfe; for it will alwayes come to passe, that they shall be brought in by those, that are discontented, either upon ambition, or feare; as the *Etolians* brought the *Romans* into *Greece*; and they were brought into every countrey they came by the Natives; and the course of that matter is, that so soone as a powerfull Stranger enters a countrey, all those that are the lesse powerfull there, cleave to him, provoked by an envie they beare him that is more mighty than

they

they: so that, for these of the weaker sort, he may easily gaine them without any paines: for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that hee hath gotten: Hee hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths, nor their authorities, and so he shall easily be able by his own forces, and their assistances, to take down those that are mighty, and remain himselfe absolute arbitre of that countrey. And he that playes not well this part, shall quickly lose what hee hath gotten; and while hee holds it, shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations. The *Romans* in the Provinces they seiz'd on, observed well these points, sent colonies thither, entertained the weaker sort, without augmenting any thing their power, abated the forces of those that were mighty, and permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gaine too much reputation there. And I will content my self only

with

with the countrey of *Greece* for example hereof. The *Achayans* and *Etolians* were entertained by them, the *Macedons* kingdome was brought low, *Antiochus* was driven thence, nor ever did the *Achayans* or *Etolians* deserts prevaile so farre for them, that they would ever promise to enlarge their State, nor the perswasions of *Philip* induce them ever to bee his friends, without bringing him lower: nor yet could *Antiochus* his power make them ever consent that hee should hold any state in that country: for the *Romans* did in these cases that, which all judicious Princes ought to doe, who are not only to have regard unto all present mischiefes, but also to the future, and to provide for those with all industry; for by taking order for those when they are afarre off, it is easie to prevent them; but by delaying till they come neare hand to thee, the remedy comes too late: for this malignity is grown incurable, and it befals

this,

his, as the physicians say of the Hectique feaver, that in the beginning it is easily cur'd, but hardly known: but in the course of time, not having been known in the beginning, nor cured, it becomes easie to know, but hard to cure. Even so falls it out in matters of State; for by knowing it aloofe off (which is given only to a wise man to doe) the mischiefs that then spring up, are quickly helped; but when, for not having been perceived, they are sufferd to increase, so that every one sees them; there is then no cure for them: therefore the *Romans*, seeing these inconvenients afarre off, alwayes prevented them, and never sufferd them to follow, for to escape a warre; because they knew, that a warre is not undertaken, but deferrd for anothers advantage; therefore would they rather make warre with *Philip*, and *Antiochus* in *Greece*, to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in *Italy*

taly, though for that time they were able to avoyd both the one and the other, which they thought not good to doe; nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouths of the Sages of our dayes, *to enjoy the benefits of the present time*; but that rather, to take the benefit of their valour and wisdome; for time drives forward every thing, and may bring with it as well good as evill, and evill as good. But let us return to *France*, and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them: and we will speak of *Lewis*, and not of *Charles*, as of whom by reason of the long possession he held in *Italy* wee better knew the wayes hee went: and you shall see hee did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a State of different Language and conditions. King *Lewis* was brought into *Italy* by the *Venetians* ambition, who would have gotten for their

their shares half the State of *Lombardy*: I will not blame his comming, or the course hee took, because hee had a mind to begin to set a foot in *Italy*; but having not any friends in the country, all gates being barrd against him, by reason of King *Charles* his carriage there; he was constraind to joyne friendship with those hee could; and this consideration well taken, would have proved lucky to him, when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any errour. The King then having conquerd *Lombardy*, recoverd presently all that reputation, that *Charles* had lost him; *Genua* yeelded to him, the *Florentines* became friends with him; the Marquesse of *Mantua* the Duke of *Ferrara*, the *Bentivolti*, the Lady of *Furli*, the Lord of *Faenza*, *Pesaro*, *Rimino*, *Camerino*, and *Piombino*, the *Luccheses*, *Pisans*, and *Sieneses*, every one came and offered him friendship: then might the *Venetians* consider the rashnesse of the

course they had taken, who, only to get into their hands two Townes in *Lombardy*, made the King Lord of two thirds in *Italy*. Let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the King have maintained his reputation in *Italy*, if he had followed these aforenamed rules, and secured & defended those his friends; who because their number was great, and they weak and fearefull, some of the Church, and others of the *Venetians*, were alwayes forced to hold with him, and by their meanes he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest: but hee was no sooner got into *Milan*, than hee took a quite wrong course, by giving ayd to Pope *Alexander*, to seize upon *Romania*, and perceivd not that, by this resolution he weakned himself, ruining his own friends, and those that had cast themselves into his bosome, making the Church puissant, by adding to their Spirituall power,

whereby

whereby they gaind their authority, and so much temporall estate. And having once got out of the way, hee was constrained to goe on forward; insomuch as to stop *Alexanders* ambition, and that he should not become Lord of all *Tuscany*, of force he was to come into *Italy*: and this sufficed him not, to have made the Church mighty, and taken away his own friends; but for the desire hee had to get the kingdome of *Naples*, he divided it with the King of *Spain*: and where before he was the sole arbitre of *Italy*; he brought in a competitour, to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country, and all that were ill-affected to him, might have otherwhere to make their recourse: and whereas he might have left in that Kingdome some Vice-King of his owne, hee took him from thence, to place another there, that might afterward chace him thence. It is a thing indeed very naturall and ordinary, to desire

to

to be of the getting hand: and alwayes when men undertake it, if they can effect it, they shall be prais'd for't, or at least not blam'd: but when they are not able, and yet will undertake it, here lies the blame, here is the errour committed. If *France* then was able with her own power to assaile the Kingdome of *Naples*: she might well have done it; but not being able, she should not have divided it: and if the division she made of *Lombardy* with the *Venetians*, deserv'd some excuse, thereby to set one foot in *Italy*; yet this merits blame, for not being excus'd by that necessity. *Lewis* then committed these five faults; extinguish't the feebler ones, augmented the State of another that was already powerfull in *Italy*, brought thereinto a very puissant forreinner, came not thither himself to dwell there, nor planted any colonies there: which faults while he liv'd, he could not but be the worse for; yet all could not have gone so ill, had

ad he not committed the sixt, o take from the *Venetians* their tate; for if he had not enlarg'd he Churches territories, nor rought the *Spaniard* into *Italy*, had been necessary to take them ower; but having first taken hose other courses, he should neer have given way to their detruction; for while they had been trong, they would alwayes have ept the others off from venturing n the conquest of *Lombardy*. For he *Venetians* would never have iven their consents thereto, unesse they should have been made ords of it themselves; and the thers would never have taken it om *France*, to give it them: & then hey would never have dar'd to oe and set upon them both togeher. And if any one should say, hat King *Lewis* yeelded *Romaia* to *Alexander*, and the Kingome of *Naples* to *Spain*, to aoyd a warre; I answer with the easons above alleaged, that one hould never suffer any disorder

to

to follow, for avoding of a warr for that warre is not sav'd, bu put off to thy disadvantage. An if any others argue, that the Kin had given his word to the Pope to doe that exploit for him, fo dissolving of his marriage, an for giving the Cardinalls Cap t him of *Roan*, I answer with tha which hereafter I shall say, touch- ing Princes words, how the ought to bee kept. King *Lew* then lost *Lombardy*, for not ha- ving observ'd some of those terme which others us'd, who have pos- sessed themselves of countries, an desir'd to keep them. Nor is thi any strange thing, but very ordi- nary and reasonable: and to thi purpose I spake at *Nantes* wit that French Cardinall, when *Valentine* (for so ordinarily wa *Cæsar Borgia* Pope *Alexander* sonne call'd) made himselfe ma- ster of *Romania*; for when th Cardinall said to mee, that the *I- talians* understood not the feat of warre, I answered, the *French-*

[...]es understood not matter of [...]tate; for had they bin wel vers'd [...]erein, they would never have [...]ffer'd the Church to have grown [...] that greatnesse. And by expe[...]ence wee have seen it, that the [...]ower hereof in *Italy*, and that of [...]*pain* also, was caused by *France*, [...]nd their own ruine proceeded [...]om themselves. From whence [...] generall rule may bee taken, [...]hich never, or very seldome fails: [...]hat *hee that gives the meanes to* [...]*nother to become powerfull, ru*[...]*es himselfe*; for that power is [...]aus'd by him either with his in[...]ustry, or with his force; and as [...]ell the one as the other of these [...]wo is suspected, by him that is [...]rown puissant.

Chap. IV.

[...]herefore Darius *his Kingdome* [...] *taken by* Alexander, *rebell'd not* *against* Alexanders *Successours* *after his death.*

THe difficulties being consi[...]der'd, which a man hath in

the

the maintaining of a State ne-
gotten, some might marvaile ho
it came to passe, that *Alexand*
the Great subdued all *Asia* in
few yeeres; and having hard
possessed himselfe of it, died
whereupon it seem'd probable th
all that State should have rebell
neverthelesse his Successours k
the possession of it, nor found th
other difficulty in holding it, th
what arose among themselv
through their own ambition.
answer, that all the Principal
ties, whereof wee have memor
left us, have been governed in tw
severall manners; either by
Prince, and all the rest Vassall
who as ministers by his favo
and allowance, doe help to go
vern that Kingdom; or by a Prin
and by Barons, who not by the
Princes favour, but by the anti
quity of blood hold that degre
And these kinds of Barons hav
both states of their own, and Va
salls who acknowledge them fo
their Lords; and beare them a tru

natur

turall affection. Those States
are govern'd by a Prince and
Vassalls, have their Prince ru-
over them with more autho-
: for in all his country, there
none acknowledg'd for superi-
, but himselfe : and if they
d obedience to any one else,
but as to his minister and of-
r, nor beare they him any par-
lar good will. The examples
hese two different Goverments
y in our dayes, are, the *Turk*,
the King of *France*. The *Turk*
ole Monarchy is govern'd by
Lord, and the rest are all his
ssalls; and deviding his whole
ngdom into divers Sangiacques
Governments, he sends severall
ther : and those hee chops and
anges, as hee pleases. But the
ng of *France* is seated in the
dst of a multitude of Lords,
o of old have been acknow-
g'd for such by their subjects,
being belov'd by them, injoy
ir preheminencies; nor can the
ng take their States from them

without danger. Hee then tha
considers the one and the other o
these two States, shall find diffi-
culty in the conquest of the *Turk*
State; but when once it is subdu'd
great facility to hold it. The rea-
sons of these difficulties in taking
of the *Turks* Kingdom from him,
are, because the Invader cannot b
call'd in by the Princes of tha
Kingdom, nor hope by the rebel-
lion of those which hee hath abou
him, to bee able to facilitate hi
enterprize: which proceeds from
the reasons aforesaid; for they be-
ing all his slaves, and oblig'd to
him, can more hardly bee cor-
rupted; and put case they were
corrupted, little profit could hee
get by it, they not being able to
draw after them any people, fo
the reasons wee have shewed
whereupon hee that assailes the
Turk, must think to find him u-
nited; and must rather relie upon
his own forces, than in the others
disorders: but when once he is o-
vercome and broken in the field,

so

so that hee cannot repaire his armies, there is nothing else to bee doubted, than the Royall blood, which being once quite out, there is none else left to bee fear'd, none of the others having any credit with the people. And as the conquerour before the victory could not hope in them; so after it, ought he not to feare them. The contrary falls out in Kingdoms govern'd as is that of *France*: for it is easie to be enter'd, by the gaining of any Baron in the Kingdom; for there are alwayes some malecontents to be found, and those that are glad of innovation. Those for the reasons alleag'd are able to open thee a way into that State, and to further thy victory, which afterwards to make good to thee, draws with it exceeding many difficulties, as well with those that have ayded thee, as those thou hast supprest. Nor is it enough for thee to root out the Princes race: for there remaine still those Lords who quickly will

bee the ring-leaders of new chan-
ges; and in case thou art not abl
to content these, nor extinguish
them, thou losest that State, when-
soever the occasion is offer'd. Now
if thou shalt consider what sort o
gouernment that of *Darius* was,
thou shalt find it like to the *Turk*
dominions, and therefore *Alex-
ander* was necessitated first to de-
feat him utterly, and drive him
out of the field; after which vict-
ory, *Darius* being dead, that Stat
was left secure to *Alexander*, for
the reasons we treated of before:
and his successors had they con-
tinued in amity, might have in-
joy'd it at ease: nor ever arose
there in that Kingdome other tu-
mults, than those they themselves
stir'd up. But of the States that are
order'd and grounded as that of
France, it is impossible to become
master at such ease: and from
hence grew the frequent rebelli-
ons of *Spain*, *France*, and *Greece*
against the *Romans*, by reason of
the many Principalities those

State

States had: whereof while the memory lasted, the *Romans* were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them; but the memory of them being quite wip't out, by the power and continuance of the Empire, at length they injoy'd it securely; and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another, each one of them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces, according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein: and that because the blood of their ancient Lord was quite spent, they acknowledg'd no other but the *Romans*. By the consideration then of these things, no man will marvaile that *Alexander* had so little trouble to keep together the State of *Asia*; and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest, as *Pyrrhus*, and many others; which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour, but from the difference of the subject.

Chap. V.

In what manner Cities and Principalties are to be govern'd, which, before they were conquer'd, liv'd under their own Laws.

WHen those States, that are conquered, as it is said, have been accustomed to live under their own Laws, and in liberty, there are three wayes for a man to hold them. The first is to demolish all their strong places; the other, personally to goe and dwell there; the third, to suffer them to live under their own Laws, drawing from them some tribute, and creating therein an Oligarchy, that may continue it in thy service: for that State being created by that Prince, knowes it cannot consist, without his aid and force, who is like to doe all he can to maintain it; and with more facility is a City kept by meanes of her own Citizens, which hath been us'd before to live free, than by

by any other way of keeping. We have for example the *Spartans*, and the *Romans*; the *Spartans* held *Athens* and *Thebes*, creating there an Oligarchy: yet they lost it. The *Romans* to be sure of *Capua*, *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, dismantell'd them quite, and so lost them not: they would have kept *Greece* as the *Spartans* had held them, leaving them free, & letting them injoy their own Lawes; and it prospered not with them: so that they were forc'd to deface many Cities of that province to hold it. For in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under, than by demolishments; and whoever becomes master of a City us'd to live free, and dismantells it not; let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it: for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of liberty for refuge, and the ancient orders it had; which neither by length of time, nor for any favours afforded them, are ever forgotten; and for any thing that can bee

done, or order'd, unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and dispers'd, that name is never forgotten, nor those customes: but presently in every chance recourse is thither made: as *Pisa* did after so many yeeres, that she had been subdu'd by the *Florentines*. But when the Cities or the Provinces are accustomed to live under a Prince, and that whole race is quite extirpated; on one part being us'd to obey; on the the other, not having their old Prince; they agree not to make one from among themselves: they know not how to live in liberty; in such manner that they are much slower to take armes, and with more facility may a Prince gaine them, and secure himselfe of them. But in Republiques there is more life in them, more violent hatred, more earnest desire of revenge; nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them, or suffer them to rest: so that the safest way, is, either to ruine

them, or dwell among them.

Chap. VI.

Of new Principalities, that are conquer'd by ones own armes, and valour.

LEt no man marvaile, if in the discourse I shall make of new Principalities, both touching a Prince, and touching a State, I shall alleadge very famous examples: for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others, and proceed in their actions by imitation, and being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd, nor their vertues, whose patterne thou set'st before thee, attain'd unto; a wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons, and imitate those that have been the most excellent: to the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto, at least it may yeeld some savour thereof, and doe as good Archers use, who thinking the place they intend

intend to hit, too farre distant, & knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry, they lay their ayme a great deale higher than the mark, not for to hit so high with their arrow, but to bee able with the help of so high an aime to reach the place they shoot at. I say, that in Principalities wholly new, where there is a new Prince; there is more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them, as the vertue of their Conquerour is greater or lesser. And because this successe, to become a Prince of a private man, presupposes either vertue, or fortune; mee thinks the one and the other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties; however he that hath lesse stood upon fortune, hath maintain'd himselfe the better. Moreover it somewhat facilitates the matter in that the Prince is constrain'd, because hee hath not other dominions, in person to come and dwell there. But to come to these, who by their

own

own vertues, and not by fortune, attain'd to be Princes; the excellentest of these are, *Moyses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus*, and such like; and though of *Moyses* we are not to reason, he onely executing the things that were commanded him by God; yet merits hee well to be admir'd, were it only for that grace, that made him worthy to converse with God. But considering *Cyrus*, and the others, who either got or founded Kingdomes; wee shall find them all admirable; and if their particular actions, and Lawes bee throughly weigh'd, they will not appeare much differing from those of *Moyses*, which hee receiv'd from so Soveraigne an instructer. And examining their lives and actions, it will not appeare, that they had other help of fortune, than the occasion, which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce what forme they then pleas'd; and without that occasion, the vertue of their mind had

had been extinguish'd; and without that vertue, the occasion had been offer'd in vaine. It was then necessary for *Moyses* to find the people of *Israel* slaves in *Ægypt*, and oppress'd by the *Ægyptians*, to the end that they to get out of their thraldome, should bee willing to follow him. It was fit that *Romulus* should not bee kept in *Albia*, but expos'd presently after his birth that hee might become King of *Rome*, and founder of that City. There was need that *Cyrus* should find the *Persians* discontented with the *Medes* government, and the *Medes* delicate and effeminate through their long peace. *Theseus* could not make proof of his vertue, had not he found the *Athenians* dispers'd. These occasions therefore made these men happy, and their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken notice of, whereby their country became ennobled, and exceeding fortunate. They, who by vertuous wayes, like unto these,

become

become Princes, attain the Principality with difficulty, but hold it with much ease; and the difficulties they find in gayning the Principality, arise partly from the new orders and courses they are forc'd to bring in, to lay the foundation of their State, and worke their own security. And it is to be consider'd, how there is not any thing harder to take in hand, nor doubtfuller to succeed, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to be the chiefe in bringing in new orders; for this Chiefe finds all those his enimies, that thrive upon the old orders, and hath but luke-warme defenders of all those that would doe well upon the new orders, which luke-warme temper proceeds partly from feare of the opposers, who have the lawes to their advantage; partly from the incredulity of the men, who truly beleeve not a new thing, unlesse there bee some certain proofe given them thereof. Whereupon it arises, that whensoever

soever they that are adversari[es]
take the occasion to assayle, they
doe it factiously; and these other[s]
defend but cooly; so that thei[r]
whole party altogether runs [a]
hazzard. Therefore it is necessary,
being we intend throughly to dis-
course this part, to examine, i[f]
these innovators stand of them-
selves, or if they depend upon o-
thers; that is, if to bring thei[r]
worke to effect, it bee necessary
they should intreat, or be able to
constrain. In the first case they
alwayes succeed ill, and bring no-
thing to passe; but when they de-
pend of themselves, and are able
to force, than seldome it is that
they hazzard. Hence came it that
all the Prophets that were arm'd,
prevail'd; but those that were un-
arm'd, were too weak; for besides
what wee have alleadg'd, the na-
ture of the people is changeable,
and easie to bee perswaded to a
matter; but it is hard also to settle
them in that perswasion. And
therefore it behooves a man to be

ſo provided, that when they be-
leeve no longer, hee may be able
to compell them thereto by force.
Moyſes, *Cyrus*, *Theſeus*, and *Ro-
mulus* would never have been a-
ble to cauſe their Lawes long to
be obey'd, had they been diſarm'd,
as in our times it befell Fryer *Je-
rome Savanarola*, who periſh'd in
his new conſtitutions, when the
multitude began not to beleeve
him; neither had hee the meanes
to keep them firme, that had be-
leev'd; nor to force beleefe in them
that had not beleev'd him. Where-
fore ſuch men as theſe, in their pro-
ceedings find great difficulty, and
all their dangers are in the way,
and theſe they muſt ſurmount by
their vertue: but having once ma-
ſterd them, and beginning to bee
honourd by all, when they have
rooted thoſe out that envy'd their
dignities, they remain powerfull,
ſecure, honourable, and happy.
To theſe choice Examples, I will
adde one of leſſe remarque; but it
ſhall hold ſome proportion with
them

them, and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind, which is *Hiero* the *Siracusan*. He of a private man, became Prince of *Siracusa*, nor knew hee any other ayd of fortune, than the occasion; for the *Siracusans* being oppress'd, made choyce of him for their Captaine, whereupon hee deserv'd to be made their Prince: and he was of such vertue even in his private fortune, that hee who writes of him, sayes, he wanted nothing of reigning, but a Kingdome. This man extinguish'd all the old souldiery, ordein'd the new; left the old allyances, entertain'd new; and as he had friendship, and souldiers that were his own, upon that ground he was able to build any edifice; so that hee indur'd much trouble in gaining, and sufferd but little in maintaining.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of new Principalities, gotten by fortune, and other mens forces.

THey, who by fortune only become Princes of private men, with small paines attain to it; but have much adoe to maintain themselves in it, and find no difficulty at all in the way, because they are carried thither with wings; but all the difficulties arise there, after they are plac'd in them. And of such sort are those, who have an estate given them for money, by the favour of some one that grants it them; as it befell many in *Greece*, in the cities of *Jonia*, and *Hellespont*; where divers Princes were made by *Darius*, as well for his own safety, as his glory; as also them that were made Emperours; who from private men by corrupting the souldiers, attaind to the Empire. These subsist meerly upon the will, and fortune of those that have advanced

vanc'd them; which are two volu-
ble and unsteady things; and the
neither know how, nor are abl
to continue in that dignity: the
know not how, because unlesse
be a man of great understandin
and vertue, it is not probable
that hee who hath alwayes liv'd
private life, can know how t
command: neyther are they abl
because they have not any forc
that can be freindly or faythfu
to them. Moreover those Stat
that suddenly fall into a ma
hands, as all other things in n
ture that spring and grow quick
ly, cannot well have taken roo
nor have made their correspon
dencyes so firme, but that the fir
storme that takes them, ruin
them; in case these, who (as it
sayd) are thus on a suddain clam
berd up to be Princes, are not
that worth and vertue as to kno
how to prepare themselves t
maintain that, which Chanc
hath cast into their bosomes, an
can afterwards lay those founda-
tions

tions, which others have cast before they were Princes. For the one and the other of these wayes about the attaining to be a Prince, by Vertue, or by Fortune, I will alleage you two examples which have been in the days of our memory. These were *Francis Sforza* and *Cæsar Borgia*; *Francis* by just meanes and with a great deal of vertue, of a private man got to be Duke of Millan; and that which with much payns he had gaind, he kept with small adoe. On the other side *Cæsar Borgia* (commonly termd Duke *Valentine*) gott his state by his Fathers fortune, and with the same lost it; however that for his owne part no paynes was spard, nor any thing omitted, which by a discreet and valorous man ought to have been done, to fasten his roots in those Estates, which others armes or fortune had bestowed on him; for (as it was formerly sayd) he that lays not the foundations first, yet might be able by means of his ex-

extraordinary vertues to lay them afterwards, however it be with the great trouble of the architect, and danger of the ædifice. If therefore we consider all the Dukes progresses, we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power, which I judge a matter not superfluous to runne over; because I should not well know, what better rules I might give to a new Prince, than the patterne of his actions; and however the courses he took, avail'd him not, yet was it not his fault, but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extreame malignity of fortune. Pope *Alexander* the sixt, desiring to make the Duke his sonne a great man, had a great many difficulties, present and future. First hee saw no way there was whereby hee might be able to make him Lord of any State, that was not the Churches; and if hee turnd to take that from the Church, hee knew that the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Venetians*

netians would never agree to it; for *Faenza* and *Riminum* were under the *Venetians* protection. Moreover, hee saw that the armes of *Italy*, and those whereof in particular hee might have been able to make some use, were in their hands, who ought to feare the Popes greatnesse: and therefore could not any wayes rely upon them: being all in the *Orsins* and *Colonnies* hands, and those of their faction. It was necessary then, that those matters thus appointed by them, should bee disturb'd, and the States of *Italy* disorder'd, to bee able safely to master part of them, which he then found easie to doe, seeing the *Venetians* upon three considerations had us'd the meanes to bring the *French* men back again into *Italy*: which hee not only did not withstand, but further'd, with a resolution of King *Lewis* his ancient marriage. The King then past into *Italy* with the *Venetians* ayd, and *Alexanders*

anders consent; nor was hee soo-
ner arriv'd in *Milan*, than th
Pope had souldiers from him fo
the service of *Romania*, which wa
quickly yeelded up to him upo
the reputation of the Kings for-
ces. The Duke then having made
himselfe master of *Romania*, and
beaten the *Colonnies*; desiring t
hold it, and proceed forward,
two things hinder'd him: the one,
his owne souldiers, which hee
thought were not true to him;
the other, the *French* mens good
wills; that is to say, hee fear'd
that the Princes souldiers, where-
of hee had serv'd himselfe, would
faile him, and not only hinder
his conquest, but take from him
what hee had gotten; and that
the King also would serve him the
same turne. Hee had experience
of the *Orsini* upon an occasion,
when after the taking of *Faenza*,
hee assaulted *Bolonia*, to which
assault he saw them goe very cold.
And touching the King, he dis-
coverd his mind, when having
taken

aken the Dutchy of *Urbin*, he
nvaded *Tuscany*; from which
ction the King made him retire;
whereupon the Duke resolv'd to
epend no more upon fortune,
nd other mens armes. And the
irst thing hee did, was, to wea-
ken the *Orsini* and *Colonnies*
actions in *Rome*: for hee gain'd
ll their adherents that were gen-
lemen, giving then large allow-
nces, and honouring them ac-
ording to their qualities with
harges and governments: so
hat in a few months the good
will they bare to the parties was
uite extinguisht, and wholly
ent to the Duke. After this,
ee waited an occasion to root
out the *Orsini*, having before dis-
persd those of the family of *Co-
onna*, which fell out well to his
hand; and he us'd it better. For
he *Orsini* being too late aware,
hat the Dukes and the Chur-
ches greatnesse was their destru-
ction; held a Counsell together
n a dwelling house of theirs in
the

the country adjoyning to *Peru-sia*. From thence grew the re-bellion of *Urbin*, and the troubl of *Romania*, and many other da-gers befell the Duke, which overcame all with the help of *French*: and having regaind reputation, trusting neither *Fra* nor any forreine forces, to end hee might not bee put make triall of them again, he took himselfe to his sleights; he knew so well to disguise his in-tention, that the *Orsins*, by mediation of *Paul Orsini*, w reconciled to him, to whom Duke was no way wanting in manner of courtesies where to bring them into security, g ving them rich garments, mon and horses, till their owne sim plicities led them all to *Sinigali* into his hands. These hea being then pluck'd off, and the partisans made his friends, Duke had laid very good foun dations, to build his owne grea nesse on, having in his power

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Romania with the Dutchy of *Urbin*, and gaind the hearts of those people, by beginning to give them some rellish of their well being. And because this part is worthy to bee taken notice of, and to be imitated by others, I will not let it scape. The Duke, when he had taken *Romania*, finding it had been under the hands of poor Lords, who had rather pillag'd their subjects, than chastis'd or amended them, giving them more cause of discord, than of peace and union, so that the whole country was fraught with robberies, quarrells, and all other sorts of insolencies; thought the best way to reduce them to termes of pacification, and obedience to a Princely power, was, to give them some good government: and therefore hee set over them one *Remiro D' Orco*, a cruell, hasty man, to whom he gave an absolute power. This man in a very short time setled peace and union amongst them with very

great reputation. Afterwards the Duke thought such excessive authority serv'd not so well to his purpose, and doubting it would grow odious, he erected a Civill Iudicature in the midst of the countrey, where one excellent Iudge did precide, and thither every City sent their Advocates: and because he knew the rigours past had bred some hatred against him, to purge the mindes of those people, and to gaine them wholly to himselfe, he purpos'd to shew, that if there was any cruelty used, it proceeded not from any order of his, but from the harsh disposition of his Officer. Whereupon laying hold on him, at this occasion, hee causd his head to bee struck off one morning early in the market place at *Cesena*, where hee was left upon a gibbet, with a bloodie sword by his side; the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people. But to returne from whence wee have digress-

gresid: I say, that the Duke finding himselfe very strong, and in part out of doubt of the present dangers, because hee was armd after his owne manner, and had in some good measure suppresd those forces, which, because of their vicinity, were able to annoy him, hee wanted nothing else to goe on with his Conquest, but the consideration of *France*: for hee knew, that the King, who now, though late, was advisd of his errour, would never suffer him: and hereupon hee began to seeke after new allyances, and to waver with *France*, when the *French* came towards *Naples* against the *Spaniards*, who then besiegd *Gageta*; and his designe was onely to be out of their danger, which had been effected for him, had Pope *Alexander* liv'd. And thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate. As for the future, hee had reason to doubt, least the new successor to the Pa-

pacy would not bee his friend, and would indeavour to take that from him that *Alexander* had bestowd on him; and hee thought to provide for this fowre wayes: first by rooting out the race of all those Lords hee had dispoyled, whereby to take those occasions from the Pope. Secondly, by gaining all the gentlemen of *Rome*, whereby he might be able with those to keep the Pope in some awe. Thirdly, to make the Colledge of Cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might bee. Fourthly, by making of so large Conquests, before the Popes death, as that hee might be able of himselfe to withstand the first fury of his enemies. Three of these fowre at Pope *Alexanders* death hee had effected, and the fourth hee had neare brought to a point. For of those Lords he had stript hee put to death as many as hee could come at, and very few scap'd him: hee gaind him the *Romane* gentlemen; and in the

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Colledge hee had made a great action. And touching his new Conqueſt, hee had a deſigne to ecome Lord of *Tuſcany*. And e had poſſeſſed himſelfe already f *Perusia*, and *Piombin*, and taken protection of *Piſa*: and ſo oone as hee ſhould have caſt of is reſpect to *France* (which now ee meant to hold no longer) eing the *French* were now driven out of the Kingdome of *Naples* by the *Spanyards*, ſo, that ach of them was forc'd to buy is friendſhip at any termes; he was then to leape into *Piſa*. After this *Lucca* and *Siena*, were reſently to fall to him, partly or envy to the *Florentines*, and artly for feare. The *Florentines* ad no way to eſcape him: all which had it ſucceeded with him, s without queſtion it had, the ery ſame yeere that *Alexander* dy'd, he had made himſelfe maſter of ſo great forces, and ſuch eputation, that hee would have been able to have ſtood upon his

own bottome, without any de-
pendance of fortune, or resting
upon others helps; but only up-
on his own ſtrength and valour.
But *Alexander* dy'd five yeeres
after that hee had begun to draw
forth his ſword: and left him ſet-
tled only in the State of *Romania*
with all his other deſignes in the
ayre, ſick unto death, between
two very ſtrong armies of his
enemies: and yet was there in
this Duke ſuch a ſpirit and cou-
rage, and hee underſtood ſo well
how men are to be gaind, and
how to be loſt, and ſo firme were
the grounds hee had laid in a
ſhort time, that, had hee not
had thoſe armies upon his back,
or had hee been in health, hee
would have carried through his
purpoſe in ſpight of all oppoſi-
tion: and that the foundations
hee grounded upon, were good
it appeard in that *Romania* held
for him above a month, and hee
remaind ſecure in *Rome*, though
even at deaths doore: and how-

ever the *Baglioni*, *Vitelli*, and *Orsini* came into *Rome*; yet found they none would take their parts against him. And this hee was able to have effected, that if hee could not have made him Pope whom hee would, he could have hindred him that hee would not should bee Pope. But had hee been in health when *Alexander* dy'd, every thing had gone easily with him; and hee told mee on that day that *Julius* the second was created Pope, that hee had fore-thought on all that which could happen, in case his father chanc'd to dye, and for every thing provided its remedy: this onely excepted, that hee foresaw not that hee himselfe should at the same time be brought unto deaths dore also. Having then collected all the Dukes actions, me thinks I could not well blame him, but rather (as I have here done) set him as a patterne to be followd by all those, who by fortune and others armes have

been exalted to an Empire. Fo hee being of great courage, an having lofty designes, could no carry himselfe otherwise; an the only obstacle of his purpo was the brevity of *Alexand* life, and his own sicknesse. Who ever therefore deemes it necessar in his entrance into a new Prin cipality, to secure himselfe of hi enemies, and gaine him friends to overcome either by force, o by cunning, to make himselfe b belovd, or feard of his people, be follow'd and reverenc'd by hi souldiers, to root out those tha can, or owe thee any hurt, to change the ancient orders wit new wayes, to bee severe, and ye acceptable, magnanimous, and liberall, to extinguish the un- faithfull souldiery, and create new, to maintaine to himselfe the amities of Kings and Princes, so that they shall either with fa- vour benefit thee, or bee wary how to offend thee; cannot find more fresh and lively example

than the actions of this man. Hee deserves to bee found fault withall for the creation of *Julius* the second, wherein an evill choice was made for him: for, as it is said, not being able to make a Pope to his mind, hee could have with-held any one from being Pope; and should never have consented that any one of those Cardinals, should have got the Papacy, whom hee had ever done harme to; or who having attaind the Pontificate were likely to be afraid of him: because men ordinarily doe hurt either for feare, or hatred. Those whom hee had offended, were among others, hee who had the title of St. *Peter ad Vincula*, *Colonna*, St. *George*, and *Ascanius*; all the others that were in possibility of the Popedome, were such as might have feard him rather, except the Cardinall of *Roan*, and the *Spanyards*; these by reason of their alliance and obligation with him, the other, because of the

power they had, having the King-dome of *France* on their party. Wherefore the Duke above all things should have created a *Spanyard* Pope, and in case hee could not have done that, hee should have agreed that *Roan* should have been, and not St. *Peter ad Vincula*. And who-ever beleeves, that with great personages new benefits blot out the remembrance of old injuries, is much deceiv'd. The Duke there-fore in this election, was the cause of his own ruine at last.

Till wee come to this seaventh Chapter, I find not any thing much blame-worthy, unlesse it be one ground hee layes in the second Chapter; whereupon hee builds most of this Fabrick, viz. *That Subjects must either be dallyed or flatterd withall, or quite crusht. Whereby our Author advises his Prince to support his authority with two Cardinall Vertues, Dissimulation, and Cruelty. He con-*

sider-

siders not herein that the head is but a member of the body, though the principall; and the end of the parts is the good of the whole. And here hee goes against himselfe in the twenty sixt Chapter of his Rep. l. 1. *where hee blames* Philip of Macedon *for such courses, terming them very cruell, and against all Christian manner of living; and that every man should refuse to be a King, and desire rather to live a private life, than to reigne so much to the ruine of mankind. The life of* Cæsar Borgia, *which is here given as a paterne to new Princes, wee shall find to have been nothing else but a cunning carriage of things so, that he might thereby first deceive and inveigle, and then suppresse all those that could oppose or hinder his ambition. For if you runne over his life, you shall see the Father Pope* Alexander *the sixt, and him, both imbarqued for his advancement, wherein they ingag'd the Papall authority, and reputation of Reli-*

gi-

gion; for faith and conscience these men never knew, though they exacted it of others: there was never promise made, but it was only so farre kept as servd for advantage; Liberalite was made use of, Clemency and Cruelty, all alike, as they might serve to worke with their purposes. All was sacrific'd to ambition, no freindship could tye these men, nor any religion: and no marvell: for ambition made them forget both God and man. But see the end of all this cunning: though this Cæsar Borgia *contriv'd all his businesse so warily, that our Author much commends him, and hee had attaind neere the pitch of his hopes, and had provided for each misadventure could befall him its remedy; Policy shewd it selfe short sighted; for hee foresaw not at the time of his Fathers death, he himselfe should bee brought unto deaths doore also. And me thinks this Example might have given occasion to our Author to confesse, that surely there is a*

God

God that ruleth the earth. And many times God cutts off those cunning and mighty men in the hight of their purposes, when they think they have neare surmounted all dangers and difficulties. To the intent that the living may know, that the most high ruleth in the Kingdome of men, and giveth it to whomsoever hee will, and setteth up over it the basest of men. Daniel. 4. 17.

Chap. VIII.

Concerning those who by wicked meanes have attaind to a Principality.

BUt because a man becomes a Prince of a private man two wayes, which cannot wholly be attributed eyther to Fortune or Vertue, I think not fit to let them passe me: howbeit the one of them may be more largely discoursed upon, where the Republicks are treated of. These are, when by some wicked and unlawfull

lawfull meanes a man rises to the Principality; or when a private person by the favour of his fellow Citizens becomes Prince of his countrey. And speaking of the first manner, it shall be made evident by two Examples, the one ancient, the other moderne, without entring otherwise into the justice or merit of this part; for I take it that these are sufficient for any body that is forc'd to follow them. *Agathocles* the *Sicilian*; not of a private man only, but from a base and abject fortune got to be King of *Siracusa*. This man borne but of a Potter, continued alwayes a wicked life throughout all the degrees of his fortune: neverthelesse he accompanied his lewdnesse with such a courage and resolution, that applying himselfe to military affaires, by the degrees thereof hee attaind to be Prætour of *Siracusa*, and being setled in that degree, and having determind that he would become

Prince

Prince, and hold that by violence and without obligation to any other, which by consent had been granted him; and to this purpose having had some private intelligence touching his designe with *Amilcar* the *Carthaginian*, who was imployd with his army in *Sicily*, one morning gatherd the people together and the Senate of *Siracusa*, as if he had somewhat to advise with them of matters belonging to the Common-wealth, and upon a signe given, caus'd his souldiers to kill all his Senatours, and the richest of the people; who being slaine, he usurp'd the Principality of that City without any civill strife: and however he was twice broken by the *Carthaginians*, and at last besiegd, was able not only to defend his own City, but leaving part of his own army at the defence thereof, with the other invaded *Affrique*, and in a short time freed *Siracusa* from the siege, and brought the *Carthagi-*

thaginians into extreme necessity, who were constraind to accord with him, be contented with the possession of *Affrique*, and quit *Sicily* to *Agathocles*. He then that should consider the actions and valour of this man, would not see any, or very few, things to be attributed unto Fortune; seeing that as is formerly sayd, not by any ones favour, but by the degrees of service in warre with many sufferings and dangers, to which he had risen, he came to the Principality; and that hee maintaind afterwards with so many resolute and hazardous undertakings. Yet cannot this be term'd vertue or valour to slay his own Citizens, betray his friends, to be without faith, without pitty, without religion, which wayes are of force to gaine dominion, but not glory: for if *Agathocles* his valour bee well weighd, in his venturing upon, and comming off from dangers, and the greatnesse of

his

his courage, in supporting and mastering of adversities, no man can see why he should be thought any way inferiour even to the ablest Captaines. Notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with innumerable wickednesses, allow not that he should be celebrated among the most excellent men. That cannot then be attributed to Fortune or Vertue, which without the one or th' other was attaind to by him. In our dayes, while *Alexander* the sixth held the sea, *Oliverotto* of *Fermo*, who some few yeeres before had been left young by his parents, was brought up under the care of an uncle of his on the mothers side, calld *John Foliani*, and in the beginning of his youth given by him to serve in the warres under *Paulo Vitelli*: to the end that being well instructed in that discipline, hee might rise to some worthy degree in the warrs. Afterwards when *Paulo* was dead,

hee

hee ſerved under *Vitellozzo* his brother, and in very ſhort time, being ingenious, of a good perſo-nage, and brave courage, he be-came one of the prime men a-mong the troops he ſerved in: but thinking it but ſervile to de-pend upon another; hee plotted by the ayd of ſome Citizens of *Fermo* (who lik'd rather the thral-dome of their City than the li-berty of it) and by the favour of the *Vitelli*, to make himſelfe maſter of *Fermo*; and writ to *John Foliani*, that having been many yeeres from home, he had a mind to come and ſee him and the City, and in ſome part take notice of his own patrimony; and becauſe he had not imployd him-ſelfe but to purchaſe honour, to the end his Citizens might per-ceive, that he had not vainely ſpent his time, he had a deſire to come in good equipage and ac-companied with a hundred horſe of his friends and ſervants; and he intreated him that he woul

be pleasd so to take order, that he might be honourably receivd by the inhabitants of *Fermo*; which turnd as well to his honour that was his uncle, as his that was the nephew. In this, *John* faild not in any office of courtesie due to his nephew: and caus'd him to be well receivd by them of *Fermo*, and lodgd him in his own house; where having passd some dayes, and stayd to put in order somewhat that was necessary for his intended villany, he made a very solemne feast, whether he invited *John Foliani*, and all the prime men of *Fermo*: and when all their cheare was ended, and all their other entertainments, as in such feasts it is customary, *Oliverotto* of purpose mov'd some grave discourses; speaking of the greatnesse of Pope *Alexander*, and *Cæsar* his son, and their undertakings; whereunto *John* and the others making answer: he of a sudden stood up, saying, that those were things to be spoken of

in

in a more secret place, and so retir'd into a chamber, whether *John* and all the other Citizens follow'd him; nor were they sooner set down there, than from some secret place therein came forth diverse souldiers, who slew *John* and all the others: after which homicide *Oliverotto* got a horsebacke and ravagd the whole towne, and besiegd the supreme Magistrate in the palace, so that for feare they were all constraind to obey him, and to settle a government, whereof hee made himselfe Prince; and they being all dead, who, had they been discontented with him, could have hurt him; he strengthned himselfe with new civill and military orders, so that in the space of a yeere that he held the Principality, he was not only secure in the City of *Fermo*, but became fearefull to all his neighbours; and the conquest of him would have prov'd difficult, as that of *Agathocles*, had he not

let himselfe been deceivd by *Cæsar Borgia*; when at *Sinigallia*, as before was said, he took the *Orsini* and *Vitelli*: where he also being taken a yeere after he had committed the parricide, was strangled together with *Vitellozzo* (whom he had had for master both of his vertues and vices.) Some man might doubt from whence it should proceed, that *Agathocles*, and such like, after many trecheryes and cruelltyes, could possibly live long secure in his own countrey, and defend himselfe from his forren enemyes, and that never any of his own Citizens conspir'd against him; seeing that by means of cruelty, many others have never been able even in peaceable times to maintaine their States, much lesse in the doubtfull times of warre. I beleeve that this proceeds from the well, or ill using of those crueltyes: they may bee termd well us'd (if it bee lawfull to say well of evill) that are put in

in practise only once of necessity for securities sake, not insisting therein afterwards, but there is use made of them for the subjects profit, as much as may be. But those that are ill usd, are such as though they bee but few in the beginning, yet they multiply rather in time, than deminish. They that take that first way, may with the help of God, and mens care, find some remedy for their State, as *Agathocles* did: for the others, it is impossible they should continue. Whereupon it is to be noted, that in the laying hold of a State, the usurper thereof ought to runne over and execute all his cruellties at once, that hee bee not forcd often to returne to them, and that hee may be able, by not renewing of them, to give men some security, and gaine their affections by doing them some courtesies. Hee that carries it otherwise, either for fearefullnesse, or upon evill advice, is alwayes constraind to

hold

hold his ſword drawne in his hand; nor ever can hee rely upon his ſubjects, there being no poſſibility for them, becauſe of his daily and continuall injuries, to live in any ſafety: for his injuries ſhould bee done altogether, that being ſeldomer taſted, they might leſſe offend: his favours ſhould bee beſtowd by little and little, to the end they might keep their taſte the better; and above all things a Prince muſt live with his ſubjects in ſuch ſort, that no accident either of good or evill can make him vary: for neceſſity comming upon him by reaſon of adverſities, thou haſt not time given thee to make advantage of thy cruellties; and the favours which then thou beſloweſt, will little help thee, being taken, as if they came from thee perforce, and ſo yeeld no returne of thanks.

Chap.

Chap. IX.

Of the Civill Principality.

But comming to the other part, when a principall Citizen, not by villany, or any other insufferable violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens becomes Prince of his native countrey: which we may terme a Civill Principality: nor to attaine hereunto is Vertue wholly, or Fortune wholly necessary, but rather a fortunate cunning. I say, this Principality is climbed up to, either by the peoples help, or the great mens. For, in every City we finde these two humours differ; and they spring from this, that the people desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are desirous to command and oppresse the people: and from these two severall appetites, arises in the City one of these three effects, either a Principality, or Liberty, or

Tumul-

Tumultuary licentiou[illegible]sse. The Principality is caused either by the people, or the great ones; according as the one or the other of these factions have the occasion offerd; for the great ones seeing themselves not able to resist the people, begin to turne the whole reputation to one among them, and make him Prince, whereby they may under his shadow vent their spleenes. The people also, not being able to support the great mens insolencies, converting the whole reputation to one man, create him their Prince, to be protected by his authority. He that comes to the Principality by the assistance of the great ones, subsists with more dificulty, than he that attaines to it by the peoples favour; for he being made Prince, hath many about him, who account themselves his equalls, and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure. But he that gaines the Principality by the peoples favor,

finds himselfe alone in his throne and hath none or very few near him, that are not very supple to bend: besides this, the great ones cannot upon easie termes be satisfied, or without doing of wrong to others, whereas a small matter contents the people: for the end which the people propound to themselves, is more honest than that of the great men, these desiring to oppresse, they only not to be oppressed. To this may be added also, that the Prince which is the peoples enemy, can never well secure himselfe of them, because of their multitude; well may hee bee sure of the Nobles, they being but a few. The worst that a Prince can look for of the people become his enemy, is, to be abandond by them: but when the great ones once grow his enemyes, he is not only to fear their abandoning of him, but their making of a party against him also: for there being in them more forecast and craft, they

alwayes

alwayes take time by the fore-locks whereby to save themselves, and seeke credit with him, who they hope shall get the mastery. The Prince likewise is necessitated alwayes to live with the same people, but can doe well enough without the same great men, he being able to create new ones, and destroy them againe every day, and to take from them, and give them credit as he pleases: and to cleare this part, I say, that great men ought to be considerd two wayes principally, that is, if they take thy proceedings so much to heart, as to ingage their fortunes wholly in thine, in case they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle, they ought to bee well honourd and esteem'd: those that bind themselves not to thy fortune, are to be considerd also two wayes; either they doe it for lack of courage,, and naturall want of spirit, and then shouldst thou serve thy selfe of them, and of them especially that are men of good

good advice; for if thy affaires prosper, thou dost thy self honor thereby; if crost, thou needst not feare them: but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose, and upon occasion of ambition, it is a signe they think more of themselves than of thee: and of these the Prince ought to beware, and account of them as his discoverd enemyes: for alwayes in thy adversity they will give a hand too to ruine thee. Therefore ought hee that comes to be Prince by the peoples favour, keepe them his friends: which he may easily doe, they desiring only to live free from oppression: but he that becomes Prince by the great mens favour, against the will of the people, ought above all things to gaine the people to him, which he may easily effect, when he takes upon him their protection: And because men when they find good, where they look for evill, are thereby more endeard to their

bene-

benefactour, therefore growes the people so pliant in their subjection to him, as if by their favours he had attaind his dignity. And the Prince is able to gaine them to his side by many wayes, which because they vary according to the subject, no certaine rule can bee given thereupon, wherefore we shall let them passe; I will only conclude, that it is necessary for a Prince to have the people his friend, otherwise in his adversities he hath no helpe. *Nabis* Prince of the *Spartans* supported the siege of all *Greece*, and an exceeding victorious army of the *Romans*, and against those defended his native countrey and State, and this suffic'd him alone, that as the danger came upon him, he secur'd himselfe of a few; whereas if the people had been his enemy, this had nothing availd him. And let no man think to overthrow this my opinon with that common proverb, that he who relyes upon the people, layes his foun-

foundation in the dirt; for that is true, where a private Citizen grounds upon them, making his account that the people shall free him, when either his enemyes or the Magistrates oppresse him. In this case he should find himselfe often deceiv'd, as it befell the *Gracchyes* in *Rome*, and in *Florence George Scali*: but he being a Prince that grounds thereupon, who can command, and is a man of courage, who hath his wits about him in his adversityes, and wants not other preparations, and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and orders, shall not prove deceiv'd by them, and shall find he hath layd good foundations. These Principalityes are wont to be upon the point of falling when they goe about to skip from the civill order, to the absolute: for these Princes either command of themselves, or by the Magistrats; in this last case their State is more weak and dangerous: because

they

they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these Citizens, who then are set over the Magistrates, who especially in adverse times are able with facility to take their State from them, either by rising up against them, or by not obeying them; and then the Prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him: for the Citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the Magistrates, are not like in those fractions to obey his: and in doubtfull times hee shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom hee may trust; for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times, when the Citizens have need of the State; for then every one runs and every one promises, and every one will venture his life for him, when there is no danger neare; but in times of hazzard, when the State hath need of Citizens, there are but few of

them then, and so much the more is this experience dangerous, in that it can be but once made. Therefore a prudent Prince ought to devise a way, whereby his Citizens alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government, and they shall alwaies after proove faithfull to him.

Chap. X.

In what maner the forces of al Principalities ought to be measured.

IT is requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities, to have another consideration of them, that is, if a Prince have such dominions, that hee is able in case of necessity to subsist of himselfe, or else whether hee hath alwaies need of another to defend him. And to cleer this point the better, I judge them able to stand of themselves, who are of power either for their multitudes of men, or quantity of money, to bring into the feild a compleat armie, and joyne battell with

who

whoever comes to assaile them: and so I think those alwayes to stand in need of others help, who are not able to appear in the feild against the enemy, but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them. Touching the first case, wee have treated already, and shall adde somewhat thereto as occasion shall require. In the second case, wee cannot say other, save only to incourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their own Capitall city, and of the countrey about not to hold much account; and whoever shall have well fortifi'd that towne, and touching other matters of governments shall have behav'd himselfe towards his subjects, as hath been formerly said, and hereafter shall bee, shall never be assaild but with great regard; for men willingly undertake not enterprises, where they see difficulty to work them through; nor can much facility bee there found, where one assailes him, who hath his

his towne strong and well guarded, and is not hated of his people. The cities of *Germany* are very free; they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them, and they obey the Emperour, when they please, and they stand not in fear, neither of him nor any other potentate about them: for they are in such a manner fortifi'd, that every one thinks the siege of any of them would proove hard and tedious: for all of them have ditches and rampires, and good store of Artillery, and alwayes have their publick sellers well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeere: besides this whereby to feed the common people, and without any losse to the publick, they have alwayes in common whereby they are able for a yeere to imploy them in the labour of those trades, that are the sinews and the life of that city, and of that industry, whereby the commons ordinarily

sup-

supported themselves: they hold up also the military exercises in repute, and hereupon have they many orders to maintaine them. A Prince then that is master of a good strong city, and causeth not himselfe to be hated, cannot bee assaulted; and in case hee were, he that should assaile him, would be faine to quitt him with shame: for the affayres of the world are so various, that it is almost impossible that an army can lye incampt before a towne for the space of a whole yeere: and if any should reply, that the people having their possessions abroad, in case they should see them afire, would not have patience, and the tedious siege and their love to themselves would make them forget their Prince: I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious, will easily master those difficulties, now giving his subjects hope; that the mischiefe will not bee of durance, sometimes affrighting them with the

the cruelty of their enemies, and otherwhiles cunningly securing himself of those, whom he thinks too forward to runne to the enemy. Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their country upon his arrivall, and at those times while mens minds are yet warme, and resolute in their defence: and therefore so much the lesse ought a Prince doubt: for after some few dayes, that their courages grow coole, the dammages are all done, and mischiefes receivd, and there is no help for it, and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince; thinking hee is now more bound to them, their houses having for his defence been fir'd, and their possessions wasted: and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they doe, as for those they receive; whereupon if all bee well weigh'd, a wise Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure

and

nd true to him his Citizens
hearts at the beginning and
atter end of the siege, when
hee hath no want of provision
for food and munition.

Chap. XI.

Concerning Ecclesiasticall Principalities.

THere remaines now only that wee treat of the Ecclesiasticall Principalities, about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten: for they are attain'd to either by Vertue or Fortune, and without the one or the other they are held; for they are maintaind by orders inveterated in the religion, all which are so powerfull and of such nature, that they maintaine their Princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live. These only have an Estate and defend it not; have subjects and governe them not; and yet their States because undefended, are not taken from them

them; nor their subjects, though not govern'd, care not, think not, neither are able to aliene themselves from them. These Principalities then are only happy and secure: but they being sustained by superiour causes, whereunto humane understanding reaches not, I will not meddle with them: for being set up and maintaind by God; it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them. Yet if any man should aske mee whence it proceeds, that the Church in temporall power hath attaind to such greatnesse, seeing that till the time of *Alexander* the sixt, the *Italian* potentates, and not only they who are entitled potentates, but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition, in regard of the temporality made but small account of it, and now a King of *France* trembles at the power thereof, and it hath been able to drive him out of *Italy*, and

[r]uine the *Venetians*; and however this bee well known, me thinks [i]t is not superfluous in some part [t]o recall it to memory. Before [t]hat *Charles* King of *France* past into *Italy*, this countrey was under the rule of the Pope, the *Venetians*, the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines*. These potentates took two things principally to their care; the one, that no forreiner should invade *Italy*; the other, that no one of them should inlarge their State. They, against whom this care was most taken, were the Pope and the *Venetians*; and to restraine the *Venetians*, there needed the union of all the rest, as it was in the defence of *Ferrara*; and to keep the Pope low, they servd themselves of the Barons of *Rome*, who being devided into two factions, the *Orsini* and *Colonnesi*, there was alwayes occasion of offence between them, who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope, held

held the Popedome weak and feeble: and however sometimes there arose a couragious Pope, as was *Sextus*, yet either his fortune, or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities, and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof: for in ten yeers, which time one with another, the Popes ordinarily liv'd, with much adoe could they bring low one of the factions. And if, as as wee may say, one had near put out the *Colonnesi*, there arose another enemy to the *Orsini*, who made them grow againe, so that there was never time quite to root them out. This then was the cause, why the Popes temporall power was of small esteeme in *Italy*. There arose afterwards Pope *Alexander* the sixt, who of all the Popes that ever were, showd what a Pope was able to doe with money and forces; and hee effected by meanes of his instrument, Duke *Valentine*, and by the occasion of the *French*

mens passage, all those things, which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions: and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the Church dominions, but to make the Duke great; yet what hee did, turnd to the Churches advantage; which after his death, when the Duke was taken away, was the heire of all his paines. Afterwards succeeded Pope *Julius*, and found the Church great, having all *Romania*, and all the Barons of *Rome* being quite rooted out, and by *Alexanders* persecutions all their factions worne down; hee found also the way open for the heaping up of moneyes, never practis'd before *Alexanders* time; which things *Julius* not only follow'd, but augmented; and thought to make himselfe master of *Bolonia*, and extinguish the *Venetians*, and chase the *French* men out of *Italy*: and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him, and so much the

the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the Church, and in no private regard; hee kept also the factions of the *Orsini*, and *Colonnesi*, in the same State hee found them: and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration; yet two things have held them quiet, the one the power of the Church, which somewhat affrights them; the other because they have no Cardinals of their factions, who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them: nor shall these parties ever bee at rest, while they have Cardinals; because they nourish the factions both in *Rome*, and abroad, and and the Barons then are forc'd to undertake the defence of them: and thus from the Prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the Barons. And now hath Pope *Leo* his Holinesse found the Popedome exceeding puissant, of whome it is hop'd, that

that if they amplifi'd it by armes, hee by his goodnesse, and infinite other vertues, will much more advantage and dignifie it.

Chap. XII.

How many sorts of Military discipline there are: and touching Mercenary souldiers.

HAving treated particularly of the qualities of those Principalities, which in the beginning I propounded to discourse upon, and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being, and shewed the wayes whereby many have sought to gaine, and hold them; it remaines now that I speak in generall of the offences and defences, that may chance in each of the forenamed. We have formerly said that it is necessary for a Prince to have good foundations laid; otherwise it must needs bee that hee goe to wrack. The principall foundations that all States

States have, as well new, as old, or mixt, are good lawes, and good armes; and because there cannot bee good lawes, where there are not good armes, and where there are good armes, there must needs be good lawes, I will omit to discourse of the lawes, and speak of armes. I say then that the armes, wherewithall a Prince defends his State, either are his own, or mercenary, or auxiliary, or mixt. Those that are mercenary, and auxiliary, are unprofitable, and dangerous; and if any one holds his State founded upon mercenary armes, hee shall never be quiet, nor secure: because they are never well united, ambitious, and without discipline, treacherous, among their friends stout, among their enemies cowardly, they have no feare of God, nor keep any faith with men, and so long only deferre they the doing of mischiefe, till the enemy comes to assayle thee, and in time of peace thou art di-

spoyld

poyld by them, in warre by thy
nemies: the reason hereof is, be-
cause they have no other love,
or other cause to keep them in
the feild, but only a smal stipend,
which is not of force to make
them willing to hazard their lives
for thee; they are willing indeed
to be thy souldiers, til thou goest to
fight, but then they flye, or run
away: which thing would cost
mee but small paines to perswade:
for the ruine of *Italy* hath not had
any other cause now adayes, than
for that it hath these many yeers
rely'd upon mercenary armes;
which a good while since perhaps
may have done some man some
service, and among themselves
they may have been thought va-
liant: but so soone as any forrein
enemy appeard, they quickly
shewd what they were: Where-
upon *Charles* the King of *France*,
without opposition made himself
master of all *Italy*: and he that
said, that the cause thereof were
our faults, said true; but these were
not

not those they beleevd, but wh
I have told; and because th
were the Princes faults, they al
have suffered the punishment.
will fuller shew the infelicity
these armes. The mercenary Ca
taines are either very able me
or not: if they bee, thou canst n
repose any trust in them; for th
will alwayes aspire unto th
owne proper advancements, e
their by suppressing of thee th
art their Lord, or by suppressi
of some one else quite out of th
purpose: but if the Captaine b
not valourous, hee ordinarily r
ines thee: and in case it be a
swerd, that whoever shall ha
armes in his hands, whether m
cenary or not, will doe so: I wo
reply, that armes are to bee im
ployd either by a Prince, or co
mon-wealth. The Prince oug
to goe in person, and perfo
the office of a commander:
Republick is to send forth h
Citizens: and when shee se
forth one that proves not of a
lit

ities, shee ought to change him then, and when hee does prove valourous, to bridle him so by the laws, that he exceed not his commissions. And by experience wee see, that Princes and Republicks of themselves alone, make very great conquests; but that mercenary armes never doe other than harme: and more hardly falls a Republick armed with her owne armes under the obedience of one of her owne Citizens; than one that is armd by forrein armes. *Rome* and *Sparta* subsisted many ages armd and free. The *Swissers* are exceedingly well armd, and yet very free. Touching mercenary armes that were of old, we have an example of the *Carthagians*, who neare upon were oppressd by their owne mercenary souldiers, when the first warre with the *Romans* was finishd, however the *Carthagians* had their owne Citizens for their Captaines. *Philip* of *Macedon* was made by the *Thebans* after

E-

Epaminondas his death, General of their Armies; and after the victory, he took from them their liberty. The *Milaneses* when Duke *Philip* was dead, entertaind *Francis Sforza* into their pay against the *Venetians*, who having vanquisht their enemies at *Caravaggio*, afterwards joyned with them, whereby to usurp upon the *Milaneses* his Masters. *Sforza* his father, being in *Joane* the Queen of *Naples* pay, left her on a sudden disarmd; whereupon she, to save her Kingdome, was constraind to cast her selfe into the King of *Arragon's* bosome. And in case the *Venetians* and the *Florentines* have formerly augmented their State with these kinde of Armes, and their own Captaines; and yet none of them have ever made themselves their Princes, but rather defended them: I answer, that the *Florentines* in this case have had Fortune much their friend: for of valorous Captains, which they might

any

any way feare, some have not
been victors, some have had op-
position, and others have layd
the ayme of their ambitions ano-
ther way. Hee who overcame
not, was *John Acuto*, of whose
faith there could no proofe bee
made, being he vanquisht not;
but every one will acknowledge,
that, had he vanquisht, the *Flo-
rentines* were at his discretion.
Sforza had alwayes the *Bracces-
chi* for his adversaries, so that
they were as a guard one upon a-
nother. *Francis* converted all his
ambition against *Lombardy*. *Brac-
cio* against the Church, and the
Kingdome of *Naples*. But let us
come to that, which followed
a while agoe. The *Florentines*
made *Paul Vitelli* their Generall,
a throughly advisd man, and
who from a private fortune had
rose to very great reputation: had
he taken *Pisa*, no man will de-
ny but that the *Florentines* must
have held fast with him; for had
he been entertaind in their ene-

myes pay, they had had no remedy, and they themselves holding of him, of force were to obey him. The *Venetians*, if wee consider their proceedings, wee shall see wrought both warily and gloriously, while they themselves made warre, which was before their undertakings by land, where the gentlemen with their own Commons in armes behaved themselves bravely: but when they began to fight by land, they lost their valour, and followed the customes of *Italy*; and in the beginning of their inlargement by land, because they had not much territory, and yet were of great reputation, they had not much cause to feare their Captaines; but as they began to extend their bounds, which was under their Commander *Carminiola*, they had a taste of this errour: for perceiving hee was exceeding valourous, having under his conduct beaten the Duke of *Milan*, and knowing on the other side,

how

ow hee was cold in the warre,
hey judg'd that they could not
make any great conquest with him;
nd because they neither would,
nor could not cashier him, that
hey might not lose what they
ad gotten, they were forc'd for
heir owne safeties to put him to
eath. Since they have had for
heir Generall *Bartholomew* of
Berganio, *Robert* of St. *Severin*,
he Count of *Petilian*, and such
ike: whereby they were to feare
heir losses, as well as to hope for
aine: as it fell out afterwards
t *Vayla*, wherein one day they
ost that, which with so much
aines they had gotten in eight
undred yeeres: for from these
ind of armes grow slack and
low & weak gaines; but sudden
nd wonderfull losses. And be-
ause I am now come with these
xamples into *Italy*, which now
hese many yeares, hath been go-
ernd by mercenary armes, I will
earch deeper into them, to the end
hat their course and progresse be-

 ing

ing better discoverd, they may be the better amended. You have to understand, that so soone as in these later times the yoak of the *Italian* Empire began to be shaken off, and the Pope had gotten reputation in the temporalty, *Italy* was divided into severall States: for many of the great cities took armes against their Nobility; who undert he Emperours protection had held them in oppression; and the Pope favoured these, whereby he might get himselfe reputation, in the temporalty; of many others, their Citizens became Princes, so that hereupon *Italy* being come into the Churches hands as it were, and some few Republicks, those Priests and Citizens not accustomed to the use of armes, began to take strangers to their pay. The first that gave reputation to these souldiers was *Alberick* of *Como* in *Romania*. From his discipline among others descended *Brachio* and *Sforza*, who in their

time were the arbitres of *Italy*. After these followd all the others, who even til our dayes have commanded the armes of *Italy*: and the successe of their valour hath been, that it was overrunne by *Charles*, pillagd by *Lewis*, forc'd by *Fardinand*, and disgrac'd by the *Swissers*. The order which they have held, hath been, first whereby to give reputation to their owne armes, to take away the credit of the infantrey. This they did, because they having no State of their owne, but living upon their industry, their few foot gave them no reputation, and many they were not able to maintaine, whereupon they reduc'd themselves to *cavalery*, and so with a supportable number they were intertaind and honourd: and matters were brought to such termes, that in an army of twenty thousand souldiers, you should not find two thousand foot. They had moreover usd all industry to free them-

selves and their souldiers of all paines and feare, in their skirmishes, not killing, but taking one another prisoners, and without ransome for their freedome; they repaird not all to their tents by night, nor made palizado, or trench thereabout, nor lay in the feild in the summer: and all these things were thus contrivd and agreed of among them in their military orders: whereby (as is sayd) to avoyd paines and dangers; insomuch as they have brought *Italy* into slavery and disgrace.

Chap. XIII.

Of Auxiliary Souldiers, mixt, and natives.

THe Auxiliary forces, being the other kind of unprofitable armes, are, when any puissant one is cal'd in, who with his forces comes to assist and defend thee; such as in these later times did Pope *Julius* use, who having seen

seen the evill proof of his mercenary souldiers in the enterprize of *Ferrara*, appli'd himselfe to the Auxiliaries, and agreed with *Ferdinand* King of *Spain*, that with his forces hee should ayd him. These armes may be profitable and advantagious for themselves; but for him that calls them in, hurtfull; because in losing, thou art left defeated; and conquering, thou becomest their prisoner. And however that of these examples the ancient stories are full fraught, yet will I not part from this of Pope *Julius* the second, which is as yet fresh: whose course could not have been more inconsiderate, for the desire hee had to get *Ferrara*; putting himselfe wholly into strangers hands: but his good fortune, caus'd another third cause to arise, that hindred him from receiving the fruit of his evill choice; for his Auxiliaries being broken at *Ravenna*, and the *Swissers* thereupon arriving, who put the Conquerours to

flight, beyond all opinion even their owne and others, he chanc'd not to remaine his enemies prisoner, they being put to flight; nor prisoner to his Auxiliaries, having vanquish'd by other forces, than theirs. The *Florentines* being wholly disarm'd, brought ten thousand *French* to *Pisa* for to take it: by which course they ran more hazzard, than in any time of their troubles. The Emperour of *Constantinople*, to oppresse his neighbours, brought into *Greece* ten thousond *Turks*, who when the warre was ended, could not bee got out thence, which was the beginning of *Greeces* servitude under the Infidels. He then that will in no case be able to overcome, let him serve himselfe of these armes; for they are much more dangerous than the mercenaries; for by those thy ruine is more suddenly executed; for they are all united, and all bent to the obedience of another: But for the mercenaries

to hurt thee, when they have vanquishd, there is no more need of time, and greater occasion, they not being all united in a body, and being found out and paid by thee, wherein a third that thou mak'st their head, cannot suddenly gaine so great authority, that hee can endammage thee. In summe, in the mercenaries their sloth and lazinesse to fight is more dangerous: in the auxiliaries their valour. Wherefore a wise Prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes, and betaken himselfe to his owne, and desird rather to lose with his owne, than conquer with anothers, accounting that not a true victorie, which was gotten with others armes. I will not doubt to alleadge *Cæsar Borgia*, and his actions. This Duke entred into *Romania* with auxiliarie armes, bringing with him all *French* souldiers: but afterwards not accounting those armes secure, bent himselfe to mercenaries

ries, judging lesse danger to be in those, and tooke in pay the *Orsini* and the *Vetelli*, which afterwards in the proof of them, finding wavering, unfaithfull, and dangerous, hee extinguishd, and betook himselfe to his owne; and it may easily be perceiv'd, what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes, considering the difference that was between the Dukes reputation, when he had the *French* men alone, and when he had the *Orsini* and *Vetelli*; but when he remaind with his own, and stood of himselfe, wee shall find it was much augmented: nor ever was it of great esteeme, but when every one saw, that hee wholly possesd his owne armes. I thought not to have parted from the *Italian* examples of late memory; but that I must not let passe that of *Hiero* the *Siracusan*, being one of those I formerly nam'd. This man (as I said before) being made generall of the *Siracusans* forces,

forces, knew presently that that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit, in that they were hirelings, as our *Italians* are; and finding no way either to hold, or cashier them, made them all bee cut to peeces, and afterwards wag'd warre with his owne men, and none others. I will also call to memory a figure of the old Testament serving just to this purpose. When *David* presented himselfe before *Saul* to goe to fight with *Goliah* the *Philistims* Champion; *Saul* to incourage him, clad him with his owne armes, which *David* when hee had them upon his back, refus'd, saying, he was not able to make any proofe of himselfe therein, and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword. In summe, others armes either fall from thy shoulders, or cumber or streighten thee. *Charles* the seaventh, Father of *Lewis* the eleventh, having by his good fortune & valour set *France*

at

at liberty from the *English*, knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes, and settled in his Kingdome the ordinances of men at armes, and infantry. Afterwards King *Lewis* his sonne abolishd those of the infantry, and began to take the *Swissers* to pay; which errour follow'd by the others, is (as now in deed it appeares) the cause of that Kingdomes dangers. For having given reputation to the *Swissers*, they have renderd all their own armes contemptible; for this hath wholly ruind their foot, and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes: for being accustomed to serve with the *Swissers*, they think they are not able to overcome without them. From whence it comes that the *French* are not of force against the *Swissers*, and without them also against others they use not to adventure. Therefore are the *French* armies mixt, part mercenaries, and part natives: which armes are farre better than the

the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries, and much inferiour to the natives; and let the said example suffice for that: for the Kingdome of *France* would have been unconquerable, if *Charles* his order had been augmented and maintaind: but men in their small wisdome begin a thing, which then because it hath some savour of good, discovers not the poyson, that lurkes there under, as I before said of the hectick feavers. Wherefore that Prince which perceives not mischiefes, but as they grow up, is not truely wise; and this is given but to few: and if we consider the first ruine of the *Romane* Empire, wee shall find it was, from taking the *Goths* first into their pay; for from that beginning the forces of the *Romane* Empire began to grow weak, and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them. I conclude then that without having armes of their owne, no Principa-

cipality can be secure, or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune, not haviug valour to shelter it in adversity. And it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men, that nothing is so weak and unsetled, as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces: which are those that are compos'd of thy subjects, or Citizens, or servants; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary; and the manner how to order those well, is easie to find out, if those orders above nam'd by me, shall be but run over, and if it shall be but consider'd, how *Philip Alexander* the Great his Father, and in what manner many Republicks and Princes have arm'd and appointed themselves, to which appointments I referre my selfe wholly.

Chap. XIV.

What belongs to the Prince touching military Discipline.

A Prince then ought to have no other ayme, nor other thought, nor take any thing else for his proper arte, but warr, and the orders and discipline thereof: for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands, and is of so great excellency, that not only those that are borne Princes, it maintains so; but many times rayses men from a private fortune to that dignity. And it is seene by the contrary, that when Princes have given themselves more to their delights, than to the warres, they have lost their States; and the first cause that makes thee lose it, is the neglect of that arte; and the cause that makes thee gaine it, is that thou art experienc'd and approv'd in that arte. *Francis Sforza* by being a man at armes, of a private man became

became Duke of *Milan*; and his ſons by excuſing themſelves of the troubles and paines belonging to thoſe imployments of Princes, became private men. For among other miſchiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee, it cauſes thee to be contemnd, which is one of thoſe diſgraces, from which a Prince ought to keepe himſelfe, as hereafter ſhall bee ſayd: for from one that is diſarmd to one that is armd there is no proportion; and reaſon will not, that he who is in armes, ſhould willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurniſhd of them, & that he that is diſarmd ſhould be in ſecurity among his armed vaſſalls; for there being diſdaine in the one, and ſuſpicion in the other it is impoſſible theſe ſhould ever well co-operate. And therefore a Prince who is quite unexperienc'd in matter of warre, beſides the other infelicities belonging to him, as is ſaid, cannot bee had in any eſteeme among his ſouldiers,

souldiers, nor yet trust in them. Wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arts of warre, and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre; which he may bee able to doe two wayes, the one practically, and in his labours & recreations of his body, the other theorically. And touching the practick part, hee ought besides the keeping of his own subjects well traind up in the discipline and excercise of armes, give himselfe much to the chase, whereby to accustome his body to paines, and partly to understand the manner of situations, & to know how the mountaines arise, which way the vallyes open themselves, and how the plaines are distended flat abroad, and to conceive well the nature of the rivers, and marish ground; and herein to bestow very much care, which knowledge is profitable in two kinds: first he learnes thereby to know his own countrey, and is the better

ter enabled to understand the defence thereof, and afterwards by meanes of his knowledge and experience in these situations easily comprehend any other situation, which a new hee hath need to view, for the little hillocks, vallies, plaines, rivers, and marrish places. For example, they in *Tuscany* are like unto those of other countries: so that from the knowledge of the site of one country, it is easie to attain to know that of others. And that Prince that wants this skill, failes of the principall part a Commander should be furnisht with: for this shows the way, how to discover the enemy, to pitch the camp, to lead their armies, to order their battells, and also to besiege a town at thy best advantage. *Philopomenes* Prince of the *Achayans*, among other prayses writers give him, they say, that in time of peace, he thought not upon any thing so much as the practise of warre; and whensoever he was abroad

abroad in the field to disport himselfe with his friends, would often stand still, and discourse with them, in case the enemies were upon the top of that hill, and we here with our army, whether of us two should have the advantage, and how might wee safely goe to find them, keeping still our orders? and if we would retire our selves, what course should we take? if they retir'd, how should wee follow them? and thus on the way propounded them all such accidents could befall in an army; would heare their opinions, and tell his own, and confirme it by argument, so that by his continuall thought hereupon, when ever he led any army, no chance could happen, for which he had not a remedy. But touching the exercise of the mind, a Prince ought to reade Histories, and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men, marke how they have behav'd themselves in the warrs, examine the

the occasions of their victories, and their losses; whereby they may be able to avoyd these, and obtaine those; and aboveall, doe as formerly some excellent man hath done, who hath taken upon him to imitate, if any one that hath gone before him, hath left his memory glorious; the course he took, and kept alwaies neare unto him the remembrances of his actions and worthy deeds: as it is said, that *Alexander* the great imitated *Achilles*; *Cæsar Alexander*; and *Scipio Cyrus*. And whoever reads the life of *Cyrus*, written by *Xenophon*, may easily perceive afterwards in *Scipio's* life, how much glory his imitation gaind him, and how much *Scipio* did conforme himselfe in his chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality with those things, that are written by *Xenophon* of *Cyrus*. Such like wayes ought a wise Prince to take, nor ever be idle in quiet times: but by his paines then, as it were pro-

provide himselfe of store, where-
of he may make some use in his
adversity, to the end that when
the times change, he may be a-
ble to resist the stormes of his
hard fortune.

Chap. XV.

*Of those things, in respect where-
of, men, and especially Princes,
are praised, or dispraised.*

IT now remaines that we consider, what the conditions of a Prince ought to be, and his termes of government over his subjects, and towards his friends. And because I know that many have written hereupon; I doubt, lest I venturing also to treat thereof, may be branded with presumption, especially seeing I am like enough to deliver an opinion different from others. But my intent being to write for the advantage of him that understands mee, I thought it fitter to follow the effectuall truth of the matter, than

the

the imagination thereof: And many Principalities and Republiques, have been in imagination, which neither have been seen nor knowne to be indeed: for there is such a distance between how men doe live, and how men ought to live; that hee who leaves that which is done, for that which ought to bee done, learnes sooner his ruine, than his preservation: for that man who will professe honesty in all his actions, must needs goe to ruine, among so many that are dishonest. Whereupon it is necessary for a Prince, desiring to preserve himselfe, to be able to make use of that honestie, and to lay it aside againe, as need shall require. Passing by then things that are only in imagination belonging to a Prince, to discourse upon those that are really true; I say that all men, whensoever mention is made of them, and especially Princes, because they are placed aloft in the view of all, are taken notice of, for

for some of these qualities, which procure them either commendations, or blame: & this is, that some one is held liberal, some miserable, (miserable I say, not covetous, for the covetous desire to have, though it were by rapine, but a miserable man is he, that too much forbears to make use of his owne) some free givers, others extortioners; some cruell, others pitious; the one a League breaker, another faithfull; the one effeminate and of small courage, the other fierce and couragious; the one courteous, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other chaste; the one of faire dealing, the other wily and crafty; the one hard, the other easie; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other incredulous, and such like. I know that every one will confesse, it were exceedingly praiseworthy for a Prince to be adorned with all these above nam'd qualities that are good: but because this is not possible, nor doe humane

humane conditions admit such perfection in vertues, it is necessary for him to be so discreet, that he know how to avoid the infamie of those vices, which would thrust him out of his State; and if it be possible, beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence; but where it cannot bee, let them passe with lesse regard. And yet, let him not stand much upon it, though he incurre the infamie of those vices, without which hee can very hardly save his State: for if all bee throughly considerd, some things we shall find which will have the colour and very face of Vertue, and following them, they will lead thee to thy destruction; whereas some others, that shall as much seeme vice, if we take the course they lead us, shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being.

The second blemish in this our Authours book I find in his fifteenth

teenth Chapter: where he instructs his Prince to use such an ambidexterity as that he may serve himselfe, either of vertue, or vice, according to his advantage, which in true pollicy is neither good in attaining the Principality, nor in securing it when it is attaind. For Politicks presuppose Ethiques, which will never allow this rule: as that a man might make this small difference between vertue, and vice, that he may indifferently lay aside, or take up the one, or the other, and put it in practise as best conduceth to the end he propounds himselfe. I doubt our Authour would have blamd Davids regard to Saul, when 1. Sam. 24. in the cave hee cut off the lap of Sauls garment, and spared his head, and afterwards in the 26. when he forbade Abishai to strike him as hee lay sleeping. Worthy of a Princes consideration is that saying of Abigal to David 1. Sam. 25. 30. It shall come to passe when the Lord shall have done to my

Lord, according to all that hee hath spoken concerning thee, and shall have appointed thee Ruler over Israel, *that this shall be no griefe to thee, nor offence of heart unto my Lord, that thou hast forborne to shed blood &c. For surely the conscience of this evill ground whereupon they have either built, or underpropped their tyranny, causes men as well* metus *as* spes in longum projicere, *which sets them awork on further mischiefe.*

Chap. XVI.

Of Liberality, and Miserablenesse.

Beginning then at the first of the above mentioned qualities, I say, that it would be very well to be accounted liberall: neverthelesse, liberality used in such a manner, as to make thee be accounted so, wrongs thee: for in case it be used vertuously, and as it ought to be, it shall never come to be taken notice of, so as to free thee from the infamie of its contra-

trary. And therefore for one to hold the name of liberall among men, it were needfull not to omit any sumptuous quality, insomuch that a Prince alwayes so dispos'd, shall waste all his revenues, and at the end shall be forc'd, if he will still maintaine that reputation of liberality, heavily to burthen his subjects, and become a great exactour; and put in practise all those things, that can be done to get mony. Which begins to make him hatefull to his subjects, and fall into every ones contempt, growing necessitous: so that having with this his liberality wrong'd many, and imparted of his bounty but to a few, he feeles every first mischance, and runnes a hazzard of every first danger. Which he knowing, and desiring to withdraw himselfe from, incurrs presently the disgrace of being termd miserable. A Prince therefore not being able to use this vertue of liberality, without his owne

dammage, in such a sort, that it may be taken notice of, ought, if he be wise, not to regard the name of Miserable; for in time he shall alwayes be esteemed the more liberall, seeing that by his parsimony his owne revenues are sufficient for him, as also he can defend himselfe against whoever makes warre against him, and can doe some exploits without grieving his subjects: so that he comes to use his liberality to all those, from whom he takes nothing, who are infinite in number; and his miserablenesse towards those, to whom hee gives nothing, who are but a few. In our dayes wee have not seen any, but those who have been held miserable, doe any great matters, but the others all quite ruind. Pope *Julius* the second, however he serv'd himselfe of the name of Liberall, to get the Papacy, yet never intended he to continue it, to the end hee might bee able to make warre against the

King

King of *France*; and hee made so many wars without imposing any extraordinary taxe; because his long thrift supplyd his large expences. This present King of *Spain* could never have undertaken, nor gone through with so many exployts, had he been accounted liberall. Wherefore a Prince ought little to regard (that hee may not be driven to pillage his subjects, that he may be able to defend himselfe, that he may not fall into poverty and contempt, that he be not forced to become an extortioner) though he incurre the name of Miserable; for this is one of those vices, which does not pluck him from his throne. And if any one should say; *Cesar* by his liberality obtaind the Empire, and many others (because they both were, and were esteemd liberall) attaind to exceeding great dignities. I answer, either thou art already come to be a Prince, or thou art in the way to it: in the

first case this liberality is hurtfull; in the seconc it is necessary to be accounted so; and *Cæsar* was one of those that aspird to the Principality of *Rome*. But if after he had gotten it, he had survivd, and not forborne those expences, hee would quite have ruind that Empire. And if any one should reply; many have been Princes, and with their armies have done great exployts, who have been held very liberall. I answer, either the Prince spends of his owne and his subjects, or that which belongs to others: in the first, hee ought to be sparing, in the second hee should not omit any part of liberality. And that Prince, that goes abroad with his army, and feeds upon prey, and spoyle, and tributes, and hath the disposing of that which belongs to others, necessarily should use this liberality; otherwise would his souldiers never follow him; and of that which is neither thine, nor

nor thy subjects, thou mayest well be a free giver, as were *Cyrus*, *Cæsar*, and *Alexander*; for the spending of that which is anothers, takes not away thy reputation, but rather addes to it, only the wasting of that which is thine owne, hurts thee; nor is there any thing consumes it selfe so much as liberality, which whilst thou usest, thou losest the meanes to make use of it; and becom'st poore and abject, or to avoyd this poverty an extortioner and hatefull person. And among all those things which a Prince ought to beware of, is, to bee dispis'd, and odious; to one and the other of which, liberality brings thee. Wherefore there is more discretion to hold the stile of Miserable, which begets an infamy without hatred, than to desire that of Liberall, whereby to incurre the necessity of being thought an extortioner, which procures an infamy with hatred.

Chap. XVII.

Of Cruelty, and Clemency, and whether it is better to be belov'd, or feard.

DEscending afterwards unto the other fore-alleadged qualities, I say, that every Prince should desire to be held pittifull, and not cruell. Neverthelesse ought hee beware that he ill uses not this pitty. *Cæsar Borgia* was accounted cruell, yet had his cruelty redrest the disorders in *Romania*, settled it in union, and restord it to peace, and fidelity: which, if it be well weighd, we shall see was an act of more pitty, than that of the people of *Florence*, who to avoyd the terme of cruelty, sufferd *Pistoya* to fall to destruction. Wherefore a Prince ought not to regard the infamy of cruelty, for to hold his subjects united and faithfull; for by giving a very few proofes of himselfe the other way, hee shall

shall be held more pittifull than they, who through their too much pitty, suffer disorders to follow, from whence arise murthers and rapines: for these are wont to hurt an intire universality, whereas the executions practisd by a Prince, hurt only some particular. And among all sorts of Princes, it is impossible for a new Prince to avoyd the name of cruell, because all new States are full of dangers: Whereupon *Virgil* by the mouth of *Dido* excuses the inhumanity of her Kingdome, saying,

Res dura & Regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri et latè ⁽nes custode tenere.

My hard plight and new State force me to guard
My confines all about with watch and ward.

Neverthelesse ought he be judicious in his giving beleefe to any thing, or moving himselfe thereat, nor make his people extreamly affraid of him; but proceed in a

a moderate way with wisdome, and humanity, that his too much confidence make him not unwary, and his too much distrust intolerable, From hence arises a dispute, whether it is better to be belov'd or feard: I answer, a man would wish hee might bee the one and the other: but because hardly can they subsist both together, it is much safer to be feard, than be lov'd; being that one of the two must needs faile; for touching men, wee may say this in generall, they are unthankfull, unconstant, dissemblers, they avoyd dangers, and are covetous of gaine; and whilst thou doest them good, they are wholly thine their blood, their fortunes, lives and children are at thy service, as is said before, when the danger is remote; but when it approaches, they revolt. And that Prince; who wholly relyes upon their words, unfurnishd of all other preparations, goes to wrack: for the friendships that are gotten with

with rewards, and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind, are dearely bought indeed; but they will neither keep long, nor serve well in time of need: and men doe lesse regard to offend one that is supported by love, than by feare. For love is held by a certainty of obligation, which, because men are mischeivous, is broken upon any occasion of their owne profit. But feare restrains with a dread of punishment which never forsaks a man. Yet ought a Prince cause himselfe to be belovd in such a manner, that if hee gaines not love, he may avoyd hatred: for it may well stand together, that a man may bee feard and not hated; which shall never faile, if hee abstaine from his subjects goods, and their wives; and whensoever hee should be forc'd to proceed against any of their lives, doe it when it is to be done upon a just cause, and apparent conviction; but above all things forbeare to

lay

lay his hands on other mens goods; for men forget sooner the death of their father, than the losse of their patrimony. Moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods, do never faile: and alwayes hee that begins to live by rapine, finds occasion to lay hold upon other mens goods: but against mens lives they are seldomer found, and sooner faile. But when a Prince is abroad in the feild with his army and hath a multitude of souldiers under his government, then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it, though hee be termd cruell: for unlesse hee be so, hee shall never have his souldiers live in accord one with another, nor ever well dispos'd to any brave peece of service. Among *Hannibals* actions of mervaile this is reckond for one, that having a very huge army, gatherd out of severall nations, and all led to serve in a strange countrey, there was never any dissention neither

amongst

amongst themselves, nor against their Generall, as well in their bad fortune as their good. Which could not proceed from any thing else, than from that barbarous cruelty of his, which, together with his exceeding many vertues, renderd him to his souldiers both venerable and terrible; without which, to that effect his other vertues had servd him to little purpose: and some writers, though not of the best advised, on one side admire these his worthy actions, and on the other side, condemne the principall causes thereof. And that it is true, that his other vertues would not have suffis'd him, wee may consider in *Scipio*, the rarest man not only in the dayes he liv'd, but even in the memory of man; from whom his army rebell'd in *Spain*: which grew only upon his too much clemency, which had given way to his souldiers to become more licentious, that was well tolerable by military discipline: for which

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hee was reprov'd by *Fabius Maximus* in the Senate, who term'd him the corrupter of the *Roman* souldiery. The *Locrensians* having been destroyed by a Liestenant of *Scipio's*, were never reveng'd by him, nor the insolence of that Liestenant punisht, all this arising from his easie nature: so that one desiring to excuse him in the Senate, said, that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults, than to correct the faults of other men: which disposition of his in time would have wrong'd *Scipio's* reputation & glory, had he therewith continu'd in his commands: but living under the government of the Senate, this quality of his that would have disgrac'd him, not only was conceal'd, but prov'd to the advancement of his glory. I conclude then, returning to the purpose of being feard, and belov'd; insomuch as men love at their owne pleasure and to serve their owne turne, and

their feare depends upon the Princes pleasure, every wise Prince ought to ground upon that which is of himselfe, and not upon that which is of another: only this, he ought to use his best wits to avoid hatred, as was said.

Chap, XVIII.

In what manner Princes ought to keep their words.

HOw commendable in a Prince it is to keepe his word, and live with integrity, not making use of cunning and subtlety, every one knows well: yet wee see by experience in these our dayes, that those Princes have effected great matters, who have made small reckoning of keeping their words, and have known by their craft to turne and wind men about, and in the end have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth. You must then know, there are two kinds of combating or fighting; the one by

by right of the laws, the other meerly by force. That first way is proper to men, the other is also common to beasts: but because the first many times suffices not, there is a necessity to make recourse to the second; wherefore it behooves a Prince to know how to make good use of that part which belongs to a beast, as well as that which is proper to a man. This part hath been covertly shew'd to Princes by ancient writers; who say that *Achilles* and many others of those ancient Princes were intrusted to *Chiron* the Centaure, to bee brought up under his discipline: the morall of this, having for their teacher one that was halfe a beast and halfe a man, was nothing else, but that it was needfull for a Prince, to understand how to make his advantage of the one and the other nature, because neither could subsist without the other. A Prince then being necessitated to know how to make use

use of that part belonging to a beast, ought to serve himselfe of the conditions of the Foxe and the Lion; for the Lion cannot keep himself from snares, nor the Foxe defend himselfe against the Wolves. Hee had need then bee a Foxe, that hee may beware of the snares, and a Lion, that he may scarre the Wolves. Those that stand wholly upon the Lion, understand not well themselves. And therefore a wise Prince cannot, nor ought not keep his faith given, when the observance thereof turnes to disadvantage, and the occasions that made him promise, are past. For if men were all good, this rule would not be allowable; but being they are full of mischiefe, and would not make it good to thee, neither art thou tyed to keep it with them: nor shall a Prince ever want lawfull occasions to give colour to this breach. Very many moderne examples hereof might be alleadg'd, wherin might be shewd how many

peaces

peaces concluded, and how many promises made, have bin violated and broken by the infidelity of Princes; and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath been neerest the Foxe in condition. But it is necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition, and to bee able to faine and dissemble throughly; and men are so simple and yeeld so much to the present necessities, that hee who hath a mind to deceive, shall alwayes find another that will be deceiv'd. I will not conceale any one of the examples that have been of late. *Alexander* the sixth, never did any thing else than deceive men, and never meant otherwise, and alwayes found whome to worke upon; yet never was there man would protest more effectually, nor averre any thing with more solemne oaths, and observe them lesse than he; neverthelesse, his coosenages all thriv'd well with him; for hee knew how to play

this

this part cunningly. Therefore is there no necessity for a Prince to bee endued with all these above written qualities, but it behooves well that he seeme to be so; or rather I will boldly say this, that having these qualities, and always regulating himselfe by them, they are hurtfull; but seeming to have them, they are advantagious; as to seeme pitifull, faithfull, mild, religious, and of integrity, and indeed to be so; provided withall thou beest of such a composition, that if need require thee to use the contrary, thou canst, and know'st how to apply thy selfe thereto. And it suffices to conceive this, that a Prince, and especially a new Prince, cannot observe all those things, for which men are held good; he being often forc'd, for the maintenance of his State, to do contrary to his faith, charity, humanity, and religion: and therefore it behooves him to have a mind so dispos'd as to turne and take

take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly I said, not forsake the good, while he can; but to know how to make use of the evill upon necessity. A Prince then ought to have a speciall care, that he never let fall any words, but what are all season'd with the five above-written qualities, and let him seem to him that sees and heares him, all pitty, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to seeme to have, than this last quality: for all men in generall judge thereof, rather by the sight than by the touch; for every man may come to the sight of him, few come to the touch and feeling of him; every man may come to see what thou seemest, few come to perceive and understand what thou art; and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who have the majesty of State to protect them: And in all mens actions, especially those of Princes, wherein

wherein there is no judgement to appeale unto, men forbeare to give their censures till the events, and ends of things. Let a Prince therefore take the surest courses he can to maintaine his life and State: the meanes shall alwaies be thought honorable, and commended by every one: for the vulgar is over-taken with the appearance and event of a thing: and for the most part of people, they are but the vulgar: the others that are but few, take place where the vulgar have no subsistence. A Prince there is in these dayes, whom I shall not do well to name, that preaches nothing else but peace and faith; but had he keept the one and the other, severall times had they taken from him his State and reputation.

In the sixteenth, seaventeenth, and eighteenth Chap. our Author descends to particulars, perswading his Prince in his sixteenth to such

a suplenesse of disposition, as that upon occasion hee can make use either of liberality or miserablenesse as need shall require. But that of liberality is to last no longer, than while hee is in the way to some designe: which if we well weigh, is not really a reward of vertue, how ere it seemes; but a bait and lure to bring birds to the net. In the seventeenth Chap. hee treats of clemency and cruelty; neither of which are to be exercisd by him as acts of mercy or justice; but as they may serve to advantage his further purposes. And lest the Prince should incline too much to clemency, our Author allowes rather the restraint by feare, than by love. The contrary to which all stories shew us. I will say this only, cruelty may cut of the power of some, but causes the hatred of all, and gives a will to most to take the first occasion offered for revenge. In the eighteenth Chap. our Author discourses how Princes ought to governe themselves in keeping their promi-

ses

se made: whereof hee sayes they ought to make such small reckoning as that rather they should know by their craft how to turne and wind men about, whereby to take advantage of all winds and fortunes. To this I would oppose that in the fifteenth Psal. v. 5. Hee that sweareth to his neighbour, and disappointeth him not, though it were to his owne hindrance. It was a King that writ it: and mee-thinks the rule hee gave, should well besit both King and subject: and surely this perswades against all taking of advantages. A man may reduce all the causes of faith-breaking to three heads. One may be, because he that promis'd, had no intention to keep his word; and this is a wicked and malitious way of dealing. A second may bee, because hee that promis'd, repents of his promise made; and that is grounded on unconstancy, and lightnesse in that hee would not bee well resolved before he entred into covenant. The third may bee, when it so falls out,

that

that it lyes not in his power, that made the promise to performe it. In which case a man ought to imitate the good debter, who having not wherewithall to pay, hides not himselfe, but presents his person to his creditour; willingly suffering imprisonment. The first and second are very vitious and unworthy of a Prince: in the third, men might well bee directed by the examples of those two famous Romans, Regulus *and* Posthumius. *I shall close this with that answer of* Charles *the fifth when hee was pressd to break his word with* Luther *for his safe returne from* Wormes. Fides rerum promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet, tamen apud imperatorem eam consistere oportet. *Though truth be banisht out of the whole world, yet should it alwayes finde harbour in an Emperours breast.*

Gulielmus Xenocarus in vit. Car. Quinti.

Chap.

CHAP. XIX.

That Princes should take a care, not to incurre contempt or hatred.

BUt because among the qualities, whereof formerly mention is made, I have spoken of those of most importance; I will treat of the others more briefly under these qualities, that a Prince is to beware, as in part is above said, and that he fly those things which cause him to bee odious or vile: and when ever hee shall avoid this, he shall fully have played his part, and in the other disgraces he shall find no danger at all. There is nothing makes him so odious, as I said, as his extortion of his subjects goods, and abuse of their women, from which hee ought to forbeare: and so long as hee wrongs not his whole people neither in their goods, nor honors, they live content, and hee hath only to strive with the Ambition of some few: which many

wayes, & easily too, is restrain'd. To be held various, light, effeminate, faint-harted, unresolv'd, these make him be contemnd and thought base, which a Prince should shun like rocks, and take a care that in all his actions there appeare magnanimity, courage, gravity, and valour; and that in all the private affaires of his subjects, he orders it so, that his word stand irrevocable: and maintaines himselfe in such repute, that no man may think neither to deceive, nor wind and turn him about; that Prince that gives such an opinion of himself, is much esteemd: and against him, who is so well esteemd, hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects, or by forreiners any invasion, when once notice is taken of his worth, and how much hee is reverenced by his subjects. For a Prince ought to have two feares, the one from within, in regard of his subjects; the other from abroad, in regard of his

mighty

mighty neighbours; from these he defends himselfe by good armes and good friends, and alwayes he shall have good friends if he have good armes; and all things shall always stand sure at home, when those abroad are firme; in case some conspiracy have not disturb'd them, and however the forraine matters stand but ticklishly; yet if hee have taken such courses at home, and liv'd as we have prescrib'd, he shall ever be able (in case he forsake not himselfe) to resist all possible force and violence, as I said, *Nabis* the Spartan did: but touching his subjects, even when his affaires abroad are setled, it is to be fear'd, they may conspire privily; from which a Prince sufficiently secures himselfe by shunning to bee hated or contemnd, and keeping himself in his peoples good opinion, which it is necessary for him to compasse, as formerly we treated at large. And one of the powerfullest remedies a

Prince can have against conspiracies, is, not to bee hated nor despisd by the universality; for alwaies he that conspires, beleevs the Princes death is acceptable to the subject: but when he thinks it displeases them, he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter; for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side, are infinite. By experience it is plaine, that many times plots have been laid, but few of them have succeeded luckily; for hee that conspires, cannot be alone, nor can he take the company of any but of those, who, he beleevs are malecontents; and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a malecontent, thou giv'st him meanes to work his own content: for by revealing thy treason, hee may well hope for all manner of favour: so that seing his gaine certaine of one side; and on the other, finding only doubt and danger, either hee had need be a rare friend, or that he be an exceeding

ding obstinate enemy to the Prince, if he keeps his word with thee. And to reduce this matter into short termes: I say, there is nothing but jealousie, feare, and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him; but on the Princes part, there is the majesty of the principality, the lawes, the defences of his friends and the State, which do so guard him; that to all these things the peoples goods wills being added, it is unpossible, any one should be so head-strong, as to conspire; for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his mischiefe; in this case he is also to feare afterwards, having the people for his enemy, when the fact is committed; and therefore for this cause, not being able to hope for any refuge. Touching this matter, many examples might be brought, but I will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the memory of our Fathers. *Annibal Bentivolii,*

lii, grand-father of this *Annibal* who now lives, that was Prince in *Bolonia*, being slaine by the *Canneschi*, that conspir'd against him, none of his race being left, but this *John*, who was then in swadling clouts; presently the people rose, upon this murder, and slew all the *Canneschi*; which proceeded from the popular affection, which the family of the *Bentivolii* held then in *Bolonia*: which was so great, that being there remain'd not any, now *Anniball* was dead, that was able to manage the State; and having notice that in *Florence* there was one borne of the *Bentivolii*, who till then was taken for a Smiths sonne: the citizens of *Bolonia* went to *Florence* for him, and gave the government of their City to him, which was rul'd by him, untill *John* was of fit yeares to governe. I conclude then that a Prince ought to make smal account of treasons, whiles he hath the people to friend: but if

they be his enemies and hate him, he may well feare every thing, and every one. And well orderd States, and discreet Princes have taken care withall diligence, not to cause their great men to fall into desperation, and to content the people, and so to maintaine them; for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a Prince. Among the Kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes, is that of *France*, and therein are found exceeding many good orders; whereupon the Kings liberty and security depends: of which the chiefe is the Parliament, and the authority thereof; for hee that founded that Kingdome, knowing the great mens ambition and insolence; and judgeing it necessary there should bee a bridle to curbe them; and on the other side knowing the hatred of the Commonalty against the great ones, grounded upon feare, intending to secure them, would

not

not lay this care wholly upon the King; but take this trouble from him, which hee might have with the great men, in case hee favourd the Commonalty, or with the Commonalty in case hee favourd the great men: and thereupon set up a third judge, which was that, to the end it should keep under the great ones, and favour the meaner sort, without any imputation to the King. It was not possible to take a better, nor wiser course than this, nor a surer way to secure the King, and the Kingdome. From whence we may drawe another conclusion worthie of note, that Princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation; and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour. Here againe I conclude, that a Prince ought to make good esteeme of his Nobility; but not thereby to incurre the Commons hatred: It would seeme

seem perhaps to many, consi dering the life and death of many *Romane* Emperours, that they were examples contrary to my opinion, finding that some have liv'd worthily, and shewd many rare vertues of the minde, and yet have lost the Empire, and been put to death by their owne subjects, conspiring against them. Intending then to answer these objections; I shall discourse upon the qualities of some Emperours, declaring the occasions of their ruine, not disagreeing from that which I have alleagd: and part thereof I will bestow on the consideration of these things; which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times: and it shall suffice mee to take all those Emperours, that succeeded in the Empire from *Marcus* the Philosopher to *Maximinus*, who were *Marcus* and *Commodus* his sonne, *Pertinax*, *Julian*, *Severus*, *Antonius*, *Caracalla* his sonne, *Macrinus*, *He-*

Heliogabalus, *Alexander*, and *Maximin*. And first it is to be noted, that were in the other Principalities, they are to contend only with the ambition of the Nobles, and the insolence of the people; the Romane Emperours had a third difficulty, having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers, which was so hard a thing, that it causd the ruine of many, being hard to satisfy the souldiers, and the people: for the people love their quiet, and therefore affect modest Princes; and the souldiers love a Prince of a warlike courage, that is insolent, cruell and plucking from every one: which things they would have them exercise upon the people, whereby they might bee able to double their stipends, and satisfie their avarice and cruelty: whence it proceeded, that those Emperours who either by Nature or by Art had not such a reputation, as therewith they could curbe the

one

one and the other, were alwayes ruind: and the most of them, specially those, who as new men came to the principality, finding the difficulty of those two differrent humours, applyd themselves to content the souldiers, making small account of wronging the people: which was a course then necessary; for the Princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one, ought first endeavour that they incurre not the hatred of any whole universality; and when they cannot attaine thereunto, they are to provide with all industry, to avoyd the hatred of those universalities, that are the most mighty. And therefore those Emperours, who because they were but newly call'd to the Empire, had need of extraordinary favours, more willingly stuck to the souldiers, than to the people; which neverthelesse turnd to their advantage, or otherwise, according as that Prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them.

them. From these causes afore-sayd proceeded it, that *Marcus*, *Pertinax*, and *Alexander*, though all living modestly, being lovers of justice, and enemies of cruelty, courteous, and bountifull, had all from *Marcus* onward, miserable ends; *Marcus* only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured: for hee came to the Empire by inheritance, and was not to acknowledge it neither from the souldiers, nor from the people: afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues, which made him venerable, hee held alwayes whilst he liv'd, the one and the other order within their limits, and was never either hated, or contemnd. But *Pertinax* was created Emperour against the souldiers wills, who being accustomd to live licentiously under *Commodus*, could not endure that honest course, that *Pertinax* sought to reduce them to: Whereupon having gotten himself hatred, and to this hatred added

ded contempt, in that hee was old, was ruind in the very beginning of his government. Whence it ought to be observed, that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad; and therefore as I formerly said, when a Prince would maintaine the State, hee is often forcd not to be good: for when that generalty, whether it be the people, or souldiers, or Nobility, whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee, is corrupted, it behooves thee to follow their humour, and content them, and then all good deeds are thy adversaries. But let us come to *Alexander*, who was of that goodnesse, that among the praysses given him, had this for one, that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the Empire, he never put any man to death but by course of justice; neverthelesse being held effeminate, and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruld by his mother, and thereupon fallen into contempt; the

the army conspir'd against him. Now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of *Commodus*, *Severus*, *Antonius*, *Caracalla*, and *Maximinus*, you shall find them exceeding cruell, and ravinous, who to satisfie their souldiers, forbeare no kinde of injury, that could be done upon the people; and all of them, except *Severus*, came to evill ends: for in *Severus* there was such extraordinary valour, that while hee held the souldiers his friends, however the people were much burthend by him, he might alwayes reigne happily: for his valour rendred him so admirable in the souldiers and peoples sights; that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd, and those others reverencing, and honoring him. And because the actions of this man were exceeding great being in a new Prince, I will briefly shew, how well hee knew to act the Foxes and the Lions parts; the conditions of which two, I say, as before,

before, are very necessary for a Prince to imitate. *Severus* having had experience of *Iulian* the Emperours sloth, perswaded his army (whereof hee was commander in *Sclavonia*) that they should doe well to goe to *Rome*, to revenge *Pertinax* his death, who was put to death by the Imperiall guard; and under this pretence, not making any shew that hee aspird unto the Empire, set his army in march directly towards *Rome*, and was sooner come into *Italy*, than it was knowne hee had mov'd from his station. Being arriv'd at *Rome*, hee was by the Senate chosen Emperour for feare; and *Julian* slaine. After this beginning, two difficulties yet remaind to *Severus*, before hee could make himselfe Lord of the whole State; the one in *Asia*, where *Niger* the Generall of those armies had gotten the title of Emperour, the other in the West with *Albinus*, who also aspird to the Empire: and

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the army conſpir'd againſt him. Now on the contrary diſcourſing upon the qualities of *Commodus*, *Severus*, *Antonius*, *Caracalla*, and *Maximinus*, you ſhall find them exceeding cruell, and ravinous, who to ſatisfie their ſouldiers, forbeare no kinde of injury, that could be done upon the people; and all of them, except *Severus*, came to evill ends: for in *Severus* there was ſuch extraordinary valour, that while hee held the ſouldiers his friends, however the people were much burthend by him, he might alwayes reigne happily: for his valour rendred him ſo admirable in the ſouldiers and peoples ſights; that theſe in a manner ſtood amazd and aſtoniſhd, and thoſe others reverencing, and honoring him. And becauſe the actions of this man were exceeding great being in a new Prince, I will briefly ſhew, how well hee knew to act the Foxes and the Lions parts; the conditions of which two, I ſay, as before,

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because hee thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both; he purposd to set upon *Niger*, and cozen *Albinus*, to whom hee writ, that being elected Emperour by the Senate, hee would willingly communicate it with him; and thereupon sent him the title of *Cæsar*, and by resolution of the Senate, tooke him to him for his Collegue; which things were taken by *Albinus* in true meaning. But afterwards when *Severus* had overcome and slaine *Niger*, and pacified the affaires in the East, being returnd to *Rome*, hee complaind in the Senate of *Albinus*, how little weighing the benefits received from him, hee had sought to slay him by treason, and therefore was hee forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude; afterwards hee went into *France*, where hee bereft him, both of his State, and life. Whoever then shall in particular examine his actions, shall

finde

findehee was a very cruell Lion, and as crafty a Foxe: and shall see that hee was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by every one, and by the armies not hated; and shall nothing marvell that hee being a new man, was able to hold together such a great Empire: for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred, which the people for his extortions might have conceiv'd against him. But *Antonius* his sonne, was also an exceeding brave man, and endued with most excellent qualities, which caus'd him to be admird by the people, and acceptable to the souldiers; because hee was a warrlike man, enduring all kind of travell and paines, despising all delicate food, and all kinde of effeminacy; which gaind him the love of all the armies: neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such and so hideous, having upon many particular occasions put to death a

great

great part of the people of *Rome*, and all those of *Alexandria*, that hee grew odious to the world; and began to bee feard by those also, that were neare about him; so that hee was slaine by a Centurion in the very midst of his army. Where it is to be noted, that these kinde of deaths, which follow upon the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde, cannot by a Prince be avoyded: for every one that feares not to dye, is able to doe it; but a Prince ought to be lesse afraid of it; because it very seldome falls out. Only should hee beware not to doe any extreame injury, to any of those of whom he serves himselfe, or that hee hath near about him in any imployment of his Principality; as *Antonius* did: who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that Centurion, also threatned him every day, and neverthelesse entertaind him still as one of the guards of his body: which was a rash course taken, and

and the way to destruction, as befell him. But let us come to *Commodus*, for whom it was very easie to hold the Empire, by reason it descended upon him by inheritance, being *Marcus* his sonne; and it had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps, and then had hee contented both the people and the souldiers; but being of a cruell and savage disposition, whereby to excercise his actions upon the people, hee gave himselfe to entertaine armies, and those in all licentiousnesse. On the other part not maintaining his dignity, but often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers, and doing such other like base things, little worthy of the Imperiall majesty, hee became contemptible in the souldiers sight, and being hated of one part, and dispisd of the other, he was conspird against, and slaine. It remaines now that wee declare *Maximinus* his conditions: who

was

was a very warrlike man; and the armies loathing *Alexanders* effeminacy, whereof I spake before, when they had slain him, chose this man Emperour; who not long continu'd so, because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt; the one because hee was very base, haviug kept cattell in *Thrace*, which was well knowne to every one, and made them to scorne him; the other, because in the beginning of his Principality having delayd to goe to *Rome*, and enter into possession of the Imperiall throne, he had gaind the infamy of being thought exceding cruell, having by his Prefects in *Rome*, and in every place of the Empire exercisd many cruelties, insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for the basenesse of his blood, on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for feare of his cruelty; first *Affrica*, afterwards the

the *Senate* with all the people of *Rome*, and all *Italy* conspird against him, with whom his own army took part; which incamping before *Aquileya*, and finding some difficulty to take the town, being weary of his cruelties, & because they saw he had so many enemies, fearing him the lesse, slew him. I purpose not to say any thing either of *Heliogabalus*, *Macrinus*, or *Julian*, who because they were throughly base, were suudenly extinguishd; but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse; and I say, that the Princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the Souldiers extraordinarily in their governments; for notwithstanding that there be some consideration to bee had of them; yet presently are those armies dissolv'd, because none of these Princes do use to maintaine any armies together, which are annex'd and inveterated with the governments of the provinces, as were the armies of

the

the *Romane* Empire. And therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the souldiers than the people, it was because the souldiers were more powerfull than the people: now is it more necessary for all Princes, (except the *Turk* and the *Souldan*) to satisfie their people than their souldiers: because the people are more mighty than they; wherein I except the *Turk*, he alwayes maintaining about his person 12000 foot, and 15000 horse, upon which depends the safety and strength of his Kingdome, and it is necessary that laying aside all other regard of his people, hee maintaine these his friends. The *Souldans* Kingdome is like hereunto, which being wholly in the souldiers power, hee must also without respect of his people keep them his friends. And you are to consider, that this State of the *Souldans* differs much from all the other Principalities: for it is very like the Papacy, which cannot

not

not be termd a hereditary Principality, nor a new Principality: for the sonns of the deceasd Prince are not heires and Lords thereof; but hee that is chosen, receives that dignity from those, who have the authority in them. And this order being of antiquity, cannot be termd a new Principality, because therein are none of those difficulties, that are in the new ones: for though the Prince be new; yet are the orders of that State ancient, and ordaind to receive him, as if hee were their hereditary Prince. But let us returne to our matter; whosoever shall consider our discourse before, shall perceive that either hatred, or contempt have causd the ruine of the afore-namd Emperours; and shall know also, from it came that part of them proceeding one way, and part a contrary; yet in any of them the one had a happy successe, and the others unhappy: for it was of no availe, but rather hurtfull, for

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Pertinax and *Alexander*, because they were new Princes, to desire to imitate *Marcus*, who by inheritance came to the Principality: and in like manner it was a wrong to *Caracalla*, *Commodus*, and *Maximinus* to imitate *Severus*, because none of them were endued with so great valour as to follow his stepps therein. Wherefore a new Prince in his Principality cannot well imitate *Marcus* his actions; nor yet is it necessary to follow those of *Severus*: but he ought make choyce of those parts in *Severus* which are necessary for the founding of a State; and to take from *Marcus* those that are fitt and glorious to preserve a State which is already establishd and setled.

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM

Chap. XX.

Whether the Citadels and many other things, which Princes often make use of, are profitable or dammageable.

SOme Princes, whereby they might safely keep their State, have disarm'd their subjects; some others have held the townes under their dominion, devided into factions; others have maintain'd enmities against themselves; others have apply'd themselves to gaine them, where they have suspected at their entrance into the government; others have built Fortresses; and others again have ruin'd and demolish'd them: and however that upon all these things, a man cannot well passe a determinate sentence, unlesse one comes to the particulars of these States, where some such like determinations were to be taken; yet shall I speake of them in so large a manner, as the matter of it selfe will

will beare. It was never then that a new Prince would disarme his own subjects; but rather when hee hath found them disarmd, hee hath alwayes armd them. For being belov'd, those armes become thine; those become faithfull, which thou hadst in suspicion; and those which were faithfull, are maitaind so; and thy subjects are made thy partisans: and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes, when thou bestowst favours on those thou armest, with the others thou canst deale more for thy safety; and that difference of proceeding which they know among them, obliges them to thee; those others excuse thee, judgeing it necessary, that they have deservd more, who have undergon more danger, and so have greater obligation: but when thou disarmst them, thou beginst to offend them, that thou distrusts them, either for cowardise, or small faith; and the one or the

other of those two opinions provokes their hatred against thee: and because thou canst not stand disarmed, thou must then turne thy selfe to mercenary Souldiery, whereof wee have formerly spoken what it is: and when it is good, it can never bee so much as to defend thee from powerfull enemies, and suspected subjects; therefore as I have said, a new Prince in a new Principality hath always ordaind them armes. Of examples to this purpose, Histories are full. But when a Prince gaines a new State, which as a member hee addes to his ancient dominions; then it is necessary to disarme that State, unlesse it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof; and these also in time and upon occasions, it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate, and so order them, that all the armes of thy State be in the hands of thy own Souldiers, who live in thy ancient State

neare unto thee. Our ancestors and they that were accounted sages, were wont to say, that it was necessary to hold *Pistoya* in factions, and *Pisa* with Fortresses; and for this cause maintaind some towne subject to them in differences, whereby to hold it more easily. This, at what time *Italy* was ballanc'd in a certaine manner, might be well done; but me thinks it cannot now adayes bee well given for a precept; for I do not beleeve, that divisions made can do any good; rather it must needs bee, that when the enemy approaches them, Cities divided are presently lost; for alwayes the weaker part will cleave to the forreine power, and the other not be able to subsist. The *Venetians* (as I think) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons, maintaind the factions of the *Guelfes* and *Gibellins*, in their townes; and however they never suffer'd them to spill one anothers blood, yet they nourishd these differences among

them, to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels, should not plot any thing against them: which as it prov'd, never serv'd them to any great purpose: for being defeated at *Vayla*, presently one of those two factions tooke courage and seizd upon their whole State. Therefore such like wayes argue the Princes weakenesse; for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions; for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace, being they are able by meanes thereof more easily to manage their subjects; but war comming, such like orders discover their fallacy. Without doubt, Princes become great, when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them; and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any new Prince great, who hath more need to gaine reputation, than a hereditary Prince, causes enemies to rise against him, and him to un-

dertake against them; to the end he may have occasion to master them, and know that ladder, which his enemies have set him upon, whereby to rise yet higher. And therefore many think, that a wise Prince, when hee hath the occasion, ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the suppressing thereof, his greatnesse may grow thereupon. Princes, especially those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those men, who in the beginning of their State, have been held suspected, than in those who at their entrance have been their confidents. *Pandolphus Petrucci*, Prince of *Siena*, governd his State more with them that had bin suspected by him, than with the others. But of this matter we cannot speak at large, because it varies according to the subject; I will only say this, that those men, who in the begininng of a principality were once enemies, if they be of quality, so that to maintain

themselves they have need of support, the Prince might alwayes with the greatest facility gaine for his; and they are the rather forc'd to serve him faithfully, insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancell that sinister opinion, which was once held of them; and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage, than from those, who serving him too supinely, neglect his affaires. And seing the matter requires it, I will not omit, to put a Prince in mind, who hath anew made himselfe master of a State, by meanes of the inward helpes he had from thence, that he consider well, the cause that mov'd them that favour'd him to favour him, if it be not a naturall affection towards him; for if it be only because they were not content with their former government, with much paines and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends, because it will bee impossible for him

him to content them. By these examples then, which are drawn out of ancient and moderne affaires, searching into the cause hereof, wee shall find it much more easie to gaine those men for friends, who formerly were contented with the State, and therefore were his enemies: than those, who because they were not contented therewith, became his friends, and favourd him in getting the mastery of it. It hath been the custome of Princes, wherby to hold their States more securely, to build Citadels, which might bee bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them, and so to have a secure retraite from the first violences. I commend this course, because it hath been usd of old; notwithstanding *Nicolas Vitelli* in our dayes hath been knowne to demolish two Citadels in the towne of *Castello*, the better to keep the State. *Guidubaldo* Duke of *Urbin* being to returne

into

into his State, out of which hee was driven by *Cæsar Borgia*, raz'd all the Fortresses of that Country, and thought he should hardlyer lose that State againe without them. The *Bentivolii* returning into *Bolonia*, usd the like courses. Citadels then are profitable, or not, according to the times, and if they advantage thee in one part, they do thee harme in another, and this part may be argued thus. That Prince, who stands more in feare of his owne people than of strangers, ought to build Fortresses: but hee that is more afraid of strangers than of his people, should let them alone. Against the house of *Sforza*, the Castle of *Millan*, which *Francis Sforza* built, hath and will make more war, than any other disorder in that State: and therefore the best Citadell that may be, is not to incurre the peoples hatred; for however thou hold it a Fortresse, and the people hate thee, thou canst hardly scape them

them: for people, when once they have taken armes, never want the help of strangers at their need, to take their parts. In our dayes we never saw, that they ever profited any Prince, unlesse it were the Countesse of *Furli*, when Count *Hieronimo* of *Furli* her husband was slaine; for by meanes thereof she escap'd the peoples rage, and attended aid from *Milan*, and so recoverd her State: and then such were the times that the stranger could not assist the people: but afterwards they serv'd her to little purpose, when *Cesar Borgia* assaild her, and that the people which was her enemy, sided with the stranger. Therefore both then, and at first, it would have been more for her safety, not to have been odious to the people, than to have held the Fortresses. These things being well weigh'd then, I will commend those that shall build up Fortresses, and him also that shall not; and I will blame him, howsoever he be that

relying

relying upon those, shall make small account of being hated by his people.

Chap. XXI.

How a Prince ought to behave himselfe to gaine Reputation.

THere is nothing gaines a Prince such repute, as great exployts, and rare trialls of himselfe in Heroicke actions. We have now in our dayes *Ferdinand* King of *Arragon* the present King of *Spain*: hee in a manner may be termd a new Prince, for from a very weak King, hee is now become for fame and glory, the first King of Christendome, and if you shall well consider his actions, you shall find them all illustrious, and every one of them extraordinary. Hee in the beginning of his reigne assaild *Granada*, and that exployt was the ground of his State. At first hee made that warre in security and without suspicion he should be

be any wayes hindred, and therein held the Barons of *Castiglia* minds busied, who thinking upon that warre, never minded any innovation; and in this while he gaind credit and authority with them, they not being aware of it; was able to maintaine with the Church, and the peoples mony, all his souldiers, and to lay a foundation for his military ordinances with that long warre: which afterwards gaind him exceeding much honour. Besides this, to the end hee might be able here among to undertake greater matters, serving himselfe alwaies of the colour of religion; hee gave himselfe to a kind of religious cruelty, chasing and dispoyling those *Jewes* out of the Kingdome; nor can this example bee more admirable and rare: under the same cloke hee invaded *Affrick* and went through with his exployt in *Italy*: and last of all hath hee assaild *France*, and so alwaies proceeded on forwards

contriving

contriving of great matters; which alwayes have held his subjects minds in peace and admiration, and busied in attending the event what it should bee; and these his actions have thus grown, one upon another, that they have never given leysure to men so to rest, as that they might ever plot any thing against them. Moreover it much availes a Prince to give extraordinary proofes of himselfe touching the government within, such as those wee have heard of *Bernard* of *Milan*; whensoever occasion is given by any one, that may effectuate some great thing either of good or evill, in the civill government; and to finde out some way either to reward or punish it, whereof in the world much notice may bee taken. And above all things a Prince ought to endeavour in all his actions to spread abroad a fame of his magnificence and worthinesse. A Prince also is well esteemd, when hee is a true

freind

friend, or a true enemy, when without any regard hee discovers himselfe in favour of one against another; which course shall bee alwayes more profit, than to stand neuter: for if two mighty ones that are thy neighbours come to fall out, or are of such quality, that one of them vanquishing, thou art like to bee in feare of the vanquisher; or not; in either of these two cases, it will ever prove more for thy profit to discover thy selfe, and make a good war of it: for in the first case, if thou discoverst not thy selfe, thou shalt alwayes bee a prey to him that overcomes, to the contentment and satisfaction of the vanquisht; neither shalt thou have reason on thy side, nor any thing else to defend or receive thee. For hee that overcomes, will not have any suspected freinds, that give him no assistance in his necessity: and hee that loses, receives thee not, because thou wouldst not with thy

thy armes in hand runne the hazard of his fortune. *Antiochus* passd into *Greece*, thereunto induc'd by the *Etolians*, to chace the *Romans* thence: and sent his Ambassadors to the *Achayans*, who were the *Romans* friends, to perswade them to stand neuters; on the other side the *Romans* mov'd them to joyne armes with theirs: this matter came to bee deliberated on in the counsell of the *Achayans*, where *Antiochus* his Ambassadour encouragd them to stand neuters, whereunto the *Romans* Ambassadour answerd. Touching the course, that is commended to you, as best and profitablest for your State, to wit, not to intermeddle in the warre between us, nothing can be more against you: because, not taking either part, you shall remaine without thanks, and without reputation a prey to the Conquerour. And it will alwayes come to passe that hee who is not thy freind, will require thy neutrality,

lity, and hee that is thy friend, will urge thee, to discover thy selfe by taking armes for him: and evill advisd Princes, to avoyd the present dangers, follow often times that way of neutrality, and most commonly goe to ruine: but when a Prince discovers himselfe strongly in favour of a party, if hee to whom thou cleavest, overcomes, however that hee be puissant, and thou remainst at his disposing, hee is oblig'd to thee, and there is a contract of friendship made; and men are never so openly dishonest, as with such a notorious example of dishonesty to oppresse thee. Besides victories are never so prosperous, that the conquerour is like to neglect all respects, and especially of justice. But if he to whom thou stickst, loses thou art receivd by him; and, while hee is able, hee aydes thee, and so thou becomst partner of a fortune that may arise againe. In the second case, when they that

enter into the lists, together, are of such quality, that thou needst not feare him that vanquisheth, so much the more is it descretion in thee to stick to him; for thou goest to ruine one with his assistance, who ought to doe the best hee could to save him, if he were well advisd; and hee overcomming, is left at thy discretion, and it is unpossible but with thy ayd he must overcome. And here it is to be noted, that a Prince should bee well aware never to joyne with any one more powerfull than himselfe, to offend another, unlesse upon necessity, as formerly is said. For when he overcomes, thou art left at his discretion; and Princes ought avoid as much as they are able, to stand at anothers discretion. The *Venetians* took part with *France* against the Duke of *Milan*, and yet could have avoided that partaking, from which proceeded their ruine. But when it cannot bee avoyded, as it befell the *Florentines*

times, when the Pope and the King of *Spain* went both with their armies to assaile *Lombardy*, there the Prince ought to side with them for the reasons aforesaid. Nor let any State think they are able to make such sure parties; but rather that they are all doubtfull; for in the order of things wee find it alwayes, that whensoever a man seeks to avoid one inconvenient; hee incurres another. But the principall point of judgement, is in discerning between the qualities of inconvenients, and not taking the bad for the good. Moreover a Prince ought to shew himselfe a lover of vertue, and that he honours those that excell in every Art. Afterwards ought hee incourage his Citizens, whereby they may bee enabled quickly to exercise their faculties, as well in merchandise, and husbandry, as in any other kind of traffick, to the end that no man forbeare to adorne and cultivate his possessions

for

for feare, that hee be despoyld of them; or any other to open the commerce upon the danger of heavy impositions: but rather to provide rewards for those that shall set these matters afoot, or for any one else that shall any way amplifie his City or State. Besides hee ought in the fit times of the yeare entertain the people with Feasts and Maskes; and because every City is devided into Companyes, and Arts, and Tribes, hee ought to take speciall notice of those bodies, and some times afford them a meeting, and give them some proofe of his humanity, and magnificence; yet withall holding firme the majestie of his State, for this must never faile in any case.

CHAP. XXII.

Touching Princes Secretaries.

IT is no small importance to a Prince, the choyce he makes of servants, being ordinarily good,

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Touching Princes Secretaries.

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good, or bad, as his wisdome is. And the first conjecture one gives of a great man, and of his understanding, is upon the sight of his followers and servants hee hath about him, when they prove able and faithfull, and then may hee alwayes be reputed wise; because hee hath knowne how to discerne those that are able, and to keepe them true to him. But when they are otherwise, there can be no good conjecture made of him, for the first errour hee commits, is in this choyce. There was no man, that had any knowledge of *Antony* of *Venafro*, the servant of *Pandulfus Petrucci* Prince of *Siena*, who did not esteeme *Pandulfus* for a very discreet man, having him for his servant. And because there are three kinds of understandings, the one that is advisd by it selfe; the other that understands when it is informed by another; the third that neither is advisd by it selfe, nor by the demonstration of another;

nother; the first is best, the second is good, and the last quite unprofitable. Therefore it was of necessity, that if *Pandulfus* attaind not the first degree, yet hee got to the second; for whenever any one hath the judgement to discerne between the good and the evill, that any one does and sayes, however that hee hath not this invention from himselfe, yet still comes hee to take notice of the good or evill actions of that servant; and those hee cherishes, and these hee suppresses; insomuch that the servant finding no meanes to deceive his master, keeps himselfe upright and honest. But how a Prince may throughly understand his servant, here is the way that never failes. When thou seest, the servant study more for his owne advantage than thine, and that in all his actions, hee searches most after his owne profit; this man thus qualified, shall never prove good servant, nor canst thou ever re-

lie upon him: for he that holds the sterne of the State in hand, ought never call home his care to his owne particular, but give himselfe wholly over to his Princes service, nor ever put him in mind of any thing not appertaining to him. And on the other side the Prince to keep him good to him, ought to take a care for his servant, honouring him, enriching, and obliging him to him, giving him part both of dignities and offices, to the end that the many honors and much wealth bestowd on him, may restraine his desires from other honours, and other wealth, and that those many charges cause him to feare changes that may fall, knowing hee is not able to stand without his master. And when both the Princes and the servants are thus dispos'd, they may rely the one upon the other: when otherwise, the end will ever prove hurtfull for the one as well as for the other.

Chap. XXIII.

That Flatterers are to bee avoyded.

I Will not omit one principle of great importance, being an errour from which Princes with much difficulty defend themselves, unlesse they be very discreet, and make a very good choice; and this is concerning flatterers, whereof all writings are full: and that because men please themselves so much in their owne things, and therein cozen themselves, that very hardly can they escape this pestilence; and desiring to escape it, there is danger of falling into contempt; for there is no other way to bee secure from flattery, but to let men know, that they displease thee not in telling thee truth: but when every one hath this leave, thou losest thy reverence. Therefore ought a wise Prince take a third course, making choyce of some

some understanding men in his State, and give only to them a free liberty of speaking to him the truth; and touching those things only which hee inquires of, and nothing else; but hee ought to be inquisitive of every thing, and heare their opinions, and then afterwards advise himselfe after his owne manner, and in these deliberations, and with every one of them so carry himselfe, that they all know, that the more freely they shall speake, the better they shall be lik'd of: and besides those, not give eare to any one, and thus pursue the thing resolv'd on, and thence continue obstinate in the resolution taken. Hee who does otherwise, either falls upon flatterers, or often changes upon the varying of opinions, from whence proceeds it that men conceive but slightly of him. To this purpose I will alleadge you a moderne example. *Peter Lucas* a servant of *Maximilian* the present Emperour, speaking

of

of his Majesty, said that hee never advisd with any body; nor never did any thing after his owne way: which was because he took a contrary course to what wee have now said: for the Emperour is a close man, who communicates his secrets to none, nor takes counsaile of any one: but as they come to be put in practise, they begin to be discoverd and knowne, and so contradicted by those that are neare about him, and hee as being an easie man, is quickly wrought from them. Whence it comes, that what hee does to day, hee undoes on the morrow; and that hee never understands himself what he would, nor what hee purposes, and that there is no grounding upon any of his resolutions. A Prince therefore ought alwayes to take counsell, but at his owne pleasure, and not at other mens; or rather should take away any mans courage to advise him of any thing, but what hee askes: but

hee ought well to aske at large; and then touching the things inquird of, be a patient hearer of the truth, and perceiving that for some respect the truth were conceald from him, be displeasd thereat. And because some men have thought, that a Prince, that gaines the opinion to bee wise, may be held so, not by his owne naturall indowments, but by the good counsells hee hath about him; without question they are deceivd; for this is a generall rule and never failes, that a Prince who of himselfe is not wise, can never bee well advisd, unlesse he should light upon one alone, wholly to direct and governe him, who himselfe were a very wise man. In this case it is possible hee may bee well governd: but this would last but little: for that governour in a short time would deprive him of his State; but a Prince not having any parts of nature, being advisd of more than one, shall never bee able

able to unite these counsells: of himselfe shall hee never know how to unite them, and each one of the counsellers, probably will follow that which is most properly his owne; and hee shall never finde the meanes to amend or discerne these things, nor can they fall out otherwise, because men alwayes prove mischievous, unlesse up n some necessity they be forc'd to become good: wee conclude therefore, that counsells from whencesoever they proceed, must needs take their beginning from the Princes wisdome, and not the wisdome of the Prince from good counsells.

In this Chapter our Authour prescribes some rules how to avoyd flattery, and not to fall into contempt. The extent of these two extreames is so large on both sides, that there is left but a very narrow path for the right temper to walke between them both: and happy were that Prince, who could

light on so good a Pilote, as to bring him to Port between those rocks and these quicksands. Where Majesty becomes familiar, unlesse endued with a supereminent vertue, it loses all awfull regards, as the light of the Sunne, because so ordinary, because so common, we should little value, were it not that all Creatures feele themselves quickned by the rayes thereof. On the other side, Omnis insipiens arrogantiâ & plausibus capitur. *Every foole is taken with his own pride and others flatteryes: and this foole keeps company so much with al great wise men, that hardly with a candle and lanterne can they be discernd betwixt. The greatest men are more subject to grosse and palpable flatteries; and especially the greatest of men, who are Kings and Princes: for many seek the Rulers favour.* Prov. 28. 26. *For there are divers meanes whereby private men are instructed; Princes have not that good hap, but they whose instruction is* mo-

most importante, so soone as they have taken the government upon them, no longer suffer any reproovers: for, but few have accesse unto them, and they who familiarly converse with them, doe and say all for favour. Isocrat. *to* Nicocles. *All are afraid to give him occasion of displeasure, though by telling him truth. To this purpose therefore sayes one, a Prince excells in learning to ride the great horse, rather than in any other excercise: because his horse being no flatterer, will shew him hee makes no difference between him and another man, and unlesse hee keepe his seate well, will lay him on the ground. This is plaine dealing. Men are more subtile, more double hearted, they have a heart & a heart, neither is their tongue their hearts true interpreter. Counsell in the heart of man is like deepe waters; but a man of understanding will draw it out.* Prov. 20. 5. *This understanding is most requisite in a Prince, inasmuch as the whole*

Plutarch. d: adulatore & amico discernendo.

Globe is in his hand, and the inferiour Orbes are swayed by the motion of the highest. And therefore surely it is the honour of a King to search out such a secret: Prov. 25. 2. *His counsellours are his eyes and eares; as they ought to be deare to him, so they ought to be true to him, and make him the true report of things without disguise. If they prove false eyes, let him pluck them out, hee may as they use glasse eyes take them forth without paine, and see never awhit the worse for it. The wisdome of a Princes Counsellours is a great argument of the Princes wisdome. And being the choyce of them imports the Princes credit and safety, our Authour will make him amends for his other erreurs by his good advice in his 22. Chap. whether I referre him.*

Chap. XXIV.

Wherefore the Princes of Italy *have lost their States.*

WHen these things above said are well observ'd, they

they make a new Prince seeme as if he had been of old, and presently render him more secure and firme in the State, than if he had already grown ancient therein: for a new Prince is much more observd in his actions, than a Prince by inheritance, and when they are known to bee vertuous, men are much more gaind and oblig'd to them thereby, than by the antiquity of their bloud: for men are much more taken by things present, than by things past; and when in the present they find good, they content themselves therein, and seeke no further, or rather they undertake the defence of him to their utmost, when the Prince is not wanting in other matters to himselfe; and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new Principality, adornd, and strengthnd it with good lawes, good arms, good friends, and good examples; as hee shall have double shame, that is borne

a Prince, and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it. And if we shall consider those Lords, that in *Italy* have lost their States in our dayes, as the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and others; first we shall find in them a common defect, touching their armes, for the reasons which have been above discoursd, at length. Afterwards we shall see some of them, that either shall have had the people for their enemies; or be it they had the people to friend, could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones: for without such defects as these, States are not lost, which have so many nerves, that they are able to maintaine an army in the field. *Philip* of *Macedon*, not the father of *Alexander* the Great, but he that was vanquishd by *Titus Quintius*, had not much State in regard of the greatnesse of the *Romanes* and of *Greece* that assail'd him; neverthelesse in that he was a warlike man and knew

how

how to entertaine the people and assure himselfe of the Nobles, for many yeares he made the warre good against them: and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him, yet the Kingdome remaind in his hands still. Wherefore these our Princes who for many yeares had continued in their Principalities, for having afterwards lost them, let them not blame Fortune, but their own sloth; because they never having thought during the times of quiet, that they could suffer a change (which is the common fault of men, while faire weather lasts, not to provide for the tempest) when afterwards mischiefes came upon them, thought rather upon flying from them, than upon their defence, and hop'd that the people, weary of the vanquishers insolence, would recall them: which course when the others faile, is good: but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that: for a man wou'd never go to fall,

beleeving another would come to take him up: which may either not come to passe, or if it does, it is not for thy security, because that defence of his is vile, and depends not upon thee; but those defences only are good, certaine, and durable, which depend upon thy owne selfe, and thy owne vertues.

Chap. XXV.

How great power Fortune hath in humane affaires, and what meanes there is to resist it.

IT is not unknown unto me, how that many have held opinion, and still hold it, that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune, and by God, that men by their wisdome cannot amend or alter them; or rather that there is no remedy for them: and hereupon they would think that it were of no availe to take much paines in any thing, but leave all to be governd by chance.

This

This opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes, by reason of the great alteration of things, which wee have of late seen, and do every day see, beyond all humane conjecture: upon which, I sometimes thinking, am in some part inclind to their opinion: neverthelesse not to extinguish quite our own free will, I think it may be true, that Fortune is the mistresse of one halfe of our actions; but yet that she lets us have rule of the other halfe, or little lesse. And I liken her to a precipitous torrent, which when it rages, over-flows the plaines, overthrowes the trees, and buildings, removes the earth from one side, and laies it on another, every one flyes before it, every one yeelds to the fury thereof, as unable to withstand it; and yet however it be thus, when the times are calmer, men are able to make provision against these excesses, with banks and fences so, that afterwards when it swels again, it

shall

ſhall all paſſe ſmoothly along, within its channell, or elſe the violence thereof ſhall not prove ſo licentious and hurtfull. In like manner befals it us with fortune, which there ſhewes her power where vertue is not ordeind to reſiſt her, and thither turnes ſhe all her forces, where ſhee perceives that no proviſions nor reſiſtances are made to uphold her. And if you ſhall conſider *Italy*, which is the ſeat of theſe changes, and that which hath given them their motion, you ſhall ſee it to be a plaine field, without any trench or banck; which had it been fenc'd with convenient vertue, as was *Germany*, *Spaine*, or *France*; this inundation would never have cauſd theſe great alterations it hath, or elſe would it not have reach'd to us: and this ſhall ſuffice to have ſaid, touching the oppoſing of fortune in generall. But reſtraining my ſelfe more to particulars; I ſay, that to day we ſee a Prince proſper and flouriſh, and

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to morrow utterly go to ruine; not seeing that he hath alterd any condition or quality; which I beleeve arises first from the causes which wee have long since run over, that is because that Prince that relies wholly upon fortune, ruines, as her wheele turnes. I beleeve also, that he proves the fortunate man, whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the times: and so likewise he unfortunate, from whose course of proceeding the times differ: for we see that men, in the things that induce them to the end, (which every one propounds to himselfe, as glory and riches) proceed therein diversly; some with respects, others more bold, and rashly; one with violence, and th'other with cunning; the one with patience, th'other with its contrary; and every one by severall ways may attaine thereto. We see also two very respective and wary men, the one come to his purpose, and th'other not; and

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in like manner two equally prosper taking divers courses, th'one being wary, th'other headstrong; which proceeds from nothing else, but from the quality of the times, which agree, or not, with their proceedings. From hence arises that which I said, that two working diversly, produce the same effect; and two equally working, th'one attaines his end, th'other not. Hereupon also depends the alteration of the good; for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience, times and affaires turne so favourably, that the carriage of his businesse prove well, hee prospers; but if the times and affaires change, he is ruind; because he changes not his manner of proceeding: nor is there any man so wise, that can frame himselfe hereunto; as well because he cannot go out of the way, from that whereunto Nature inclines him: as also, for that one having alwayes prosperd, walking such

a way, cannot be perswaded to leave it: and therefore the respective and wary man, when it is fit time for him to use violence and force, knows not how to put it in practise, whereupon hee is ruind: but if he could change his disposition with the times and the affaires, he should not change his fortune. Pope *Julius* the second, proceeded in all his actions with very great violence, and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding, that in all of them he had happy successe. Consider the first exploit he did at *Bolonia*, even while *John Bentivolio* liv'd: the *Venetians* were not well contented therewith; the King of *Spaine* likewise with the *French*, had treated of that enterprise; and notwithstanding all this, hee stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse, personally undertook that expedition: which action of his put in suspence and stopt *Spaine* and the *Venitians*, those

for

for feare, and th'others for desire to recover the Kingdome of *Naples*; and on th'other part drew after him the King of *France*: for that King seeing him already in motion, and desiring to hold him his friend, whereby to humble the *Venetians*, thought he could no way deny him his souldiers, without doing him an open injury. *Julius* then effected that with his violent and heady motion, which no other Pope with all humane wisdome could ever have done; for if hee had expected to part from *Rome* with his conclusions settled, and all his affaires ordered before hand, as any other Pope would have done, hee had never brought it to passe: For the King of *France* would have devisd a thousand excuses, and others would have put him in as many feares. I will let passe his other actions, for all of them were alike, and all of them prov'd lucky to him; and the brevity of his life never sufferd him to feele the

the contrary: for had he litt upon ſuch times afterwards, that it had been neceſſary for him to proceed with reſpects, there had been his utter ruine; for hee would never have left thoſe wayes, to which he had been naturally inclind. I conclude then, fortune varying, and men continuing ſtill obſtinate to their own wayes, prove happy, while theſe accord together: and as they diſagree, prove unhappy: and I think it true, that it is better to be heady, than wary: becauſe Fortune is a miſtreſſe; and it is neceſſary, to keep her in obedience, to ruffle and force her: and we ſee, that ſhe ſuffers her ſelfe rather to be maſterd by thoſe, than by others that proceed coldly. And therefore, as a miſtreſſe, ſhee is a friend to young men, because they are leſſe reſpective, more rough, and command her with more boldneſſe.

I have conſidered the 25 Chapter, as repreſenting me a full view of humane

humane policy and cunning: yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a Christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things. The life of man is like a game at Tables; skill availes much I grant, but that's not all: play thy game well, but that will not winne: the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play. Examine this; play never so surely, play never so probably, unlesse the chance thou castest, lead thee forward to advantage, all hazards are losses, and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch. The sum of this is set down in Ecclesiastes chap. 9. v. 11. *The race is not to the swift, nor the battell to the strong; neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all. Our cunning Author for all his exact rules he delivers in his books, could not fence against the despight of Fortune, as he complaines in his Epistle to this booke. Nor that great example of policy,*

Duke

Duke Valentine, *whom our Author commends to Princes for his crafts-master, could so ruffle or force his mistresse Fortune, that he could keep her in obedience. Man can contribute no more to his actions than vertue and wisdome: but the successe depends upon a power above. Surely there is the finger of God: or as* Prov. the 16. v. 33. *The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. It was not* Josephs *wisdom made all things thrive under his hand; but because the Lord was with him, and that which he did, the Lord made it to prosper.* Gen. 39. *Surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence, which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes, as that their effects prove answerable, and sometimes (that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes) the successe returnes with such a supereminency of worth, that it farr exceeds the vertue of the ordinary causes.*

Chap.

Chap. XXVI.

An Exhortation to free Italy *from the* Barbarians.

HAving then weigh'd all things above discours'd, and devising with my selfe, whether at this present in *Italy* the times might serve to honour a new Prince, and whether there were matter, that might minister occasion to a wise and valourous Prince, to introduce such a forme, that might doe honour to him, and good to the whole generalty of the people in the countrey: me thinks so many things concurre in favour of a new Prince, that I know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose. And if as I said, it was necessary, desiring to see *Moyses* his vertue, that the children of *Israel* should bee inthrald in *Ægypt*; and to have experience of the magnanimity of *Cyrus* his minde, that the *Persians*

sians should be oppresd by the *Medes*; and to set forth the excellency of *Theseus*, that the *Athenians* should bee dispersd: so at this present now wee are desirous to know the valour of an *Italian* spirit, it were necessary *Italy* should bee reduc'd to the same termes it is now in, and were in more slavery, than the *Hebrews* were; more subject than the *Persians*; more scatterd than the *Athenians*; without head, without order, batterd, pillagd, rent asunder, overrunne, and had undergone all kind of destruction. And however even in these later dayes, wee have had some kinde of shew of hope in some one, whereby wee might have conjectur'd, that hee had been ordeind for the deliverance hereof, yet it prov'd afterwards, that in the very height of all his actions hee was curb'd by fortune, insomuch that this poore countrey remaining as it were without life, attends still for him that

that ſhall heale her wounds, give an end to all thoſe pillagings and ſackings of *Lombardy*, to thoſe robberies and taxations of the Kingdome, and of *Tuſcany*, and heale them of their ſoares, now this long time gangren'd. We ſee how ſhe makes her prayers to God, that he ſend ſome one to redeem her from theſe Barbarous cruelties and inſolences. We ſee her alſo wholly ready and diſpoſd to follow any colours, provided there bee any one to take them up. Nor doe we ſee at this preſent, that ſhee can look for other, than your Illuſtrious Family, to become Cheiftaine of this deliverance, which hath now by its owne Vertue and Fortune been ſo much exalted, and favourd by God and the Church, whereof it now holds the Principality: and this ſhall not be very hard for you to doe, if you ſhall call to minde the former actions, and lives of thoſe that are above named. And though thoſe men

were very rare and admirable, yet were they men, and every one of them began upon lesse occasion than this; for neither was their enterprise more just than this, nor more easie; nor was God more their friend, than yours. Here is very great justice: for that warre is just, that is necessary; and those armes are religious, when there is no hope left otherwhere, but in them. Here is an exceeding good disposition thereto: nor can there be, where there is a good disposition, a great difficulty, provided that use bee made of those orders, which I propounded for ayme and direction to you. Besides this, here we see extraordinary things without example effected by God; the sea was opened, a cloud guided the way, devotion powrd forth the waters, and it raind downe manna; all these things have concurrd in your greatnesse, the rest is left for you to doe. God will not doe every

thing

thing himselfe, that he may not take from us our free will, and part of that glory that belongs to us. Neither is it a marvell, if any of the aforenamd *Italians* have not been able to compasse that, which wee may hope your Illustrious family shall; though in so many revolutions of *Italy*, and so many feats of warr, it may seeme that the whole military vertue therein be quite extinguisht; for this arises from that the ancient orders thereof were not good; and there hath since been none that hath knowne how to invent new ones. Nothing can so much honour a man rising anew, as new lawes and new ordinances devisd by him: these things when they have a good foundation given them, and containe in them their due greatnesse, gaine him reverence and admiration; and in *Italy* their wants not the matter wherein to introduce any forme. Here is great vertue in the members, were it not wanting in the heads.

Consider in the single fights that have been, and duells, how much the *Italians* have excell'd in their strength, activity and adresse; but when they come to armies, they appeare not, and all proceeds from the weaknesse of the Chieftaines; for they that understand the managing of these matters, are not obeyd, and every one presumes to understand; hitherto there having not been any one so highly raisd either by fortune or vertue, as that others would submit unto him. From hence proceeds it, that in so long time, and in so many battles fought for these last past 20 yeers, when there hath been an army wholly *Italian*, it alwayes hath had evill successe; whereof the river *Tarus* first was witnesse, afterwards *Alexandria, Capua, Genua, Vayla, Bolonia, Mestri.* Your Illustrious family then being desirous to tread the footsteps of these Worthyes who redeemd their countryes, must above all things

as the very foundation of the whole fabrick, be furnisht with souldiers of your owne natives: because you cannot have more faithfull, true, nor better souldiers; and though every one of them be good, all together they will become better when they shall find themselves entertaind, commanded, and honourd by their owne Prince. Wherefore it is necessary to provide for those armes, whereby to be able with the *Italian* valour to make a defence against forreiners. And however the *Swisse* infantery and *Spanish* bee accounted terrible; yet is there defect in both of them, by which a third order might not only oppose them, but may bee confident to vanquish them: for the *Spanyards* are not able to indure the Horse, and the *Swisse* are to feare the Foot, when they incounter with them as resolute in the fight as they. Whereupon it hath been seene, and upon experience shall bee certaine, that

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the *Spaniards* are not able to beare up against the *French* Cavalery; and the *Swisses* have been routed by the *Spanish* Foot. And though touching this last, there hath not been any entire experience had, yet was there some proofe thereof given in the battell of *Ravenna*, when the *Spanish* Foot affronted the *Dutch* batallions, which keepe the same ranke the *Swisses* doe, where the *Spanyards* with their nimblenesse of body, and the help of their targets entred in under their Pikes, and there stood safe to offend them; the *Dutch* men having no remedy: and had it not been for the Cavalery that rush'd in upon them, they had quite defeated them. There may then (the defect of the one and the other of these two infanteries being discoverd) another kind of them bee anew ordaind, which may bee able to make resistance against the Horse, and not feare the Foot, which shall not be a new sort of armes,

but a change of orders. And these are some of those things which ordaind anew, gaine reputation and greatnesse to a new Prince. Therefore this occasion should not bee let passe, to the end that *Italy* after so long a time may see some one redeemer of hers appeare. Nor can I expresse with what dearnesse of affection hee would be receiv'd in all those countryes which have sufferd by those forrein scumms, with what thirst of revenge, with what resolution of fidelity, with what piety, with what teares. Would any gates bee shut against him? Any people deny him obedience? Any envy oppose him? Would not every *Italian* fully consent with him? This government of the *Barbarians* stinks in every ones nostrills. Let your Illustrious Family then undertake this worthy exployt with that courage and those hopes wherewith such just actions are to be attempted; to the end that

under your colours, this country may be ennobled, and under the protection of your Fortune that saying of *Petrarch* bee verifyd.

Vertu contr' al furore
Prendera l'arme, & fia il combatter corto:
Che l'antico valore
Ne gli Italici *cor non è anchor morto.*

Vertue 'gainst fury shall advance the fight,
And it i'th' combate soone shall put to flight:
For th'old *Romane* valour is not dead,
Nor in th' *Italians* brests extinguished.

FINIS.

under your colours, this country may be ennobled, and under the protection of your Fortune that saying of Petrarch bee verifyd.

Vertu contr' al furore
Prenderà l'arme, & fia il combatter corto:
Che l'antico valore
Ne gl' Italici cor non è ancor morto.

Vertue 'gainst fury shall advance the fight,
And it i'th' combate soone shall put to flight:
For th'old Romane valour is not dead,
Nor in th' Italians brests extinguished.

FINIS.

The life of *Castruccio Castracani* of *Lucca*, composed by *Nicholas Machiavelli*, and presented to *Zanobi Buondelmonti* and *Luigi Alomanni* his very good friends.

ZANOBI and LUIGI, my very good friends, it seemes a matter of great mervayle to those that take it into consideration, how that all they, or the greater part of them, who have effected great things in this World, and borne up their heads above others their contemporaries, have taken their rises and births from obscure and base beginnings; or such as have been by Fortune extraordinarily afflicted. For all of them have been either exposed to the mercy of savage creatures, or had such base Sires, that as asha-

med of them, they have feigned themselves sons to *Jupiter*, or some other Deity; who these have been, every one having knowledge of many of them, we shall omit to relate, as superfluous, yeelding rather distaste than delight to the Reader. I am indeed of opinion that it proceeds from thence, *viz.* in that Fortune willing to demonstrate unto the World, that she, and not Wisdome, gives men their greatnesse, therefore begins to shew her strength at such a time, when Wisdome can challenge no interest, but all rather is to bee attributed as due to her alone. *Castruccio Castracani* of *Lucca* was then one of those, who in regard of the times hee liv'd in, and the City where he was borne, effected very great matters, and had, as others in this kind, neither a very fortunate nor known birth, as in my further discourse of his life it shall appeare: which I thought fit to bring to memory, as having found therein a subject

of very great example, as well in regard of valour, as fortune. And I thought I might the better direct this discourse unto you two, who of all that I know most delight in such glorious atchievements. I say then, that the Family of the *Castracani* is reckoned among the noble Families of the City of *Lucca*, however that in these dayes it be much decayed, according to the course of all other worldly things. Of this there was one *Antony* borne, who took upon him religious orders, and was a *Canon* of S. *Michaels* at *Lucca*, and in honour thereof was entitled Master *Antony*. He had but one sister, who was married to *Buonaccorso Cennami*; but *Buonaccorso* being dead, & she remaining a widdow, betook her selfe to live with her brother, with intention not to marry any more. Master *Antony* had behind his house where he dwelt, a vineyard, whereinto by reason of divers gardens bordering thereupon on

severall sides, the passage was very ordinary. It happened that one morning a little after the Sunne rise, Dame *Dionora*, for so was Master *Antonies* sister cald, walking out into the vineyard, as she was gathering some herbs, after the manner of women, to make a sallet withall; shee heard some kind of russeling under a vine amongst the leaves, and casting her eye that way, she perceiv'd some little cry there: wherupon drawing neare to the noise, she discover'd the hands and face of an Infant, wrapt in the vine leaves, which seem'd as if it ask'd her assistance: so that she partly mervayling, partly frighted, full of pity and amazement, tooke it up in her armes; and having carried it home, and wash'd it, and swaddled it in cleane clouts, as they use children; at her returne presented it to Master *Antony*: who considering the accident, and seeing the child, was as much amaz'd and compassionate as was

his

his sister: and advising together what they should do in this case, resolved to bring it up, he being a Priest, and she not having any children. Having then taken a nurse into the house, they nourishd it with as much tendernesse as if it had bin their own child; & causing it to be baptiz'd, nam'd it *Castruccio*, after the name of their own father. *Castruccio* as he increased in years, so he grew in person & feature, and in every thing he shewd wit and discretion: and quickly, according to his age, he learnd whatsoever Master *Antony* taught him: who purposing to make him a Priest, and to turne over unto him his Canonicate, and his other Benefices, instructed him that way: but he found him not a subject fit for that regular life: For so soon as *Castruccio* came to 14 yeeres of age, and that hee began to grow a little masterfull towards Master *Antony* and Dame *Dianora*, so that he stood no longer in feare of them,

them, laying aside all Church books, he began to handle armes, and took not delight in any thing more than to mannage them, or with others his equals to run, leape, or wrastle, and such other like exercises: wherein he shew'd such courage and strength, that he far surpass'd all others of his age; and if any time he gave himselfe to reading, he took pleasure in nothing else than discourses of wars, and the actions of most famous men: for which cause Master *Antony* was much griev'd at heart. In the City of *Lucca* there happened to dwell a Gentleman of the Family of the *Guinigi*, cald Master *Francis*, who for fortunes, esteem, and valour, out-went all others the citizens of *Lucca*: who was always train'd up in bearing of armes, and who had a long time serv'd under the Viscounts of *Milan*: and because he was a *Gibelline*, he was accounted of above all that follow'd that faction in *Lucca*. This man being then in

Lucca,

Lucca, and assembling morning and evening, with the rest of the citizens under the Governours Palace, which is in the head of the place of S. *Michael*, being the prime place of *Lucca*; oftentimes saw *Castruccio* using of those exercises with other lads of the towne, wherein I formerly said he took delight; and perceiving that besides the mastering of them, he held over them a kind of Princely authority, and that they again lov'd and reverenc'd him, he became very desirous to know what he was: whereof being inform'd by some there present, hee became the more desirous to take him home to him; and calling him one day to him, ask'd him, where he had rather live, either in a Cavaliers house, when he might learne to ride and use his armes, or else in a Priests house, where nothing else were to be heard but their Offices and Masses? Master *Francis* perceiv'd how much *Castruccio* was cheer'd upon the

mention

mention of horses and armes; yet hee standing a little out of countenance, Mr. *Francis* again encouraging him to speak, he answerd, that if his Patron would therwith be content, hee could not have a greater pleasure, than to quit this calling of Priest, and betake himselfe to that of a Souldier. Master *Francis* was much satisfy'd with this reply: and in a short time so negociated in this matter, that Master *Antony* gave him up to his charge, whereunto hee was the rather mov'd by the lads inclination, judgeing thereby that he could not hold him much longer in his former course. *Castruccio* then being preferr'd from Master *Antony Castracani* the Priests house, to the Palace of Master *Francis Guinigi* the Commander; it was a marvaile to think in how short a time hee attain'd to those vertues and good qualities, which are requir'd in a compleate Cavaliere. First he became an excellent horseman: for he was able to manage

manage the roughest horse at ease, and, though but a youth, in jousts and tournaments hee was of prime remarque; so that in any action of strength or activity, none could exceed him. These perfections besides, were season'd with such manners, and good qualities, as that touching modesty, it was incredible how that either in word or deed he gave no distaste to any; to his superiours he yeelded reverence; he was modest with his equals, and pleasant with his inferiours; which gain'd him favour, not only in the whole Family of *Guinigi*, but also in the whole City of *Lucca*. It chanc'd in those times, *Castruccio* being now arriv'd to eighteen yeares of age, that the *Gibellins* were chasd by the *Guelfes* from *Pavia*, in favour of whom Master *Francis Guinigi* was sent for by the Viscounty of *Milan*, with whom went *Castruccio*, as hee on whose shoulders lay the charge of the whole troops: in which imployment

ment, *Castruccio* gave such proofs of his judgement and courage, that not one in this expedition gain'd so much esteeme as he, and his name became honourable, not only in *Pavia*, but throughout all *Lombardy*. *Castruccio* being then return'd to *Lucca* of far greater esteeme, than before his departure he was; fayl'd not (to his power) to gaine himselfe friends, practising meanes to win them. But Master *Francis Guinigi* now chancing to dye, and having left behind him a son nam'd *Paul* of 13 yeares of age; appointed *Castruccio* his Tutor, and the Governour of his estate; having first causd him to bee cald to him before his death, and intreated him, that he would take upon him the care to bring up his son, with that faithfulnesse he had found himselfe, and that what kindnesses he could not returne to the father, he would requite to the son. And now at length Master *Francis Guinigi* being dead, *Castruccio*

left

left Tutour and Governour to *Paul*, grew in such credit and power, that the favour hee was wont to find in *Lucca*, in some part was turn'd into envy, and he was calumniated by many, as who they doubted had some projects upon a tyranny. Among who the principall was M. *George Opizi*, head of the *Guelfes* faction. This man hoping by the death of Mr. *Francis*, to remaine without competitour in *Lucca*, thought that *Castruccio*, being left with that trust, by the grace and favour his discreet carriage gain'd him, had bereav'd him of all meanes, to attaine thereto; and hereupon sowed many seeds of scandall against him, whereby to choake his well-grown credit. Which at first *Castruccio* disdeign'd, but afterwards grew jealous of it: for he thought that Master *George* would never rest, till he had so far disgrac'd him with King *Robert* of *Naples* his Lievtenant, as to cause him to chase him out of

Lucca.

Lucca. At that time there was one *Uguccion* of *Faggiuolo* of *Arezo,* then Lord of *Pisa,* who by the *Pisans* was first chosen for their Commander, and afterwards made himselfe their Lord. Divers out-law'd *Lucchesi* of the *Gibellin* faction abode with *Uguccion*, whome *Castruccio* practis'd to restore againe with *Uguccions* aid; and this designe he communicated also with his friends at home, who could no way endure the *Opizies* autority. Having therefore given order, as was requisite, to this purpose, *Castruccio* fortify'd the tower of the *Honesti* and furnish'd it with municion and store of vittayls, whereby upon occasion he might be able to defend himselfe therein for some time; and the night being come, which was agreed of with *Uguccion*; hee gave the signe to him, who was gone down into the plaine with much people between the mountaines and *Lucca*; and having seene the signall,

signall hee came close to Saint *Peters* gate, and fir'd the antiport: *Castruccio* on the other side rais'd a great cry, calling the people to armes, and forced the gate on the other side within: so that *Uguccion* entring with his men, forced the towne, and slew Mr. *George* with all those of his Family, and many others his friends and partisans, and chas'd out the governour, and changd the State of the City, as *Uguccion* lik'd best, to the great dammage thereof; for it appeard then, that there were above a hundred families chas'd out of *Lucca*. Those that fled, part went to *Florence*, and part to *Pistoya*, which Cities were then governd by the *Guelfes* faction; and hereupon they became enemies to *Uguccion* and the *Lucchefes*. And upon this the *Florentines* and the rest of the *Guelfes* thinking the *Gibellines* faction growne too mighty in *Tuscany*, accorded together to restore againe these exild *Lucchefes*, and

and having levyed a huge army, they came to the vale of *Nievole*, and seizng upon Mount *Carmo*, from hence they went to incampe at Mount *Carlo*, whereby to have the passage open to *Lucca*. Whereupon *Ugnccio* having gatherd a good army of *Pisans* and *Luccheses*, besides many *Dutch* horse which hee drew out of *Lombardy*, went to find the *Florentines* campe: which perceiving the enimies approach, was removd from Mount *Carlo*, and settled between Mount *Catino* and *Pescia*; and *Uguccion* sate downe under Mount *Carlo* about some two miles off the enemy, where for some dayes between the Horse of the two Armyes there passd some slight skirmishes: for *Uguccion* being falne sick, the *Pisans* and *Luccheses* refusd to come to battell with the enemy. But *Uguccions* malady augmenting, hee retird to Mount *Carlo* for his recovery, and committed the charge

of

of the army to *Castruccio*, which was the *Guelfes* destruction: for thereupon they tooke courage; esteeming the enemies armies as left without a head: which *Castruccio* understood, and lay still some few dayes, the more to confirme this their opinion, making shew of feare, and not suffering any one to goe out of the trenches: and on the other side the *Guelfes* the more they saw this feare, the more insolent they became, and every day being orderd for fight, they presented themselves before *Castruccio's* army, who thinking hee had now enough, emboldned them, and having had full notice of what order they kept, resolved to come to the tryall of a day: and first with his speeches hee confirmd his souldiers courage, and shewd them the victory certaine, if they would follow his directions. *Castruccio* had seene how the enemy had plac'd all his strength in the body of the army, and the weaker

weaker sort in the wings there-
of: whereupon hee did the clean
contrary; for hee put his best
souldiers in his wings, and the
slightest people in the body: and
issuing out of his trenches with
this order, so soone as ever he
came within view of the enemy,
which insolently, as before they
had wont, came to find them
out, hee commanded that those
squadrons in the middle should
g oe on leisurely, but that the rest
should move with speed, inso-
much that when they came to
joyne battell with the enemy,
only the wings of each army
fought, and the troops in the
middle stood unimployd because
the middle part of *Castruccio's*
army had lagguerd so much be-
hind, that the enemyes body had
not yet reach'd to them: and thus
the ablest of *Castruccio's* army
came to fight with the weakest
of the enemies, and the enemies
strength lay idle, not able to en-
dammage those, they were to
en-

encounter with, nor could they ayd any of their owne party: so that without much difficulty, the enemies two winges were both put to flight, and they in the middle seeing themselves left naked on each flanke, without having whereupon to shew their valour, fled likewise. The rout and the slaughter were great: for there were slaine above ten thousand men, with many Officers, and great Cavallers of the *Guelfes* faction throughout all *Tuscany*, and many Princes, who came thither in favour of them: to wit, *Peter* King *Roberts* Brother, and *Charles* his nephew, and *Philip* Lord of *Taranto*: but of *Castruccio's* side they came not to above three hundred: among which *Francis Uguccions* sonne was slaine: who being young and overventurous, was kild at the first onset. This overthrow much augmented *Castruccio's* credit, so that *Uguccion* grew so jealous and suspitious of his owne State, that hee continually

ally busied his brains how to bring him to destruction, thinking with himselfe, that that victory had rather taken his power from him, than settled it: and being in this thought, while he awaited some faire colour to effect his designes, it happned that *Pieragnolo Michaeli* was slain in *Lucca*, a man of good worth and esteeme, and the *Assassin* fled into *Castruccio's* house, where the Captaines and Serjeants going to apprehend him, were affronted, and hindred by *Castruccio*, so that the murtherer by his ayd escapd, which thing *Uguccion*, who was then at *Pisa* hearing, and deeming then he had just occasion to punish him, calld unto his owne sonne *Neri*, to whom hee had now given the command of *Lucca* and charged him, that under colour of inviting *Castruccio*, hee should lay hold on him, and put him to death. Whereupon *Castruccio* going familiarly into the commanders pallace

pallaces, not fearing any injury, was first by *Neri* entertaind at supper, and afterwards seizd on. And *Neri* doubting, lest by putting him to death, without any publick justification, the people might bee inrag'd, kept him alive, till hee were better informd by *Uguccion* what was farther to be done in that case: who blaming his sonnes slownesse and cowardise, for the dispatching hereof went out of *Pisa* with four hundred Horse towards *Lucca*: & hardly yet was he arriv'd at the *Baths*, but the *Pisans* took armes, and slew *Uguccions* Lieutenant, and the rest of his family, that remaind at *Pisa*, and made *Count-Gaddo* of *Gerardesca* their Lord: *Uguccion* before he came to *Lucca*, had notice of this accident befalne in *Pisa*, yet thought he it not fit to turne back, lest the *Luccheses*, like as the *Pisans*, should also shut their gates against him. But the *Luccheses* understanding the chance at *Pisa*, notwithstanding

that *Uguccion* was enterd *Lucca*, taking this occasion to free *Castruccio*, first began at their meetings in the *Piazze* to speake slightly of him, afterwards to make some hub-bub, and from thence came to armes, demanding *Castruccio* to be set free; insomuch that *Uguccion* for feare of worse, drew him out of prison. Whereupon *Castruccio* suddenly rallying his friends, with the peoples favour made an assault upon *Uguccion* who finding no other remedy, fled thence with his friends, and so went into *Lombardy* to the Lords of *Scala*, where afterwards hee dy'd poorly. But *Castruccio* being of a prisoner become as Prince of *Lucca*, prevaild so by his friends, and with this fresh gale of the peoples favour, that hee was made Generall of their Forces for a yeare; which being compass'd, to gaine himselfe further credit in armes, hee purpos'd to recover for the *Lucchesers* severall townes which

rebelld after *Uguccions* departure, and went also by the *Pisans* favour, with whom he had enterd into league at the campe, to *Serezana*, and to winne that, he had built over it a fort, which, being afterwards changed by the *Florentines*, is now calld *Serezanello*, and in two monthes space tooke the towne, and afterwards in strength of this credit, hee wonne *Massa*, *Carrara*, and *Lavenza*, and in short time all *Lunigiana*: and to stop the passage that comes from *Lombardy* into *Lugimiana*, he tooke *Pontremoli*, and drew out thence Mr. *Anastasia Palivicini*, who was Lord thereof. Returning then to *Lucca* with this victory, hee was met by the whole people: whereupon *Castruccio* resolving not to deferre longer to make himselfe Prince, by meanes of *Pazzino* of *Poggio*, *Puccinello* of *Porcico*, *Francisco Boccansecchi*, and *Cecco Guinigi* at that time of great repute in *Lucca*, but

corrupted by him, made himselfe Lord thereof, and so solemnely and by resolution of the people was elected their Prince. At this time *Frederick* of *Baviere* King of the *Romans*, came into *Italy* to take the Imperiall crown, whom *Castruccio* made his friend, and went to him with five hundred Horse, having left for his Lieutenant at *Lucca Paulo Guinigi*, whom in remembrance of his father, hee made account of as his owne child. *Castruccio* was entertaind very honourably by *Frederick*, who gave him many priviledges, and made him his Deputy in *Tuscany*; and because the *Pisans* had expelld *Gaddo* of *Gerardesca*, and for feare of him askd succours of *Frederick*, hee made *Castruccio* their Lord, whom the *Pisans* accepted for feare of the *Guelfes* faction, and in particular because of the *Florentines*. *Frederick* then being returnd into *Germany*, and having left at *Rome* a governour for his af-

affaires in *Italy*, all the *Gibellins*, as well *Tuscans* as *Lombards* that follow'd the Imperial faction, had their recourse to *Castruccio*, and each promis'd him the Principality of their native country; provided that by his meanes they might bee restor'd: among whom was *Mattheo Guidi*, *Nardo Scolare*, *Lapo Uberti*, *Gerozzi Nardi* and *Piero Buonacorsi*, all *Gibellins*, and outlaw'd *Florentines*: and *Castruccio* plotting by helpe of these, and with his owne forces to become Lord of all *Tuscany*, to gaine himself credit the more, entred into amity with Mr. *Mattheo Visconti* Prince of *Milan*: and traind up all the men of his owne city and country to armes: and because *Lucca* had five gates, hee devided the country into five parts, armd them, and distributed them under Captaines and colours, so that on a sudden hee was able to bring together above twenty thousand men into the feild, besides the help hee might

 have

nave from *Pisa*. Hee then being environd with these forces and freinds, it fortun'd that Mr. *Matheo Visconti* was assayled by the *Guelfes* of *Piacuza*; who had driven out the *Gibellins*, in whose behalfe the *Florentines* and King *Robert* had sent their troopes. Whereupon Mr. *Mattheo* intreated *Castruccio* to assaile the *Florentines*, that they being constraind to defend their owne homes, should call back their men out of *Lombardy*. So *Castruccio* with a good army enterd the Vale *Arno*, tooke *Fucachio*, and St. *Miniato* with great dammage of the country; and upon this occasion the *Florentines* were forc'd to call back their troopes: who were hardly returnd into *Tuscany*, but *Castruccio* was compelld upon another necessity to haste back to *Lucca*: And in that City the Family of *Poggio* being of such power and authority as that it had made *Castruccio* not only great, but Prince also, and not

not taking themselves to have been requited as they had deserv'd, agreed with other Families of *Lucca* to move the city to rebellion and to chace *Castruccio* thence; whereupon taking occasion one morning they came armd upon the Deputy, whom *Castruccio* had there ordaind over Justice, and slew him, and further purposing to raise the people to commotion; *Steven* of *Poggio* an ancient and peaceable man, who had no hand at all in this conspiracy, came before them, constrain'd his friends by his autority amongst them, to lay aside their armes, offering himselfe to mediate with *Castruccio* for them, that he should satisfie their desires. Thus they layd down their armes, but not with greater discretion than they had taken them up; for *Castruccio* having had notice of these novelties befalne in *Lucca*, without making any delay, with part of his troops, leaving *Paul Guinigi* Commander of the residue, came

thence to *Lucca*, where having found the tumult appeas'd, beyond his expectation, deeming hee might with the more ease secure himselfe; dispos'd those of his party in severall places, as best was for his turne. *Steven* of *Poggio* thinking with himselfe, that *Castruccio* was beholding to him, went to him, and intreated, not for himselfe, because he thought it no way needfull for him, but for the others of his Family, praying that many things hee would pardon, in respect of their youth, and many things in regard of the ancient amity, and obligation hee had to the whole kindred. Wherunto *Castruccio* answered courteously, and bid him be of good cheere, and told him that hee received more content the tumult was appeased, than hee had had trouble that it was raysed, and perswaded *Steven* to cause them all to come to him, saying, that he thank'd God he had given him opportunity to make a shew of

his

his clemency, and bounty. They all then presenting themselves upon *Stevens* word and *Castruccios*, were together with *Steven* imprisond and put to death. In this meane while the *Florentines* had recoverd S. *Miniato*; whereupon *Castruccio* thought fit to stay that war: cōsidering that as yet he was not secure of *Lucca*, being t[illegible] as he could not safely part from home; and having causd the *Florentines* to be felt whether they would admit of a truce, he found them easily yeelding thereto; for they also were weary of the charge, and desirous to stop the expence. Whereupon they made a truce of two yeares, and that every one should keep what they had gotten. In the meane while *Castruccio* being freed from the war, that he might not againe incurre those dangers and hazards which formerly he had run, under divers colours and pretences, cut off all those in *Lucca*, who could have any ambition to aspire to the

Principality, and pardoned not one of them, depriving them of their Country and Fortunes, and those he could get in his clutches, of their lives: affirming that hee had found it by experience, that none of them would abide true; and for his better safegard, built a Fortresse in *Lucca*, and made use of the materialls of their Towres, whom he had banish'd and murdred. While *Castruccio* was thus quiet with the *Florentines*, and that hee strengthened himselfe in *Lucca*, he fail'd not to do all that he could, without entring into open hostility to increase his greatnesse: and having a great desire to take *Pistoja*, thinking with himselfe that by the possession of that City, he had gotten one foot into *Florence*, gain'd himselfe by divers wayes the whole mountaine to friend, and by the factions hee made in *Pistoja*, so behav'd himselfe, that every one rely'd much on him. At that time the City was divided

(as always it was) into the *Bianchi* and *Neri*; head of the *Bianchi* was *Bastiano* of *Possente*, and of the *Neri*, *James* of *Gia*: each of which held streight correspondence with *Castruccio*, and one desir'd to expell th'other, so that the one and the other after many suspicions came to blowes. *James* made himselfe strong at the gate towards *Florence*. *Bastiano* at that towards *Lucca*, and the one and th'other of them relying more upon *Castruccio*, than upon the *Florentines*, judging him more ready and quick of dispatch in any thing touching the warre, each of them sent to him secretly for ayd: which *Castruccio* promis'd to them both, letting *James* know that hee would come in person, and telling *Bastiano*, hee would send *Paul Guinigi* his Foster son: and appointing a set time, sent *Paul* by way of *Pescia*, and himselfe went straight on to *Pistoya*, so that about midnight, for thus was it agreed between

tween *Castruccio* and *Paul*, they both arrived at *Pistoya*, and there receiv'd as friends: being both entred, when *Castruccio* found his time, he gave the watchword to *Paul*, whereupon he slew *James* of *Gia*, and the other *Bastiana* of *Possente*; & all their partakers were partly taken, partly slaine, wherupon they forced *Pistoya* without resistance; & for the government of the towne, *Castruccio* constrained the people to yeeld him obedience, remitting to them many old debts and dutyes, and thus did he to the whole Country thereabouts; who all flock't together, partly to see the new Prince, so that every one fraught with hopes, or admiring his valour, set his heart at rest. It happened about this time, that the people of *Rome* mutinyed upon the extreame dearth of provision there, which was caused by the Popes absence, who was then at *Avignon* and they blamed the *Germane* government, insomuch that

that every day murders and other disorders were committed: which *Henry* the Emperours Deputy could no way remedy; whereupon he had a great suspicion that the *Romanes* would call in King *Robert* of *Naples*, and chace him *Rome*, and so restore it to the Pope: And having no nearer Allie, whom he could make recourse unto, than *Castruccio*, he sent to intreat him, that he would be pleasd, not only to send him aid, but to come himselfe also in person. *Castruccio* thought this voyage was no way to be put off, as well to render some service of merit to the Emperour, as because now the Emperour was absent from *Rome*, there was some necessity of it: leaving *Paul Guinigi* at *Lucca*, hee went thence with two hundred horse to *Rome*, where he was entertain'd by *Henry*, with very much honour; and his presence in a short time gave so much credit to the Imperials, that without blood or other vio-

violence, all things were well quieted: for *Castruccio* having caused a good quantity of corne to be brought by Sea out of the Country about *Pisa*, tooke away all occasion of offence. Afterwards, partly by admonishing, partly by chastising the chiefe Officers of *Rome*, he reduc'd them freely under *Henries* government; and *Castruccio* was created a *Romane* Senatour, besides many other honours he received of the people; and that Order hee tooke with very great pompe, putting on a gowne of cloth of tissue, with great letters before to this purpose: *This man is what it pleases God*, and againe behind, *And shall be what God will.* In this meane while the *Florentines*, who were displeased that *Castruccio* during the truce had made himselfe Lord of *Pistoja*, devis'd which way they might make it rebell, which by reason of his absence, they thought might easily be effected. Amongst the banish'd

nish'd *Pistoyeses*, who were then at *Florence*, there was *Baldo Cecchi*, and *James Baldini*, both men of authority, and ready for any hazard. These men held correspondence with some friends they had within; so that with the *Florentines* helpe, they entred by night into *Pistoya*, and chac'd thence *Castruccios* friends and officers, and some of them they slew, and restord the City her liberty, which news much displeasd *Castruccio*; so that having taken leave of *Henry*, he came with his men by great dayes journyes to *Lucca*. The *Florentines* when they had word of *Castruccios* returne, thinking hee would not take much rest, resolv'd to prevent him, and with their forces to enter first into the Vale of *Nievole*, before him: supposing, that if they first made themselves masters of that vally, they should cut of from him all meanes of possibility to recover *Pistoya*; and so having put in order a great army

of

of all the friends of the *Guelfes* faction, they came into the territory of *Pistoya*. On the other side, *Castruccio* came with his troops to mount *Carla*, and having learned where the *Florentines* army was, determined not to meet them in the plaine of *Pistoya*, nor to attend them in the plaine of *Pascia*, but if it might be, to encounter them in the straight of *Saravalla*; deeming that by bringing his designe to passe, hee should surely gaine the victory; for hee understood the *Florentines* had got together some forty thousand men, and he had made choyce of some twelve thousand out of all his, and however he was confident of his own industry, and their valour, yet doubted he, lest if he set on them in a large place, he might bee environ'd by the multitude of the enemies. *Saravalla* is a Castle between *Pescia* and *Pistoya*, plac't upon a hill, that shuts in the Valle of *Nievole*, not upon the very passage, but above

to

to that some two bow shots of the place, by which a man passes, is more straight than on the sudden; for of every side it rises gently, but in a straight manner, especially upon the hill, where the waters are divided; so that twenty men on the one side and the other would wholly possesse it. In this place *Castruccio* had a designe to encounter with the enemy, as well because his small troops should have the advantage, as not to discover the enemy, but just upon the skirmish, fearing lest his men seeing the number of the enemies, should be startled. Mr. *Manfredi* of the *German* nation, was then Lord of the Castle of *Seravalle*, who before that *Castruccio* was Lord of *Pistoya*, had been left in that Castle, as in a place that was neuter between the *Luccheses* & *Pistoyeses*: nor afterward befell it either of them to offend him, he promising to abide neuter, and not to apply himselfe to the one or other: So that for

this cause, and for that the situation was strong, he had kept himselfe thus: but upon this accident *Castruccio* became desirous to possesse this place. And having very neare acquaintance with one of the inhabitants of the place, he so appointed his businesse with him, that the night before the skirmish was to begin, he should take into the town 400 men of his, and slay the commander; and abiding thus prepared, he stirred not his army from Mount *Carlo*, the more to encourage the *Florentines* to passe, who, because they desired to carry the war far off from *Pistoya*, and to bring it into the Vale of *Nievole*, encamped under *Serravalle*, with intention the day following to passe the hill; but *Castruccio* having without any noyse taken the Castle in the night, parted from Mount *Carlo* about midnight, and quietly arrived in the morning at the foot of *Serravalle*, so that at the same instant both

both the *Florentines* and hee began to ascend the side of the hill. *Castruccio* had sent his infantery by the rode way, and a troope of 400 Horse hee had sent upon the left hand towards the Castle: on the other side the *Florentines* had sent 400 Horse before them, and after those their Foot mov'd, not any way thinking they should find *Castruccio* upon the top of the hill; for they knew nothing of that hee had made himselfe master of the Castle. Thus at unawares the *Florentine* Horse having got to the top of the hill, discoverd *Castruccio's* Foot, and were so near approachd them, that they had hardly time to lace on their helmets. These men then that were unprovided, being assaild by the others that were prepard, and in order, were fiercely set upon, and with much adoe made resistance, and indeed some few of them made head awhile: but so soon as the noyse hereof descended into the

Florentines

Florentines campe, all was full of confusion. The Horse were oppressd by the Foot, the Foot by the Horse, and their carriages; the Commanders because of the straightnesse of the place could neither advance nor retire: so that no man in this confusion knew what could or should bee done: insomuch that the Horse which were at blowes with the enemies Foot, were cut to peeces, and they not able to defend themselves, because the malignity of the scite did not suffer them, yet made they resistance more of necessity than of valour: for being hemm'd in by the mountaines on both sides, behind by their freinds, and before by their enemies, they had no way open for flight. Hereupon *Castruccio* having perceiv'd that his troops were not able to breake the enimy, sent a thousand Foot by way of the Castle, causing them to descend with the 400 Horse which hee had sent before, who struck them so rude-

ly

ly upon the flanke, that the *Florentines* unable longer to resist that violence, vanquisht rather by the place than by the enimy, all tooke them to flight; and the flight began from those who were behind towards *Pistoya*, who dispersing themselves all along the plaine, every one where hee best could, provided for his safegard. This defait was very great and bloody; many Commanders were taken, among which was *Bandino* of *Rossi*, *Francesco Brunnelleschi*, and *John* of *Tosa*, all noble *Florentines*, and many other *Tuscans*, besides divers of the Kingdome of *Naples*, who being sent by King *Robert* in favour of the *Guelfes* serv'd under the *Florentines*. The *Pistoyeses* hearing of this rout, without delay chasing out the faction of the *Guelfes*, yeelded themselves to *Castruccio*. Who not contented herewith, tooke *Prato*, and all the Castles of the plaine, as well on this as on the other side of

of *Arno*, and set himselfe downe with his army in the plaine of *Perettola* some two miles of from *Florence*, where hee abode many dayes to divide the spoyle, and to feast for joy of the victory gotten, causing moneys to be stampd in scorne of the *Florentines*, and races to be runne by horse, men, and queanes: neither faild hee to endeavour to corrupt some noble Citizens, to open to him in the night the gates of *Florence*; but the conspiracy being discoverd, they were taken and beheaded, among whom was *Thomas Lupacco*, and *Lambertuccio Frescobaldi*. Hereupon the *Florentines* being affrighted upon this defeat, hardly knew any remedy to preserve their liberty: and to the end they might bee sure of ayd, sent Ambassadours to *Robert* King of *Naples*, to give him the City, and the dominion thereof. Which that King accepted of, not somuch for the honour the *Florentines* had done him, as for that hee knew

knew well how much it imported his State that the *Guelfes* faction should maintaine the State of *Tuscany*: and having agreed with the *Florentines* to have of them two hundred thousand *Florins* by the yeare, hee sent *Charles* his sonne with foure thousand Horse to *Florence*: so that the *Florentines* were somewhat eas'd of *Castruccio's* troopes: for they were constraind to leave their territories and to goe to *Pisa*, there to represse a conspiracy made against him by *Benedicto Lanfranchi*, one the cheife of *Pisa*, who not being able to endure that his native country should be enthral'd to a *Lucchese*, conspird against him, plotting to seize upon the Cittadell, and to chace out the garrison, and to slay those of *Castruccio's* party. But because in such matters, if the small number be fit to keepe the secret, yet suffices it not to put it in execution: while hee went about to gaine more men to his purpose, some

some there was that bewrayd his plot to *Castruccio*: neither passd this discovery without the infamy of *Bonifacio Cerchi* and *John Guidi Florentines*, who were neare neighbours to *Pisa*; whereupon *Benedicto* being layd hand on, was put to death, and all the rest of that Family banisht, and many other Noble Citizens beheaded: and thinking with himselfe that *Pistoya* and *Pisa* were not very faithfull unto him, he tooke care both by his industry and forces to secure himselfe thereof: which gave leysure to the *Florentines* to recover their strength, and to be able to attend the returne of *Charles*: who being arriv'd, they determined to lose no longer time, and gatherd a great number of men; for they calld together to their ayd in a manner all the *Guelfes* in *Italy*, and made an exceeding great army of more than 30000 Foot, and 10000 Horse: and having advisd, which were first to bee assaild, either

either *Pistoja*, or *Pisa*, they resolv'd it were better to set first upon *Pisa*, being a thing more likely to succeed, by reason of the late conspiracy there, as also of more profit, deeming that if *Pisa* were once gotten, *Pistoja* would soone render of it selfe. The *Florentines* then going forth with this army in the beginning of May 1328, suddenly tooke *Lastra*, *Signia*, Mount *Lupo*, and *Empoli*, and came with their army to St. *Miniato*. *Castruccio* on the other part perceiving this great army, which the *Florentines* had brought against him, was nothing startled, but rather thought that this was the time, when Fortune was to give him in his hand the whole dominion of *Tuscany*: beleeving they should have no better successe in this of *Pisa*, than formerly they had in that of *Serravalle*; and that now they could not hope to repaire themselves againe, as then; whereupon assembling twenty thou-

sand Foot and 4000 Horse, hee brought his army to *Fucechio*, and sent *Paul Guinigi* with 5000 Foot to *Pisa*. *Fucechio* is seated in a stronger place than any other Castle, upon the territory of *Pisa*, because it is in the midst between the *Gusciana* and the *Arno*, and a little raisd from the plaine; where he abiding, the enemies were not able, unlesse they divided their army into two parts, to hinder his provision either from *Lucca*, or *Pisa*; neither could they but upon disadvantage either come upon him, or goe towards *Pisa*: for in one case they might be inclosd in the midst between *Castruccios* troopes, and those of *Pisa*; in the other case, having the *Arno* to passe, they could not doe it with the enemy on their backs, without very great danger. And *Castruccio* for their incouragement to undertake the passage had not placd himselfe with his troopes along the banke of *Arno*, but a little aside neare unto

unto the walls of *Fucechio*, and had left distance enough between the River and him. The *Florentines* having gotten St. *Miniato*, advisd whether were to be done, either to goe to *Pisa*, or to find out *Castruccio*; and having measured the difficulties of both courses, they resolvd to goe and invest him. The river *Arno* was so low that a man might wade over it, but yet not so, but that the infantery was wet to the shoulders, and the Horse even to the saddle. Upon the tenth day then of June in the morning, the *Florentines* in battell array, causd part of their Cavalery to begin to passe, and a body of ten thousand Foot. *Castruccio* who stood ready and intent to what hee had in his mind to doe, with a battalion of five thousand Foot and three thousand Horse fell upon them: neither gave hee them any time to get out of the water but that hee was at blowes with them; hee sent a thousand light

armd Foot up by the banke on that part under the *Arno*, and a thousand above it. The *Florentines* Foot were much distressed with the water and weight of their armes, nor had they all yet got over the channell of the river. When some of the Horse had passd, by reason that they had moord the bottome of the *Arno*, they made the passage the uneasier for them that came after them; for the bottome proving rotten and miry, some of the Horse came over and over on their riders, and many stuck so fast in the mud that they were there stabled: whereupon the *Florentine* Commanders seeing the difficulty to passe on that part, causd them to retire and make proofe of a higher part of the river, whereby to finde a sounder bottome, and the channell more favorable for their passage; against whom those whom *Castruccio* had sent under the banke, made resistance, who

slightly

slightly armd with targets and darts in their hands, with huge outcryes, wounded them both in the face and brest, insomuch that the horses affrighted both with the cryes and strokes, would in no wise passe forwards, but fell foule one upon another: the fight between *Castruccio's* men and those that were already past, was sharp and terrible, and of each side there fell many, and every one usd all his skill and strength to overcome his adversary. *Castruccio's* men would force them back into the river, the *Florentines* striv'd to put forwards to make place for others, that being come forth of the water, they might be able to stand to the fight, to which obstinacy there was added the Captaines encouragements. *Castruccio* put his men in mind, that these were the same enemies, which but a little while agoe they had beaten at *Sarravalle*. The *Florentines* reproachd theirs, that they being many, should suffer a few

few to overcome them. But *Castruccio* perceiving that the fight lasted, and that his owne and his adversaries were well wearied, and that on each side many were hurt and slaine, hee sent out another band of five thousand Foot, and when hee brought them up to the very back of his owne that fought, hee gave order that they before should open, and wheele about, one on the right hand, the other on the left, and so retire; which thing done gave roome to the *Florentines* to advance and gaine some ground. But when once they came to handy blowes, the fresh men with those that were tir'd, they staid not long ere they forc'd them back into the river, between the Horse of the one side, and the other, yet there was not much advantage: whereupon *Castruccio* knowing his owne inferiour, had given order to the leaders, that they should only maintaine fight, as hee that hop'd to overcome the

the Foot; which done, he might bee able with more ease to overcome the Horse; which fell out as hee purposd: for having seene the Foot forc'd back into the river, hee sent the rest of his infantery against the enemies Horse, who with lances and darts wounding them, and the Cavalery also pressing them with greater fury, put them to flight. The *Florentine* Commanders seeing the difficulty that their Horse had to passe; strove to make their Foot passe on that part beneath the river, to fight with the flanke of *Castruccio's* troops. But the channell being deep, and all above already possest by his men, all this prov'd vaine. Whereupon the whole army was put to rout, to *Castruccio's* great glory and honour, and of so great a multitude there escap'd not a third. Many Chieftaines were taken, and *Charles* sonne of King *Robert*, together with *Michaelangelo Falconi*, and *Taddeo* of the *Albizi*

Florentine Commissaries, fled thence to *Empoli*. The spoyle taken was great, the slaughter exceeding great, as a man may imagine in such and so great a conflict: for of the *Florentine* army 20231, and of *Castruccio's* part 1570 were left dead upon the place. But Fortune being enemy to his glory, when as she should have given him life, took it from him, and interrupted those designes which hee a long time before had purposd to put in effect: neither could any thing but death hinder him. *Castruccio* had toyld himselfe all that day in the battell, when at the end thereof all weary and sweaty, he stayd about the port of *Fucechio*, to attend the souldiers, as they should returne from the victory, and in person receive and thank them, and partly if peradventure any thing should arise from the enemyes, that they had made head in any place, hee might bee ready to give order thereto; judge-

ing it the office of a good Commander, to be the first to get a Horse-back, and the last to light off. Whereupon hee standing expos'd to a wind, which ordinarily about midday rises upon the *Arno*, and uses to be pestiferous, hee was all over chill'd. Which thing not being made account of by him, was the occasion of his death: for the night following hee was taken with a dangerous feaver, which continually augmenting, and the sicknesse being judg'd mortall by all the Physitians, and *Castruccio* perceiving of it, call'd *Paul Guinigi*, and spake to him these words. Had I beleev'd, my sonne, that Fortune would have cut off my course in the midst of the way, to arrive unto that glory, which I by my so many good successes had promis'd my selfe, I should have lesse wearied my selfe, and to thee as I should have left a smaller estate, so also fewer enemies, and lesse envy: for I would have been

content with the dominion of *Lucca* and *Pisa*, and never subdu'd the *Pistojeses*, nor with so many injuries provoked the *Florentines*; but by making the one and the other of these people my freinds, I should have led a life, though not longer, yet surely more quiet; and to thee should I have left an estate, though lesse, without doubt, more secure and firme: but Fortune, who will dispose of all humane affayres, gave mee not so much judgement, that I was able first to know it, or so much time, that I was able to overcome it. Thou hast heard, for many have told thee, and I never denyd it to thee, how I came into thy fathers house being yet a young lad, and voyd of all those hopes, which every generous spirit ought to conceive, and how I was by him brought up, and belov'd by him as much as if I had been of his own blood, whereupon under his government I became valourous, and grew

capable of that fortune, in which thou hast and dost see mee: and because at his death, hee committed thee and all his fortunes to my fidelity, I have brought thee up with that affection, and increasd them with that fidelity, that I was and am bound to. And because not only whether that alone which was left thee by thy father, but that also which my fortune and valour got, were thine, I never would marry, to the end that the love of children should never take mee off, from shewing in any part that thankfullnesse towards thy fathers blood, which I thought I was oblig'd to shew. I leave thee therefore a very faire State, whereat I am much pleasd: but for that I leave it thee weake and unsettled, I am exceedingly grieved: there remaines to thee the City of *Lucca*, which will never be content to live under thy government: *Pisa* is also thine: wherein there are men naturally incon-

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stant, and full of treachery: which, however it bee divers times accustomed to serve, yet will it alwayes disdaine to have a *Lucchese* for its Lord. *Pistoya* likewise is left to thee, very little faithfull to thee, because it is divided, and by fresh injuries provok'd against our Family. Thou hast the *Florentines* for thy neighbours, and those offended, and divers wayes injuryed by us, and not extinguisht, to whom the news of my death would be more welcome than the Conquest of all *Tuscany*. Thou canst not rely upon the Princes of *Milan*, nor upon the Emperour, because they are far hence, lazy, and very slow with their succours; wherefore thou oughtest not to hope in any thing, but in thy owne industry, and the remembrance of my valour, and in the reputation which this present victory gaines thee: which if thou shalt know with discretion how to make use of, will ayd thee to make an accord with

with the *Florentines*, who being affrighted at this present defeate, ought with desire to condiscend thereto: whom though I sought to make them mine enemies, and thought it would procure mee both power and glory, yet thou art by all meanes to seeke to gaine for thy friends; for their friendship will prove thy security and advantage. It is a thing of very much importance in this world for a man to understand his owne selfe, and to know how to measure the forces of his owne courage and State; and he that finds himselfe unfit for warr, should endeavour to settle his government by the rules of peace, whereunto thou shalt doe well if by my advice thou addresse thy selfe, and strive by this way to enjoy my paines, and dangers, which shall easily prove successefull to thee, when thou shalt account these my advertisements true: and herewithall thou shalt be doubly oblig'd to mee, first

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that I have left thee this State, and secondly that I have taught thee how to keepe it. Afterwards having causd those citizens to come to him, who of *Lucca*, *Pisa*, and *Pistoya*, serv'd in the warres under him, and recommended *Paul Guinigi* to them, and made them to sweare obedience to him, hee dyed; leaving to all those, that ever knew him, a happy remembrance of him; and to those that had been his friends, so great a desire of him, that never any Prince, that died at any time, left more. His funeralls were most honourably solemnizd, and hee was buried at St. *Francesco* in *Lucca*. But neither valour, nor fortune were so favourable to *Paul Guinigi*, as to *Castruccio*; for not long after, hee lost *Pistoya*, and after *Pisa*; and with much adoe held hee the government of *Lucca*: which continued in his Family till *Paul* the grand-child. *Castruccio* then was, by what is here shewed,

ed, a man of rare note, not only for those times he lived in, but for many ages that had past long before. He was of a stature higher than ordinary, and his limbs were well answerable each to other, and of such a grace hee was in his aspect, and entertain'd all men with that humanity, that hee never spake with any, that he sent from him discontent; his haire inclin'd to a reddish colour, and he wore it always cut above his eares; and always and in all seasons, whether it rain'd or snew, he went with his head uncover'd; hee was very pleasing to his friends, and terrible to his enemies; just among his subjects, treacherous with forreiners: nor where hee could vanquish by fraud did he ever strive to do it by force: for he said the victory, and not the manner how it was got, gain'd a man glory; no man enter'd more boldly into dangers, nor was more wary to get out of them: and he was wont to say,

that

that men ought to prove every thing, but to be astonish'd at nothing, and that God favours valiant men, who alwayes chastises the feeble with the mighty. Hee was also very admirable in replying or biting sharply or gentilely; and as in this kind hee spared not any, so likewise he was nothing mov'd, when himselfe was not spar'd: So that we have many things he said wittily, and heard patiently, as these: Having caus'd a duckat to bee given for a starling, and a friend of his reproving him for it, said *Castruccio*, thou wouldst not have given above a peny for it; and his friend saying it was true, he reply'd, a duckat is lesse to mee. Having a flatterer about him, and in scorne having spat upon him, the flatterer said, that Fishermen to take a little Fish suffer themselves to be all moyl'd in the Sea; I will let my selfe be daub'd by a little spettle, to catch a Whale: which *Castruccio* not only heard patiently,

ly, but rewarded. When one told him, that he livd too sumptuously; said *Castruccio*, if this were a vice, there would not bee so splendide entertainments at the Saints Feasts. Passing through a street, and seeing a young man comming out of a whore-house all blushing, because he had been seen by him; he said to him, be not asham'd when thou goest out, but when thou enterst in. A friend of his giving him a knot to loose, that was curiously tyed, said, O foole, dost thou think I will loosen such a thing, which being tyed gives me so much trouble? *Castruccio* saying to one that profest himselfe a Philosopher, you are of the condition of dogs, that always go about those who can best give them meat; no says the party, we are like Physitians, who visit their houses that have most need of them. Going from *Pisa* to *Ligorne* by water, and a dangerous storme there arising, and thereupon being much perplex'd, was

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reprehended by one of his company as pusillanimous, saying himselfe was not afraid of any thing; to whom *Castruccio* reply'd, that he nothing marvayl'd thereat, for every one valu'd his life, according to its worth. Being ask'd by one, what he should do to gaine a good esteeme? answered him; see when thou goest to a Feast, that a blocke sit not upon a blocke. When one boasted that hee had read many things; said *Castruccio*, it were better thou couldst brag thou hadst remembred much. Another bragging though he had tippled much, he was not drunk; reply'd, an Oxe does the same. *Castruccio* kept a young lasse, which he lay with ordinarily, and thereupon being reprov'd by a friend, telling him, that it was a great wrong to him that he had suffer'd himselfe to bee so taken by a Wench; thou art mistaken, quoth *Castruccio*, I took her, not she me. Also when one blam'd him that he was too deli-

lici-

licious in his dyet; hee said to him, I warrant thou wouldst not spend herein so much as I doe; that is true quoth the other; then reply'd he, thou art more covetous, than I am gluttonous. Being invited to supper by *Tadeo Bernardi* a *Lucchese*, a rich and magnificent citizen; and in the house *Tadeo* shewing him a chamber all furnish'd with cloth of gold, and that it was all pav'd with curious stones, which were diversly wrought with sundry colours, and represented flowers, leaves, and such like green things: *Castruccio* having got together a great deale of spettle in his mouth, spat it full in *Tadeos* face; at which he shewing himselfe much troubled, says *Castruccio*, I knew not where to spet that I might offend thee lesse. Being ask'd how *Cæsar* dy'd? saith he, would to God I might dye like him. Being one night in a house of one of his Gentlemen, where there were divers Ladyes invited to a feast, and

and hee dancing, and sporting with them, more than befitted his condition, was reprovd by a friend, answered, he that is held a wise man in the day time, will never be thought a foole in the night. One comming to aske a favour at his hands, and *Castruccio* seeming as if he heard not, fell down upon his knees before him, whereat *Castruccio* chiding him, he answered, thou art the cause thereof, who carryest thine ears in thy feet: and thereby he gaind double the favour he asked. He used to say, that the way to Hell was easie, because men went thither downwards, and blindfold. When one askd him a favour with many and superfluous words, *Castruccio* said to him, hereafter when thou wouldst any thing with me, send another. Such another man having wearied him with a tedious speech, and telling him in the latter end, perhaps I may have tir'd you with my long speaking; no, thou

hast

hast not, said he, for I heard not one word of all that thou hast spoken. He was wont to say of one, who had been a handsome boy, and afterwards became a comely man, that he was too injurious, having first distracted the husbands from their wives, and afterwards the wives from their husbands. To an envious man that laughd, he said, laughst thou because thou art well, or because another suffers evill? When he was also under the rule of Master *Francis Guinigi*, one of his playfellows, saying to him, what wilt thou that I shall give thee, for a blow on the mouth? *Castruccio* answered him, a Helmet. Having causd a citizen of *Lucca* to dye, who had helpd him in his rising to his greatnesse, when it was said to him, he had ill done to put to death one of his old friends; he reply'd, you are deceivd, I have put to death a new enemy. *Castruccio* commended much those that betrothd wives, but never mar-

married them, like men that say they will go to Sea, but never do. He said he wondred much at men, that when they bought any vessell of earth or glasse, they sound it first whether it be good; but in taking a wife they are content only to see her. When hee was neare death, one asking him, how he would be buried? he answered, with my face downwards: for I know, that as soon as I am dead, this Country shall go upside down. Being asked, whether he never thought to become a Fryer to save his Soule? he said no, for it was strange to him, that *Lazarus* should go to Paradise, and *Uguccion* of *Faggivola* to Hell. Being asked, when it was best to eate, to preserve the health? he answered, if a man be rich, when hee is hungry; if hee be poore, when he may. Seeing a gentleman a friend of his, that made his servant trusse his points, hee said, I hope one day too thou wilt make him feed thee. Seeing that

that one had written upon his house in Latine, God keep the wicked hence; said, the master then must not enter here. Passing by a way where there was a little house with a great gate, he said, this house will run out of doores. Treating with an Ambassadour of the King of *Naples* touching some goods of the borderers, whereat he was somewhat angry, when the Ambassadour said, feare you not the King then? *Castruccio* said, is this your King good or bad? and he answering that he was good, *Castruccio* reply'd, wherefore then should I be afraid of those that are good? We might relate many others of his sayings, wherein he shewd both acutenesse of wit, and gravity; but these shall suffice in testimony of his worthy qualities. He liv'd forty foure yeares, and behavd himselfe like a Prince in all his fortunes: and as of his good fortunes there are enough monuments left, so likewise would

would he there should be seene some of his evill fortunes; for the manacles wherewith hee was chain'd in prison, are yet to bee seene fastned in the tower of his dwelling house, where they were put by him, that they might beare witnesse of his adversity. And because hee was no way inferiour to *Philip* of *Macedon*, *Alexanders* father; nor to *Scipio* of *Rome*: hee dy'd in the same age they two did; and doubtlesse hee would have exceeded the one and the other, if in exchange of *Lucca* hee had had *Macedon*, or *Rome* for his Countrey.

FINIS.

A Relation of the course taken by Duke *Valentine*, in the murdering of *Vitellozzo Vitelli*, *Oliverotto* of Fermo, *Paul*, and the Duke of *Gravina*, all of them of the Family of the *Orisini*; compos'd by *Nicholas Machiavelli.*

Duke *Valentine* was return'd from *Lombardy*, whither hee had gone to excuse himselfe to King *Lewys* of *France*, touching those many calumnies, which the *Florentines* charg'd him with, for the rebellion of *Arezo*, and the other Townes of the Vale of *Chiana*, and was thence come to *Imola*; where he plotted his enterprise against *John Bentivogli* tyrant of *Bolonia*: for

hehad a mind to reduce that City into his subjection, and make it head of his Duchy of *Romania*: which thing being knowne to the *Vitelli* and *Orsini*, and their other complices, they thought the Duke would grow too powerfull, and that it was to be feard, lest that taking *Bolonia*, hee should seeke their utter ruine; that hee might remaine the only Champion of *Italy*: and hereupon they made a diete at the *Magione*, in the territories of *Perusia*: where there met Cardinall *Paulo*, and the Duke of *Gravina* of the Family of the *Orsini*, *Vitellozzo Vitelli*, *Oliverotto* of *Fermo*, *John Paulo Baglioni* tyrant of *Perusia*, and Master *Antonio* of *Venafro*, sent by *Pandulfo Petrucci* head of *Siena*: where it was argued amongst them touching the Dukes greatnesse, and touching what his further intentions were: and that it was necessary to bridle his appetite: otherwise they ran hazard together with others, all to

go to ruine: and they determined not to abandon the *Bentivolti*, and to seek to gaine the *Florentines*; to one and the other of which places they dispatcht men, promising ayd to the one; and incouraging the other to unite with them, against the common enemy. This diete was suddenly known throughout all *Italy*, and those people that under the Dukes government were discontented; among whom were the *Urbinates*, began to hope they might be able to innovate some things; from whence it proceeded, that their minds being thus held in suspence by some of *Urbino*, it was plotted to take the Rocke of *Leo*, which held for the Duke, and these took occasion from hence. The Governour fortify'd the Castle; and causing timber to be carried thither: they of the conspiracy contriv'd that some great peeces of timber, which they were drawing into the Castle, should bee brought upon the bridge, to the

end that being thus cloggd, it could not bee lift up by them within: which occasion being taken, they leapd upon the bridge, and thence into the Rocke, by which surprisall, so soon as it was understood, all that State rebelld, and calld home againe their old Duke. Hope now being layd hold on, not so much by the taking of the Rock, as for the diet held at the *Magione*, by meanes whereof they thought to be assisted: who having heard the rebellion of *Urbin*, imagind it not fit to lose the occasion: and getting their men together, they put forward, intending if there were any towne of all that State remaining in the Dukes hands, to assaile it: and they sent a fresh againe to *Florence* to sollicite that Common-wealth to joyne with them in extinguishing this common calamity: shewing the party already gained, and such an occasion offered as the like was not to be expected.

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But the *Florentines* for the hate they bare to the *Vitelli* and the *Orsini* upon divers occasions, not only cleav'd not to them, but sent *Nicholas Machiavelli* their Secretary, to offer receipt to the Duke, and ayd against these his new enimyes, who was then in *Imola* full of feare: because of a sudden, and beyond his opinion, his souldiers being become his enemyes, hee unarmd met with a warre at hand: but having taken heart upon the *Florentines* profers, hee purposd to temporise, and hold off the warre with those few people which hee had, and with treaties of agreement, and partly to prepare aydes, which hee provided two wayes, by sending to the King of *France* for men, and partly by taking into his pay all men at armes, and what others else made profession to serve a Horse-back, and to all he gave money. Notwithstanding all this the enemyes advanc'd, and thence came towards

wards *Fossombrone*; where some of the Dukes troops had made head: which by the *Vitelli* and *Orsini* were broken: which thing causd the Duke to turne himselfe wholly to see if hee with treaties of accord could stop this humour: and being an exceeding great dissembler, hee faild not of any meanes to give them to understand who had taken armes against him, that what hee had gotten hee was willing should be theirs: and that it suffic'd him to enjoy the title of Prince, but hee was content the Principality should bee theirs: and so effectually perswaded hee them, that they sent *Paul* to the Duke to treate of peace, and so stayd their armes: but now the Duke stayd not his preparations, and with a great deale of care increasd both his Horse and Foot, and to the end these provisions should not appeare, hee went and scattered all his souldiers in severall places throughout *Romania*. In this

while also came there to him five hundred *French* lances: and howeuer hee was now so strong, that with open force hee was able to right himselfe upon his enemies; yet thought hee it the more safe and profitable way to beguile them, and for all this not to stop the treaty for peace: and this matter was so farre labourd in, that hee made a peace with them, and assurd to them their old pays; gave them foure thousand duckets in hand; promisd not to molest the *Bentivolii*, and made alliance with *John*, and moreover that hee could not constraine any of them to come in person to him, more than hee thought good himselfe. On the other side they promisd to restore unto him the Dutchy of *Urbin*, and all the other places taken by them, and to serve him in any expedition hee should undertake, nor without his permission to warre with any one, or take pay of any one. This accord being made,

Guidubaldo Duke of *Urbin* fled againe to *Venice*, having first causd all the fortresses of that State to bee demolishd: for relying upon the people, hee would not that those forts, which hee thought hee could not defend, should fal into the enemies hands, whereby to bridle his friends. But Duke *Valentine* having made this agreement, and devided all his troops throughout all *Romania*, with the *French* men at armes, at the end of November departed from *Imola*, and thence went to *Cesena*, where hee abode many dayes to contrive with those that were sent by the *Vitelli* and the *Orsini*, who were ready then with their forces in the Dutchy of *Urbin*, what action they should then anew enter in, but not concluding any thing, *Oliverotto* of *Fermo* was sent to offer him that if hee would adventure an expedition against *Tuscany*, they were at his service: in case hee would not, they would be ready

to serve him against *Sinigallia*; to whom the Duke answerd, that in *Tuscany* hee would not make any warre, because the *Florentines* were his friends: but hee was well content they should goe to *Sinigallia*: whence it came to passe that not long after, advice was brought, that the towne was yeelded to them, but the Fort would not: for the Governour would render it to the Duke in person, and to none else; and thereupon they perswaded him to come before it. The Duke thought this occasion very good, and that it would not any way skarre them, being hee was calld by them, and not going of himselfe: and the more to secure them, hee dismisd all his *French* forces, which returnd thence into *Lombardy*, save only a hundred lances of Monsieur *Candales* his kinsman, and parting about the middle of December from *Cesena*, hee went thence to *Fano*; wherewithall his wiles and craft hee

could, he perswaded the *Vitelli* and the *Orsini*, to expect him at *Sinigallia*; shewing them that such strangenesse would make their accord to be neither faithfull nor durable; and that hee was a man, that desird hee might availe himselfe both of the forces and advice of his friends: and however *Vitellozzo* was very unwilling, and that his brothers death had taught him, that hee should not offend a Prince, and afterwards trust him; neverthelesse, being wrought to it by *Paulo Orsino* who had been corrupted by the Duke with gifts and faire promises, hee agreed to attend him: whereupon the Duke before the 30 day of December, 1502, that hee was to goe from *Fano*, communicated his purpose to eight of his cheife confidents, among whom were *Don Michael*, and the Lord of *Enna*, who was afterwards Cardinall: and gave them charge, that presently assoone as *Vitellozzo*, *Paulo*

lo Orsino, the Duke of *Gravina*, and *Oliverotto* had met them, each two of them should get one of them between them: consigning each one by name to certaine two, who should traine them along even into *Sinigallia*, nor suffer them to part, till they had brought them to the Dukes lodging, and that they were there taken. Hee afterwards tooke order that all his Horse and Foot, which were better than two thousand Horse, and ten thousand Foot, should bee in the morning at breake of day upon the *Metauro*, a River some five miles from *Fano*, where they should attend him: being then the last day of December, upon the *Metauro* with those troops, he caus'd some two hundred Horse to go before him, afterwards the Foot mov'd, and after them himselfe in person, with the rest of his men at armes. *Fano* and *Sinigallia* are two Cities of the Marches, scituate upon the bank of the *Adriatick*

driaticke Sea fifteen miles distant the one from the other: So that he who goes towards *Sinigallia*, hath the Mountaines on his right hand, the feet whereof sometimes are so bounded by the Sea, that between them and the water there remaines but a very small distance, and where they are most extended, there is not above two miles distance. The City of *Sinigallia* from the foot of these Mountaines, is not much further than a bow-shot, and from the Sea not above a mile distant: along the side hereof runs a little river, which washeth that part of the wals, which is towards *Fano*, looking towards the high way, so that till it come neare unto *Sinigallia*, it runs for a good part of the way along the Mountaines: and being come neare up to the river that passes alongst by *Sinigallia*, it turnes upon the left hand alongst the banke thereof: So that running on for the space of a bow-shot, it reaches to a bridge,

bridge, which passes that river, and stands in front with the gate, that enters into *Sinigallia*; not by a right line, but athwart: before the gate there is a bourg of houses, with a broad place before them, which the bank of the river shoulders upon one side. So that the *Vitelli* & *Orsini* having given order to attend the Duke, and personally to honour him, the better to give way to his men, they retir'd their own into certaine Castles, some six miles from *Sinigallia*, and had left only *Oliverotto* in *Sinigallia*, with his band, which was some thousand Foot, and a hundred and fifty Horse, which were lodg'd in the bourg beforenam'd. Things being thus orderd, Duke *Valentine* came thence towards *Sinigallia*, and when the first head of the Horse troops came up to the bridge, they pass'd it not, but making stand, they turnd their horse, the one part towards the river, th'other to the open field, and so left a way in

in the midst, whereby the infan-
tery pass'd, which without stop
enter'd the Towne. *Vitellozzo*,
Paulo, and the Duke of *Gravina*
upon their mules, accompanied
with a few Horse, went to meet
the Duke; and *Vitellozzo* disarm'd
having a cloake all lin'd with
green, being exceeding melan-
choly, as if presaging his own
death neare at hand, caus'd a cer-
taine admiration of himselfe in
all, the valour of this man being
well knowne, and the fortune he
had pass'd: and it is said, that
when he left his souldiers to come
to *Sinigallia*, there to meet the
Duke, that hee did in a manner
take his last leave of them; to his
Captaines he recommended his
house, and the welfare thereof,
and admonish'd his Nephews,
that they should not so much
mind the great fortunes of their
Family, as the valour of their An-
cestors. These three then being
come up to the Duke, and done
their obeissance, were receiv'd by
him

him with a cheerfull countenance, and presently by those, who had charge to looke to them, taken between them. But when the Duke saw that *Oliverotto* was wanting, who had stay'd with his men at *Sinigallia*, and attended before at the broad place by his lodging, above the river, to keep them in order, and exercise them: he wink'd upon Don *Michael*, to whom the care of *Oliverotto* was committed, that hee should take such order, that *Oliverotto* should not escape him. Whereupon Don *Michael* rode before, and being come to *Oliverotto*, told him, that now it was not a time to hold his men together out of their lodgings; because then they would be taken from them by the Dukes Souldiers: and therefore perswaded him to send them to their lodgings, and go with him to meet the Duke: which when *Oliverotto* had done, the Duke came, and having seen him, calld him;

to

to whom *Oliverotto* having made reverence, he joyn'd in troope with the rest, and entred into *Sinigallia*, where all dismounting at the Dukes lodging, and entred with him into a private chamber, they were held prisoners to the Duke, who presently got a horseback, and commanded that *Oliverotto* and the *Orsinies* Souldiers should be all rifled. *Oliverotto's* were all pillag'd, by reason they were neare at hand; those that belong'd to the *Orsini* and *Vitelli*, being more remote, having before heard of the ruine of their Masters, had time to get together; where calling to mind the valour and discipline of the Families of the *Orsini* and *Vitelli*, joyntly all in one body, in despight of the country and their enemies power, they sav'd themselves. But the Dukes Souldiers not satisfy'd with the pillage of *Oliverotto's* Souldiers, began to sacke *Sinigallia*. And had not the Duke by the death of many, stopd their insolence,

solence, they would utterly have sackt it. But night being come, & all stirres quiet, the Duke thought fit to put *Vitellozzo* and *Oliverotto* to death, and having brought them together, causd them to be strangled. Where neither of them spake any thing worthy of their life past: For *Vitellozzo* prayd, that supplication should be made to the Pope, to grant him a plenary Indulgence of all his sinnes; *Oliverotto* much lamenting himselfe, cast all the fault of the injuries against the Duke on *Vitellozzo's* back. *Paul*, and the Duke of *Gravina* were kept alive, till the Duke had word, that at *Rome* the Pope had laid hold on the Cardinall *Orsino*, the Arch-bishop of *Florence*, and Master *James* of the Holy Crosse. After which news upon the 18 of *January*, at the Castle of *Pieve*, they also were strangled in the like manner.

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